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Management review
In 2013, the Finnish nuclear power plants operated safely and caused no danger to the 
plant environment or employees. The collective radiation doses of employees were the 
lowest ever during the history of the plants, and radioactive releases into the environment 
were extremely low. The low employee radiation doses were the result of short annual 
outages and radiation safety improvements implemented by the plants. Radioactive waste 
generated in the operational processes of the nuclear power plants accumulated as antici-
pated. Its processing and final disposal in underground facilities took place in a controlled 
manner.
The number of events to be reported to STUK by the Loviisa power plant has increased 
over the past few years. The licensee launched a study due to the events in 2012. A report 
on the results of this study was submitted to the management of the power plant and to 
STUK in 2013. STUK will follow progress of the detailed measures specified based on the 
recommendations at the Loviisa power plant and assess adequacy of the measures. STUK 
has also monitored the development of management system processes and a procurement 
development project that was launched in 2013 at the Loviisa power plant. The licensee 
has reformed its procurement organisation and procurement procedures based on the de-
velopment project.
STUK did not make any significant observations in its inspections and reviews of the 
operating Olkiluoto nuclear power plant units in 2013. Over the course of the year, STUK 
focused its regulatory oversight on the plant’s management, modification and procurement 
processes, and the handling of non-conformances. STUK has also overseen TVO’s plans 
linked to the commissioning of Olkiluoto 3. According to these plans, the management sys-
tem and organisation of the Olkiluoto 3 project will be merged with the management sys-
tem of Olkiluoto 1 and Olkiluoto 2. The licensee has several ongoing development projects 
related e.g. to process based management system and modification process.
At both Olkiluoto and Loviisa, modifications required for improving safety continued 
regarding plant systems, structures and components as well as operating procedures. 
Modifications to, for instance, replace the emergency diesel generators was started at 
Olkiluoto to improve the reliability of power supply in exceptional situations. An expansion 
project of the spent fuel storage facility proceeded as planned in 2013. Preparations for the 
commissioning of the storage facility are ongoing. According to the licensee, implementa-
tion of the second phase of the I&C renewal in Loviisa has been postponed to 2016. Based 
on lessons learned from the Fukushima accident, both nuclear power plants have prepared 
action plans to improve safety. Most of the improvements will be implemented in 2014 and 
2015. In 2013, improvements on the capacity of the battery banks in redundant electricity 
systems were made at Loviisa, and cooling towers to secure residual heat removal from the 
reactor and fuel pools were being constructed.
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Most of the detailed design of the Olkiluoto 3 plant unit has been approved by STUK, and 
the volumes of construction work and component manufacture have decreased. The focus 
of STUK’s oversight has therefore transferred to the onsite installation and commissioning 
of components at Olkiluoto. The most important open point of plant design is the plant’s 
I&C systems. In its review of the I&C architecture design documentation, STUK has paid 
attention to the independence of I&C systems in particular. The review will continue in 
early 2014. STUK has also requested an assessment of the safety impact of a potential I&C 
failure and taking into account the assessment results in design. In 2013, STUK ordered a 
study on the status of the safety culture at the Olkiluoto 3 construction site. Based on the 
study results, one can state that the safety culture of the Olkiluoto 3 project has improved 
over the past few years. The study recommended that TVO and the plant suppliers should 
try to reach a consensus about the concept of safety culture and continue supporting the 
work of the safety coordinators.
As part of the continuous improvement of safety and preparation for new nuclear power 
plant projects, STUK continued the revision of its own YVL Guides and also participated 
in the preparatory work for amending the Finnish Nuclear Energy Act. Two amendments 
of the Nuclear Energy Act and one amendment of the Nuclear Energy Decree were imple-
mented in 2013. Furthermore, new Government Decrees on the safety of nuclear power 
plants and emergency preparedness at nuclear power plants entered into force in October 
2013. A comprehensive reform of the YVL Guides that took several years was effectively 
completed in November 2013. The reform aimed at making the YVL Guides clearer and 
more user-friendly as well as updating their technical requirements. The structure of the 
YVL Guides as a whole and the internal structure of single YVL Guides were reformed. 
The reform means replacing the more than 70 old YVL Guides with 44 new YVL Guides. 
Forty of these were simultaneously published. There are almost complete drafts for the 
remaining four new YVL Guides, but most of them cannot be published until amendments 
have been made in the Finnish legislation. Thus, seven of the old YVL Guides are still 
valid. The new YVL Guides are applied as such to new nuclear power plants. In the case of 
plants under construction and operating plants, the YVL Guides come into force by means 
of a separate implementation decision.
The processing and storage of nuclear waste and spent nuclear fuel, as well as the nuclear 
fuel repository project, proceeded in a safe manner, and no problems were detected at the 
Loviisa or Olkiluoto power plants. Due to successful planning of operations, the plants 
accumulated clearly less nuclear waste than nuclear power plants on average. At Loviisa, 
STUK supervised the commissioning of a liquid waste solidification facility. The facility’s 
systems operated as planned in connection with the solidification test runs, but some dam-
age was detected in solidification tanks manufactured from reinforced concrete and the test 
runs were disconnected to study the underlying cause of the damage. STUK will assess the 
related reports once they are complete.
Posiva Oy (Posiva) continued its operations that aim at the final disposal of spent nuclear 
fuel. At the end of 2012, Posiva submitted to the Government a construction license ap-
plication for the encapsulation facility and repository, and delivered to STUK the safety 
documentation required by the Finnish Nuclear Energy Decree. Documentation on the 
safety case on the long-term safety of the repository was submitted to STUK separately 
from the rest of the documentation. The fact that some of the application documentation 
was submitted to STUK late and the fact that supplements to some documents have been 
required have postponed the review process, but it is expected to be completed by the end 
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of 2014. Processing of the documentation was started at STUK with a coverage review that 
verified the sufficiency and appropriateness of the submitted information. STUK decided 
to start the further processing of the documents. Supplements to some documents are still 
needed. In a more detailed review, STUK observed several issues for which further infor-
mation is needed. STUK used a team of Finnish and international experts from a variety 
of technical sectors as an aid in its review. In addition to reviewing the documents, STUK 
conducted reviews of Posiva’s management system and organisation. STUK stated after the 
reviews that Posiva’s personnel resources are still incomplete and Posiva does not, based 
on the review results, have the required readiness to supervise and control detailed design 
and implementation of a nuclear facility. STUK will continue assessment of the personnel 
resources of Posiva’s plant project in 2014.
Most of the construction activities of an underground research facility were completed in 
2012. In 2013, Posiva excavated facilities to be used to test the final disposal method and 
divide the repository into smaller areas, as well as the last of the shafts and tunnels, and 
completed structural engineering works. STUK supervised the construction of the under-
ground research facility, the operations of Posiva’s organisation and the research carried 
out at Onkalo.
The implementation of nuclear safeguards functioned without problems in Finland, and 
no cause for remarks was found in the inspections carried out by STUK, IAEA and the 
European Commission. In 2013, Posiva drafted the first basic technical characteristics 
documents for the encapsulation facility and repository required by the Commission 
Regulation and submitted them to the European Commission. STUK, the Commission 
and IAEA verified during an inspection that Onkalo has been constructed as stated in the 
report. The basic technical characteristics of Olkiluoto 3 were also verified by an inspection. 
Development of the nuclear safeguards of spent nuclear fuel continued in cooperation with 
the European Commission and IAEA.
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Introduction
This report constitutes the report on regulatory control in the field of nuclear energy which 
the Radiation and Nuclear Safety Authority (STUK) is required to submit once a year 
to the Ministry of Employment and the Economy pursuant to section 121 of the Nuclear 
Energy Decree. The report is also delivered to the Ministry of Environment, the Finnish 
Environment Institute and the regional environmental authorities of the localities in which 
a nuclear facility is located.
The regulatory control of nuclear safety in 2013 included the engineering, construction and 
operation of nuclear facilities, as well as nuclear waste management and nuclear materi-
als. The control of nuclear facilities and nuclear waste management, as well as nuclear 
non-proliferation, concern two STUK departments: nuclear reactor regulation and nuclear 
waste and material regulation.
The first parts of the report explain the fundamentals of nuclear safety regulation as part 
of STUK’s duties, as well as the objectives of the operations, and briefly introduce the ob-
jects of regulation. The chapter concerning the development and implementation of legis-
lation and regulations describes changes in nuclear legislation, as well as the progress of 
STUK’s YVL Guide reform work.
The section concerning the regulation of nuclear facilities contains an overall safety assess-
ment of the nuclear facilities currently in operation or under construction. For the nu-
clear facilities currently in operation, the section describes plant operation, events during 
operation, annual maintenance and observations made during regulatory activities. Data 
and observations gained during regulatory activities are reviewed with a focus on ensur-
ing the safety functions of nuclear facilities and the integrity of structures and compo-
nents. The chapters describing the development of the plants and their safety also include 
summaries of the development targets established after the Fukushima accident. For the 
existing NPPs, the report describes the regulation and inspections of the interim storage 
of spent nuclear fuel, management of operating waste, and the provisions for the costs of 
nuclear waste management. The report also includes a description of the oversight of the 
operations and quality management of organisations, oversight of operational experience 
feedback activities, and the results of these oversight activities. The radiation safety of 
nuclear facilities is examined on the basis of employees’ individual doses, collective doses, 
radioactive releases and the results of environmental radiation monitoring. The report also 
includes summaries on STUK’s regulatory oversight concerning physical protection, emer-
gency preparedness and safeguards of nuclear materials at the nuclear power plants. For 
the Olkiluoto 3 plant unit currently under construction, the report includes descriptions 
of the regulation of design, construction, manufacturing, installation, and commissioning 
preparations, as well as regulation of the operations of the licensee and the organisations 
participating in the construction project. At the end of the chapter on the regulation of nu-
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clear facilities there is a summary of new plant projects and the regulation of the research 
reactor.
The chapter concerning the regulation of the final disposal project for spent nuclear fuel de-
scribes the preparations for the final disposal project and the related regulatory activities. 
In addition, the oversight of the design and construction of the research facilities (Onkalo) 
currently under construction in Olkiluoto, as well as the assessment and oversight of the 
research, development and design work being carried out to specify further the safety case 
for final disposal are included in the report.
In addition to actual safety regulation, the report describes safety research, regulatory in-
dicators and the development of regulatory operations, as well as emergency preparedness, 
communication and STUK’s participation in international nuclear safety cooperation.
Appendix 1 presents a detailed study of the safety performance of the nuclear power 
plants by means of an indicator system. Appendix 2 includes a summary of employees’ 
doses at the nuclear power plants. Appendix 3 describes exceptional operational events at 
the nuclear power plants. Appendix 4 lists the licenses granted by STUK pursuant to the 
Nuclear Energy Act in 2013. Summaries of inspections included in the periodic inspec-
tion programme of nuclear power plants are presented in Appendix 5, and the Olkiluoto 3 
construction inspection programme is in Appendix 6. Inspections included in the construc-
tion period inspection programme for Onkalo are listed in a table in Appendix 7 and the 
inspection programme for the processing stage of Posiva’s construction licence application 
are listed in Appendix 8. A table in Appendix 9 lists the amount of nuclear materials in 
Finland. Appendix 10 lists the most important assignments funded by STUK concerning 
the safety of nuclear power plants and final disposal of nuclear waste in 2013. Appendix 11 
contains definitions of terms and abbreviations used in the report.
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1 Fundamentals of nuclear 
safety regulation
Regulatory oversight by STUK is 
based on the Nuclear Energy Act.
The Radiation and Nuclear Safety Authority 
(STUK) is responsible for the regulatory oversight 
of nuclear safety in Finland. Its responsibilities 
include the control of physical protection and emer-
gency response, as well as the safeguards for nu-
clear materials necessary to prevent nuclear pro-
liferation.
Figure 1. Oversight of nuclear facilities; from strategy to implementation.
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STUK lays down detailed requirements 
concerning nuclear safety.
STUK contributes to the processing of applications 
for licences under the Nuclear Energy Act, con-
trols compliance with the licence conditions, and 
formulates the detailed requirements. STUK also 
lays down qualification requirements for personnel 
involved in the use of nuclear energy and controls 
compliance with these requirements. In addition, 
STUK submits proposals for legislative amend-
ments and issues general guidelines concerning 
radiation and nuclear safety. 
The aim is to ensure safety and maintain 
the confidence of the general public.
The general objective of STUK’s regulatory activ-
ities is to ensure the safety of nuclear facilities, 
14
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so that plant operation does not cause radiation 
hazards that could endanger the safety of work-
ers or the population in the vicinity or cause other 
harm to the environment or property. The most 
important objective is to prevent a reactor accident 
that would cause a release of radioactive substanc-
es, or the threat of a release. Another objective is to 
maintain public confidence in regulatory activities.
STUK ensures the adequacy of 
safety regulations and compliance 
with their requirements.
It is STUK’s task to ensure in its regulatory acti-
vities that safety regulations contain adequate re-
quirements for the use of nuclear energy and that 
nuclear energy is used in compliance with these 
requirements.
Regulation by STUK ensures the 
attainment of safety objectives.
STUK ensures, by means of inspections and cont-
rols, that the operational preconditions and ope-
rations of the licensee and its subcontractors and 
the systems, structures and components of nuclear 
facilities are in compliance with regulatory requi-
rements. STUK’s operations are guided by annual 
follow-up plans, presenting the key items and acti-
vities for inspection and review. STUK carries out 
Defence in depth
The safety of a nuclear power plant is ensured by 
preventing the harmful effects of reactor damage 
and radiation through successive and mutually-
redundant functional and structural levels. This 
approach is called the “defence in depth” principle. 
Safety-ensuring functions may be divided into pre-
ventive, protective and mitigating levels.
The aim of the preventive level is to prevent 
any deviations from the plant’s normal opera-
tional state. Accordingly, high quality standards 
apply to component design, manufacture, installa-
tion and maintenance, as well as plant operation.
The protective level refers to providing for oper-
ational transients and accidents through systems 
aimed at detecting disturbances and preventing 
their development into an accident.
If the first or second level functions fail to stop 
the progress of an accident, its consequences must 
be mitigated. In such a case, the main thing is to 
ensure the integrity of reactor containment and the 
operation of its associated systems.
In addition to the functional levels, the defence 
in depth approach includes the principle of mul-
tiple successive barriers to potential radioactive 
releases, and a number of good design and quality 
management principles.
Advisory Commission on Nuclear Safety
Pursuant to the Nuclear Energy Act, the prelimi-
nary preparation of matters related to the safe use 
of nuclear energy is vested with the Advisory 
Commission on Nuclear Safety. It is appointed 
by the Government and functions in conjunction 
with STUK. Its term of office is three years. The 
Commission was appointed on 1 October 2012 and 
will remain in office until 30 September 2015.
In 2013, the Chairman of the Commission 
was Dr. Sc. (Tech.) Seppo Vuori, and the Vice-
Chairman was senior specialist Miliza Malmelin 
(Ministry of the Environment). Members of the 
Commission were professor Riitta Kyrki-Rajamäki 
(LTY), customer director Rauno Rintamaa (VTT), 
chief commercial officer Timo Okkonen (Inspecta 
Oy), customer manager Ilona Lindholm (VTT) and 
Dr. Sc. (Tech.) Antero Tamminen. Petteri Tiippana, 
Director General of STUK, was a permanent ex-
pert to the Commission.
The Commission has two committees, the 
Reactor Safety Committee and the Nuclear Waste 
Safety Committee. Foreign and Finnish experts 
have been invited to join the committees. English is 
the working language in the committees, and more 
extensive questions of principle will be brought 
to them for preparation. Nuclear industry ex-
perts from the UK, France, Sweden, Germany, 
Switzerland, Hungary and the United States have 
been invited to join the committees. Both of the 
Committees convened once in 2013. The members 
of the actual Commission also participate in the 
work of the committees.
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inspections of plans for nuclear facilities and other 
documents that the licensee is obliged to request 
STUK to do. The compliance of activities with the 
plans is verified through inspections carried out 
at the plant site or at subcontractors’ premises. In 
addition to these inspections and reviews, STUK 
has separate inspection programmes for periodic 
inspections of operating plants and inspections 
during construction. STUK also employs resident 
inspectors at the plants, who supervise and wit-
ness the construction, operation and condition of 
the plant and the operations of the organisation 
on a daily basis and report their observations. An 
overall safety assessment is conducted annually on 
each nuclear facility, dealing with the attainment 
of radiation protection objectives, the development 
of defence in depth, and the operation of organisa-
tions constructing or operating nuclear facilities 
and providing services to them.
STUK evaluates the safety of nuclear 
facilities starting from the application 
for a decision-in-principle
The construction of a nuclear power plant, inter-
mediate storage for spent fuel and a final disposal 
facility require a Government decision-in-principle 
that the project is in line with the overall good of 
society. The task of giving a statement on and pre-
paring a preliminary safety assessment of the ap-
plication for the decision-in-principle is vested with 
STUK. The safety assessment will state, in particu-
lar, whether any issues have been discovered that 
would indicate that the necessary prerequisites for 
the construction of a nuclear power plant in com-
pliance with the Nuclear Energy Act do not exist. 
In connection with the application for the decision-
in-principle, the applicant also presents a report on 
the environmental impact assessment. When an 
application for a construction or operating licence 
for a nuclear facility has been submitted to the 
Government, STUK issues a statement on it and 
includes its safety assessment. 
STUK regulates the different nuclear 
facility design and construction stages
The principles of STUK’s regulatory oversight ac-
tivities and oversight and inspection procedures 
are described in the YVL Guides issued by STUK. 
The purpose of oversight and inspection activities 
regarding plant projects is to allow STUK to verify 
Nuclear liability
The Nuclear Liability Act prescribes that the users 
of nuclear energy must have a liability insurance 
policy, or other financial guarantee, for a possible 
accident at a nuclear facility that would harm 
the environment, population or property. Fortum 
Power and Heat Oy and Teollisuuden Voima Oy 
(TVO) have prepared for damage from a nuclear 
accident as prescribed by law by taking out an 
insurance policy for this purpose, mainly with the 
Nordic Nuclear Insurance Pool.
International negotiations concerning the 
renewal of the Paris/Brussels nuclear liability 
agreements were completed in 2004. It was agreed 
that the funds available for compensation were 
to be increased, and plant owners were to have 
unlimited liability. However, the entry into force 
of these international agreements has been repeat-
edly postponed. Consequently, the decision was 
taken in Finland to legislate nationally regard-
ing a higher amount of insurance and impose an 
unlimited liability on licence holders. A temporary 
amendment of the Nuclear Liability Act entered 
into force at the beginning of 2012. The legislative 
amendment will be revoked once the agreements 
discussed above will become valid. 
In case of an accident, the funds available for 
compensation come from three sources: the licens-
ee, the country of location of the facility and the in-
ternational liability community. In 2013, a total of 
600,000,000 SDR was available for compensation 
from these sources. SDR refers to Special Drawing 
Right, an international reserve asset defined by 
the International Monetary Fund (IMF), whose 
value is based on a basket of key international cur-
rencies. In 2013, the value of the SDR was about 
EUR 1.12.
In Finland, the Financial Supervisory 
Authority is responsible for ascertaining the con-
tents and conditions of the licensee’s insurance ar-
rangements. The Financial Supervisory Authority 
has approved both Fortum Power and Heat Oy’s 
and Teollisuuden Voima Oy’s liability insurance, 
and STUK has verified the existence of the policies 
as required by the Nuclear Energy Act.
The Nuclear Liability Act also covers the trans-
port of nuclear materials. STUK ascertains that 
all nuclear material transport has had liabil-
ity insurance either approved by the Financial 
Supervisory Authority or by the authorities of 
the sending state in accordance with the Paris 
Convention.
16
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that the prerequisites for operations of a high stan-
dard exist, that the plans are acceptable before the 
implementation begins and that the implementa-
tion is compliant with regulations before the oper-
ating licence is granted. 
Pursuant to the Nuclear Energy Act, the li-
censee must ensure safety. Through its oversight, 
STUK ensures that the licensee meets its re-
sponsibilities. STUK oversees and inspects the 
implementation of the plant and the organisations 
participating in its implementation and operation. 
STUK does not monitor and inspect every detail; 
instead, the oversight and inspections are tar-
geted on the basis of the safety implications of 
each subject. To this end, the plant is divided into 
systems, structures and equipment, which are 
further classified according to their importance to 
plant safety. The safety classification of the plant is 
reviewed by STUK at the stage of applying for the 
construction licence. STUK inspects and monitors 
the design and manufacture of the equipment and 
structures that are most critical from the point of 
view of safety. Inspection organisations approved 
by STUK have been trusted with the inspection of 
equipment and structures with lesser safety im-
plications. STUK oversees the operations of these 
inspection organisations.
In plant projects, STUK ensures with its over-
sight and inspections, the bulk of which are sched-
uled to take place in advance, that the power 
company planning to build the plant and the plant 
supplier responsible for its implementation, and its 
main sub-contractor, have the necessary capabili-
ties for a high-quality implementation. 
During the construction licence stage, the plant 
design work and quality assurance of implemen-
tation are evaluated in order to make sure that 
the plant can be implemented in compliance with 
high quality standards and Finnish safety re-
quirements. During construction, inspections and 
oversight are deployed in order to ensure that the 
plant is implemented in compliance with the prin-
ciples approved at the construction licence stage. 
The inspections are based on detailed documen-
tation delivered to STUK and onsite inspections 
at the suppliers’ premises. Before the manufac-
ture of equipment and structures may commence, 
STUK inspects both the respective detailed plans 
and the capabilities of the manufacturing organ-
isations to produce high-quality results. During 
manufacture and building, STUK carries out in-
spections in order to verify that the equipment 
and structures are manufactured in compliance 
with the plans approved by STUK. Regarding the 
installation of equipment and structures, STUK 
carries out inspections in order to verify that the 
installations are made in compliance with the ap-
proved plans and that the requirements set out 
for installations are fulfilled. Approval by STUK 
after inspection is a prerequisite for trial opera-
tion of the equipment. After that, STUK inspects 
the results of the trial operation before the actual 
commissioning.
Before operating the plant, STUK must be pro-
vided with documentation proving that the plant 
was designed and implemented in compliance with 
Finnish safety requirements. In addition, STUK 
has to be provided with evidence verifying that 
the prerequisites exist for safe operation of the 
plant. These include personnel that have been 
trained and verified to be competent, the instruc-
tions required for operating the plant, safety and 
preparedness arrangements, maintenance sched-
ule and staff, as well as radiation protection staff. 
Having verified that the implementation is safe 
and the organisation has the required capabilities, 
STUK prepares the safety assessment and report 
required for the operating licence. Obtaining the 
operating licence is a prerequisite for loading the 
reactor with fuel. 
Comprehensive safety assessment 
is a prerequisite for extending 
the operating licence
In Finland, operating licences are granted for a fi-
xed term, typically 10 to 20 years. A comprehensive 
safety assessment is required to renew the opera-
ting licence. If the operating licence is granted for a 
period exceeding 10 years, a periodic safety review 
(PSR) is carried out during the licence period. The 
scope of the safety review is similar to that carried 
out in conjunction with renewing the operating 
licence. During the assessments, the state of the 
plant is investigated, paying particular attention 
to the effects of ageing on the plant and its equip-
ment and structures. In addition, the capabilities 
of the operating personnel for continued safe ope-
ration of the plant are assessed. 
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Regulation of operating plants includes 
continuous safety assessment.
STUK’s regulation of operating nuclear facilities 
ensures that the condition of the facilities is and 
will be in compliance with the requirements, the 
facilities function as planned and are operated in 
compliance with the regulations. The regulatory 
activities cover the operation of the facility, its sys-
tems, components and structures, as well as the 
operations of the organisation. In this work, STUK 
employs regular and topical reports submitted by 
the licensees, on the basis of which it assesses the 
operation of the facility and the plant operator’s 
activities. In addition, STUK assesses the safety of 
nuclear power plants by carrying out inspections 
on plant sites and at component manufacturers’ 
premises, and based on operational experience 
feedback and safety research. On the basis of the 
safety assessment during operation, both the licen-
see and STUK evaluate the need and potential for 
safety improvements.
Safety analyses provide tools for assessing 
the safety of nuclear facilities
Safety analyses ensure that the nuclear facility 
is designed to be safe and that it can be operated 
safely. Deterministic and probabilistic approaches 
complement each other. 
Deterministic safety analyses 
For the purpose of STUK’s regulatory YVL Guides, 
deterministic safety analyses are analyses of 
transients and accidents required for justifying 
the technical solutions employed by nuclear po-
wer plants. The licensees update these analyses in 
connection with the renewal of operating licences, 
periodic safety reviews and any significant modifi-
cations carried out at the plant. 
Probabilistic risk analyses 
Probabilistic risk analysis (PRA) refers to quanti-
tative estimates of the threats affecting the safety 
of a nuclear power plant and the probabilities of 
chains of events and any detrimental effects. PRA 
makes it possible to identify the plant’s key risk 
factors, and can contribute to the design of nuclear 
power plants and the development of plant opera-
tion and technical solutions. The licensees employ 
PRA for the maintenance and continuous impro-
vement of the technical safety of nuclear facilities.
STUK reviews the deterministic safety analyses 
and probabilistic risk analyses related to construc-
tion and operating licences and the operation of a 
nuclear power plant. When required, STUK has 
its own independent comparison analyses made in 
order to verify the reliability of results. 
STUK oversees modifications from 
planning to implementation
Various modifications are carried out at nuclear 
facilities to improve safety, replace aged systems 
or components, facilitate plant operation or main-
tenance, or improve the efficiency of energy gene-
ration. STUK inspects the plans for extensive or 
safety-significant plant modifications and oversees 
the modification work by reviewing the documents 
submitted by the licensee and carrying out inspec-
tions on site or at manufacturers’ premises. 
As a consequence of modifications implemented 
at the plant, several documents that describe 
the plant’s operation and structure – such as the 
Operating Limits and Conditions, the Final Safety 
Analysis Report and the operating and mainte-
nance procedures – have changed. STUK oversees 
the document revisions and generally follows the 
updating of plant documentation after the modifi-
cations.
Operability of the plant is overseen during 
operation and annual maintenance
The technical operability of nuclear facilities is 
overseen by assessing the operation of the facility 
in compliance with the requirements laid down in 
the operational limits and conditions, and over-
seeing annual maintenance outages, plant main-
tenance and ageing management, fire safety, ra-
diation safety, physical protection and emergency 
preparedness.
Operational limits and conditions
The operational limits and conditions (OLC)
of nuclear facilities lay down the detailed tech-
nical and administrative requirements and re-
strictions concerning the plant and its various 
systems, equipment and structures. The licensee 
is responsible for keeping the operational limits 
and conditions up-to-date and ensuring compli-
ance with them. STUK controls compliance with 
the plants’ operational conditions and limits by 
witnessing operations on site. Special attention is 
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quired for events or near-misses not subject to a 
special or operational transient report. Reports on 
such events are submitted to STUK for information 
if the event is or may be relevant to nuclear or ra-
diation safety or STUK’s communication activities.
Annual maintenance
Work that cannot be done during plant operation is 
carried out during annual maintenance of nuclear 
power plants. These include refuelling, preven-
tive equipment maintenance, periodic inspections 
and tests, as well as failure repairs. These actions 
ensure the preconditions for operating the power 
plant safely during the following operating cycles. 
STUK is responsible for controlling and ensur-
ing that the nuclear power plant is safe during the 
annual maintenance and future operating cycles, 
paid to the testing and fault repairs of components 
subject to the operational limits and conditions.
When annual maintenance outages end, STUK 
ascertains the plant unit’s state in compliance 
with the operational limits and conditions prior to 
start-up. Any changes to and planned deviations 
from the operational limits and conditions must 
be submitted to STUK for approval in advance. In 
addition, the licensee is responsible for reporting to 
STUK without delay all situations deviating from 
the requirements under the operational limits and 
conditions. In the report, the power company pre-
sents its corrective action for approval by STUK. 
STUK oversees the implementation of corrective 
action. 
Oversight of operation, incidents 
during operation and reporting 
the operation to STUK
STUK oversees the safe operation of plants 
through regular inspections and reports submitted 
by the power companies. In addition, STUK’s local 
inspectors working on plant sites oversee the op-
eration on a daily basis. The local inspectors assess 
faults and oversee their repairs, as well as tests 
of safety-critical equipment. The inspections of 
the periodic inspection programme focus on major 
faults, incidents and progress made in corrective 
actions, as well as on operating procedures. The 
inspections are based on the regular reports sub-
mitted by power companies and inspections and 
walkdown inspections conducted on site.
The power companies are obliged to report 
any operational transients and any matters that 
may compromise safety. STUK assesses the safety 
implications of the incidents and the power compa-
ny’s ability to detect safety deficiencies, take action 
and carry out corrective actions.
The licensees submit event reports to STUK on 
operational events at nuclear facilities, comprising 
special reports, operational transient reports and 
scram reports. In addition to event reports, the fa-
cilities submit daily reports, quarterly reports, an-
nual reports, outage reports, annual environmental 
safety reports, monthly individual radiation dose 
reports, annual experience operational feedback 
reports and safeguard reports to STUK.
Internal processing and reporting is also re-
The majority of radioactive substances cre-
ated during the operation of a nuclear re-
actor are contained in the nuclear fuel. In addi-
tion, radioactive substances are contained in the 
reactor cooling system, as well as in the related 
purification and waste systems. The liquid and 
atmospheric effluents from the plant are purified 
and delayed so that their radiation impact on the 
environment is very low compared with the im-
pact of radioactive substances normally existing 
in nature. The emissions are carefully measured 
to ensure that they remain clearly below the pre-
scribed limits.
Radioactive emissions from a nuclear 
power plant into the air and sea are veri-
fied through comprehensive radiation monitoring. 
Radiation monitoring in the environment of a 
power plant comprises radiation measurements 
and determination of radioactive substances, con-
ducted to analyse the radioactive substances ex-
isting in the environment. In case of potential 
accident situations, continuously-operating radia-
tion measurement stations monitoring the external 
radiation dose rate are installed in the vicinity of 
nuclear power plants at distances of a few kilome-
tres. The measurement data from these stations 
are transferred to the power plant and to the na-
tional radiation-monitoring network.
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and that the annual maintenance does not cause a 
radiation hazard to the workers, the population or 
the environment. STUK ensures this by reviewing 
the documents required by the regulations, such as 
outage plans and modification documentation, and 
by performing on-site inspections during annual 
maintenance. 
Plant maintenance and ageing management
In its regulatory activities concerning the ageing 
management of operating nuclear facilities, STUK 
controls the plants’ ageing management strategy 
and its implementation ensures the maintenance of 
sufficient safety margins for safety-significant sys-
tems, components and structures throughout their 
lifetime. The organisation of the licensee’s opera-
tions, the prerequisites for the organisation to carry 
out the necessary actions, and the condition of com-
ponents and structures important to safety are sub-
ject to inspection and review. Regulatory control and 
inspections ensure that the power companies have 
the lifetime management programmes in place that 
enable them to detect potential problems in time. 
In addition, corrective action must be carried out 
in a way that ensures the integrity and operability 
of safety-significant components and structures so 
that safety functions can be activated at any time.
STUK monitors ageing management through 
the inspections of the periodic inspection pro-
gramme and inspections related to modifications 
and annual maintenance. The key issue in op-
eration licence renewal and periodic safety assess-
ments is the management of plant ageing.
Every year, the power companies provide STUK 
with reports on the ageing of electrical and I&C 
equipment, mechanical structures and equipment, 
as well as buildings. These reports describe the 
most salient ageing phenomena to be monitored, 
observations related to the ageing process and 
actions required for extending the service life of 
equipment and structures.
The licensee must carry out periodic inspec-
tions of safety-critical equipment and structures 
(such as the reactor pressure vessel and reactor 
coolant system). STUK approves the inspection 
programmes prior to the inspections and monitors 
the inspections and their results on site. The final 
result reports will be submitted to STUK for ap-
proval after the annual maintenance. 
Radiation safety
STUK oversees occupational radiation safety by 
inspecting and reviewing dosimetry, radiation 
measurements, radiation protection procedures, 
radiation conditions and radiation protection ar-
rangements for work processes at each facility. The 
dosimeters used for measuring the occupational ra-
diation doses undergo annual tests carried out by 
STUK. The test comprises irradiating a sample of 
dosimeters at STUK’s measurement standard lab-
oratory and reading the doses at the power plant. 
In addition, STUK oversees the meteorological dis-
persion measurements of radioactive substances, 
release measurements and environmental radia-
tion monitoring, and also reviews the relevant re-
sult reports.
Emergency preparedness
Besides the periodic inspections of other opera-
tions, STUK controls the readiness of the organ-
isations operating nuclear power plants to act in 
abnormal situations. The inspection focuses on 
training in emergency response organisation, ar-
rangement of rooms, securing the connections used 
for the transfer of meteorological measurement 
data during an emergency situation and radia-
tion monitoring of the surrounding environment, 
as well as the development of internal alarm proce-
dures at the power plant. Emergency exercises test 
the operation of the emergency response organisa-
tion, the functionality of the emergency response 
guidelines and the usability of the alert areas in 
practice, which are developed on the basis of the 
feedback received for the exercises. STUK moni-
tors the actions of power companies during these 
emergency drills.
Oversight of the operation of organisations 
is part of the process of ensuring plant safety
STUK oversees the operation of organisations by 
reviewing safety management, the management 
and quality systems, the competence and train-
ing of the staff of nuclear facilities and opera-
tional experience feedback activities. The aim is 
to ensure that the organisations of the power 
company as a whole and its key suppliers operate 
in a manner that ensures the safety of the plant 
at all levels and in connection with safety-related 
actions.
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Training and qualifications of personnel
STUK monitors the training and qualifications of 
personnel through inspections included in the peri-
odic inspection programme, by assessing the suit-
ability and approving the appointment of certain 
key personnel and by assessing the ability of the 
power company to ensure safety in conjunction 
with incidents and annual maintenance opera-
tions. The key persons whose appointment must be 
approved by STUK are the director in charge of 
the construction and safe operation of the nuclear 
facility, the operators working in the plant control 
rooms and the persons in charge of materials re-
lated to preparedness, safety and nuclear technol-
ogy. In addition, STUK’s approval is required for 
personnel carrying out certain integrity checks on 
materials. In case events reveal flaws in the op-
eration of the organisation, number of personnel 
or their competence, STUK will require the power 
company to take rectifying action as required.
Operational experience feedback
According to the Government Decree the advance-
ment of science and technology and operating ex-
perience must be taken into account for the further 
enhancement of the safety of nuclear power plants. 
This principle is not limited to operational experi-
ence from Finnish nuclear power plants, but feed-
back from abroad must also be analysed systemati-
cally, and action must be taken to improve safety 
as necessary. STUK controls and ensures that the 
power companies’ operational experience feedback 
activities effectively prevent the reoccurrence of 
problematic events. STUK pays particular atten-
tion to the power companies’ ability to detect and 
identify the causes of the events and to remedy the 
underlying operational weaknesses. In addition, 
STUK analyses Finnish and foreign operational 
experience data and, as necessary, lays down re-
quirements to enhance safety.
STUK controls the operational experience feed-
back activities by reviewing the event reports sub-
mitted by the licensee and the annual summary of 
operational feedback activities. During inspections 
included in the periodic inspection programme, the 
operational experience feedback activities of the 
plant and utilisation of international experience 
are monitored.
Event investigations
An event investigation team is appointed when the 
licensee’s own organisation has not operated as 
planned during an event or when it is estimated 
that the event will lead to significant modifications 
to the plant’s technical layout or procedures. A 
STUK investigation team is also set up if the li-
censee has not adequately clarified the root causes 
of an event. 
Pressure equipment critical to nuclear 
safety is monitored by STUK
In addition to regulating the design and manufac-
turing of pressure equipment, STUK oversees the 
operational safety of pressure equipment included 
in the most important safety classes and performs 
periodic inspections of such equipment. Pressure 
equipment in other safety classes is inspected by 
inspection organisations authorised by STUK. 
STUK oversees the operation of the manufacturers 
and testing and inspection organisations autho-
rised by it in connection with its own inspection 
activities, and by reviewing documents and making 
follow-up visits.
Regulatory oversight of nuclear non-
proliferation is a basic requirement 
for using nuclear energy
Oversight of nuclear non-proliferation ensures that 
nuclear materials and other nuclear commodities 
remain in peaceful use in compliance with the rel-
evant licences and notifications, and that nuclear 
facilities and the related technologies are only uti-
lised for peaceful purposes. Another objective of 
the oversight of non-proliferation is to ensure that 
appropriate security arrangements are in place for 
nuclear items.
The operator is responsible for managing the 
nuclear items in its possession, accounting for 
them and reporting on plant sites and its ac-
tivities relating to the nuclear fuel cycle to STUK 
and submitting their reports on nuclear materi-
als to the European Commission. STUK main-
tains a national control system the purpose of 
which is to carry out the safeguards for the use 
of nuclear energy that are necessary for the non-
proliferation of nuclear weapons. In compliance 
with the Safeguards Agreement and its addi-
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tional protocol, STUK forwards data on activities 
relating to the nuclear fuel cycle in Finland to 
the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA). 
STUK verifies the correctness of the notifications, 
accounting and reporting through on-site inspec-
tions and participates in all inspections carried 
out by the IAEA and the European Commission. 
STUK also grants the approvals for IAEA and 
Commission inspectors to perform safeguards 
inspections in Finland.
Oversight of nuclear waste management 
extends from planning to final disposal
The aim of the regulation of nuclear waste man-
agement is to ensure that nuclear waste is pro-
cessed, stored and disposed of safely. The control of 
nuclear waste processed at plant sites is part of the 
regulatory control of operating plants mentioned 
above. STUK oversees the nuclear waste manage-
ment of nuclear power plants through document 
reviews and inspections within the periodic inspec-
tion programme. In addition, STUK approves the 
clearing of waste from control and reviews plants’ 
nuclear waste management and decommissioning 
plans, on the basis of which the licensees’ nuclear 
waste management fees are determined. 
The final disposal project for spent fuel requires 
special attention. STUK inspects and reviews 
Posiva Oy’s plans and research work for project im-
plementation and is overseeing the construction of 
an underground research tunnel called Onkalo at 
Olkiluoto. Onkalo is also being used to test suitable 
working methods for the final disposal facility and 
mapping the underground premises. The plan is to 
later convert the research tunnel into an entrance 
for the repository.
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2 Objects of regulation
Loviisa NPP
Plant Start-up National Nominal electric power, Type,
unit  grid (gross/net, MW) supplier
Loviisa 1 8.2.1977 9.5.1977 520/496 PWR, 
    Atom ener goex port
Loviisa 2 4.11.1980 5.1.1 981 520/496 PWR, 
    Atom ener goex port
Fortum Power and Heat Oy owns the Loviisa 1 and 2 plant units located in Loviisa.
Olkiluodon voimalaitos NPP
Plant Start-up National Nominal electric power, Type,
unit  grid (gross/net, MW) supplier
Olkiluoto 1 2.9.1978 10.10. 1979 910/880 BWR,
    Asea Atom
Olkiluoto 2 18.2.1980 1.7.1 982 910/880 BWR,
    Asea Atom
Olkiluoto 3 Construction license granted n. 1600 (net) PWR,
 17.2.2005   Areva NP
Teollisuuden Voima Oyj owns the Olkiluoto 1 and 2 plant units located in Olkiluoto, Eurajoki, and the  
Olkiluoto 3 plant unit under construction.
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Onkalo
Posiva Oy is constructing an under-
ground research facility (Onkalo) in 
Olkiluoto, where bedrock volumes 
suitable for final disposal of spent 
nuclear fuel can be investigated in 
more detail. Bedrock research at 
the planned final disposal depth is 
a requirement for granting a con-
struction licence for the final dis-
posal facility. Posiva has designed 
Onkalo to function as one of the 
entrance routes to the planned final 
disposal facility, so STUK is apply-
ing the same regulatory procedures 
to the construction of Onkalo as 
those of a nuclear facility. 
The underground research facility consists of a 
drive tunnel, three shafts and a research gallery 
quarried to a depth of 437 m. Posiva started con-
structing Onkalo in 2004. By the end of 2011, the 
excavation of the drive tunnel had reached a depth 
of 455 m, and the length of the tunnel was 4913 m. 
In addition, intake air and personnel shafts had 
been quarried using raise boring techniques to a 
depth of 290 m and exhaust air shaft to a depth of 
437 m.
Research reactor
In addition to nuclear power plants, STUK regu-
lates the FiR 1 research reactor operated by VTT 
Figure 3. FiR 1 research reactor and the BNCT station.
• TRIGA Mark II research reactor 
Thermal power 250 kW
• Fuel of the core: 
80 fuel rods with 15 kg uranium 
TRIGA reactors have a unique fuel type;  
uranium–zirconium hybrid combination 
8% uranium 
91% zirconium 
1% hydrogen
Technical Research Centre of Finland. The reactor 
is located in Otaniemi, Espoo, and its maximum 
thermal power is 250 kW. It was started in March 
1962, and its current operating license will expire 
at the end of 2023. The reactor is used to manufac-
ture radioactive tracers, perform activation analy-
ses and train students. The reactor was also used 
to treat cancer with the boron neutron capture 
therapy (BNCT), but this operation was stopped in 
January 2012.
Other uses of nuclear energy
The regulation also applies to mining and mill-
ing of ore aiming at obtaining uranium or tho-
rium. Such operations are practiced at the produc-
tion plants of Norilsk Nickel Harjavalta Oy and 
Freepoint Cobalt Oy. A planned uranium extrac-
tion plant at Talvivaara is also part of this regula-
tory group. There are small amounts of regulated 
materials at some laboratories. The regulation also 
applies to nuclear equipment, systems and data as 
well as nuclear sector research and development 
activities and the transport of nuclear materials 
and nuclear waste. 
Figure 2. Diagram of the encapsulation and disposal facility  
in Olkiluoto (Posiva Oy).
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3 Development of regulations
Two amendments to the Nuclear Energy Act 
(990/1987) were made in 2013. The first amend-
ment (499/2013) enforced the Council Directive 
establishing a Community framework for the re-
sponsible and safe management of spent fuel and 
radioactive waste. A framework provision stating 
that the volume of waste must be kept as low as 
reasonably practicable was added to the Nuclear 
Energy Act. Furthermore, regulations of the 
Nuclear Energy Act on arranging self-assessments 
and peer reviews on nuclear safety and nuclear 
waste management were supplemented, and a 
principle on graded approach was added.
The second amendment of the Nuclear Energy 
Act (1148/2013) was linked to the amending of the 
Coercive Measures Act. It caused a minor change 
relating to legislation technique in the Nuclear 
Energy Act.
In 2013, STUK also prepared in cooperation 
with the Ministry of Employment and the Economy 
an amendment of the Nuclear Energy Act, based 
on the results of the international IRRS evalu-
ation on STUK’s regulatory work in 2012, that 
would change the monitoring of the surroundings 
of nuclear power plants into one of STUK’s regula-
tory duties and also implement other changes that 
would emphasise STUK’s independent position in 
the regulation of nuclear safety.
An amendment (755/2013) of the Nuclear 
Energy Decree (161/1988) entered into force in late 
October 2013. The amendment specified regula-
tions on inspection organisations and corrected 
other defects observed over the course of the years 
in the Decree.
A reform of the Government Decree on the Safety 
of Nuclear Power Plants and the Government 
Decree on Emergency Response Arrangements at 
Nuclear Power Plants was also prepared simul-
taneously with the Nuclear Energy Decree. The 
new Decrees entered into force in October 2013. 
Several minor corrections and more precise for-
mulations were made in the Government Decree 
on the Safety of Nuclear Power Plants (717/2013). 
Regulations were added, deemed necessary af-
ter the Fukushima accident, stating that nuclear 
power plants must have equipment and methods to 
ensure that the residual heat of the spent nuclear 
fuel can be removed from the reactor and the stor-
age pools in three days in a manner independent 
of the plant’s external supply of electricity and 
water in case of a rare external event or a disrup-
tion of the plant’s internal electricity distribution 
system. Furthermore, a regulation was added, 
in compliance with the safety objectives of the 
Western European Nuclear Regulators’ Association 
(WENRA) published in 2010, on ensuring that a 
radioactive release after a severe nuclear power 
plant accident may not cause the need to imple-
ment extensive protection measures concerning 
public or long-term limitations on the use of exten-
sive land or water areas.
Most of the changes made in the Government 
Decree on Emergency Response Arrangements at 
Nuclear Power Plants (716/2013) were specifica-
tions caused by changes made in the Finnish res-
cue services legislation. Furthermore, the amend-
ment of the Decree took into account the possibility 
of a simultaneous accident at several nuclear fa-
cilities in the same power plant area, which was a 
lesson learned from the Fukushima accident.
A comprehensive reform of the YVL Guides 
that took several years was practically completed 
in November 2013. The reform aimed at making 
the YVL Guides clearer and more user-friendly as 
well as updating their technical requirements. The 
structure of the YVL Guides as a whole and the 
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Structure of the new YVL-guides
A Safety management of 
a nuclear facility
B Plant and system 
design
C Radiation safety of a 
nuclear facility and 
environment
D Nuclear materials 
and waste
E Structures and equipment 
of a nuclear facility
A.1
 
 
A.2
 
A.3
 
A.4
 
 
A.5
 
 
A.6
 
 
A.7
 
 
 
A.8
 
A.9
 
 
A.10
 
 
A.11
 
A.12
Regulatory oversight 
of safety in the use of 
nuclear energy 
Site for a nuclear 
facility 
Management system 
for a nuclear facility 
Organisation and 
personnel of a nuclear 
facility 
Construction and 
commissioning of a 
nuclear facility 
Conduct of operations 
at a nuclear power 
plant 
Probabilistic risk 
assessment and risk 
management of a 
nuclear power plant 
Ageing management 
of a nuclear facility 
Regular reporting on 
the operation of a 
nuclear facility 
Operating experience 
feedback of a nuclear 
facility 
Security of a nuclear 
facility 
Information security 
management of a 
nuclear facility
B.1
 
 
B.2
 
 
 
 
B.3
 
 
 
B.4
 
B.5
 
 
 
B.6
 
 
B.7
 
 
 
 
B.8
Safety design of 
a nuclear power 
plant 
Classification 
of systems, 
structures and 
components of a 
nuclear facility 
Deterministic 
safety analyses 
for a nuclear 
power plant 
Nuclear fuel and 
reactor 
Reactor coolant 
circuit of a 
nuclear power 
plant 
Containment of 
a nuclear power 
plant 
Provisions for 
internal and 
external hazards 
at a nuclear 
facility 
Fire protection at 
a nuclear facility 
C.1
 
 
C.2
 
 
 
C.3
 
 
 
C.4
 
 
 
C.5
 
 
C.6
Structural radiation 
safety at a nuclear 
facility 
Radiation protection 
and exposure mo-
nitoring of nuclear 
facility workers 
Limitation and 
monitoring of radioa-
ctive releases from 
a nuclear facility 
Radiological 
monitoring of the 
environment of a 
nuclear facility
Emergency arrange-
ments of a nuclear 
power plant 
Radiation monitoring 
at a nuclear facility
D.1
 
 
D.2
 
 
D.3
 
 
D.4
 
 
 
 
 
 
D.5
 
D.6
Regulatory 
control of nuclear 
safeguards 
Transport of 
nuclear materials 
and nuclear waste 
Handling and 
storage of nuclear 
fuel 
Predisposal ma-
nagement of low 
and intermediate 
level nuclear 
waste and de-
commissioning of 
a nuclear facility 
Disposal of 
nuclear waste 
Production of 
uranium and 
thorium 
E.1
 
 
E.2
 
E.3
 
E.4
 
 
E.5
 
 
 
E.6
 
E.7
 
E.8
E.9
E.10
 
E.11
 
E.12
Authorised inspection body 
and the licensee’s in-house 
inspection organisation 
Procurement and operation 
of nuclear fuel 
Pressure vessels and piping 
of a nuclear facility 
Strength analyses of nuclear 
power plant pressure 
equipment 
In-service inspection of 
nuclear facility pressure 
equipment with non-
destructive testing methods 
Buildings and structures of a 
nuclear facility 
Electrical and I&C equip-
ment of a nuclear facility 
Valves of a nuclear facility 
Pumps of a nuclear facility 
Emergency power supplies 
of a nuclear facility 
Hoisting and transfer equip-
ment of a nuclear facility 
Testing organisations for 
mechanical components 
and structures of a nuclear 
facility 
 
Collected definitions of YVL-guides: same data is shown both as the collection and within the guides.
Figure 4. The structure of the new YVL guides at the end of 2013.
internal structure of single YVL Guides were re-
formed. The reform means replacing the more than 
70 old YVL Guides with 44 new YVL Guides. Forty 
of these were simultaneously published. There are 
almost complete drafts for the remaining four new 
YVL Guides, but most of them cannot be published 
until amendments have been made in the Finnish 
legislation. Thus, seven of the old YVL Guides are 
still valid.
One of the goals in terms of technical require-
ments was to take into account in the YVL Guides 
lessons learned from the Olkiluoto 3 project and 
the requirements of IAEA’s top level documents 
Safety Fundamentals and Safety Requirements. 
Furthermore, STUK wished to take into account in 
the YVL Guides the Safety Reference Levels agreed 
in the Western European Nuclear Regulators’ 
Association (WENRA). The Fukushima accident 
took place while the reform was underway. STUK 
wished to take into account the lessons learned 
from Fukushima accident in the YVL Guides as 
well, which is why the completion of the reform 
was delayed. Due to the Fukushima accident the 
new YVL Guides include requirements based on 
which the nuclear facilities have to endure more 
powerful natural phenomena than before and situ-
ations where the plant’s power supply is lost.
Relevant STUK’s personnel  received system-
atic training on the new YVL Guides in 2013. A 
course in English was also arranged for stakehold-
ers at the end of 2013.
The new YVL Guides are applied as such to new 
nuclear facilities. In the case of facilities under con-
struction and operating facilities, the YVL Guides 
will be brought into effect by means of a separate 
enforcement decision by the end of 2015.
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4 Regulatory oversight of nuclear 
facilities and its results in 2013
The plant’s operation has been, for the most 
part, systematic and safe. In 2013, seven events 
warranting a special report were reported. Three 
of them were rated as INES Category 1 or inci-
dents affecting safety. The number of events and 
the problems detected still indicate deficiencies in 
the power company’s policies. The licensee started 
an investigation based on the events in 2012 to 
identify problem areas in the operations in more 
detail. The recommendations drafted based on 
the investigation were reported to STUK in June 
2013. STUK will monitor implementation of the 
licensee’s measures based on these recommenda-
tions and assess the impact of the measures. The 
events are described in more detail in Appendix 3.
No major modifications were implemented dur-
ing the annual outages of the power plant units 
in 2013. However, a large number of maintenance 
measures and inspections are carried out during 
each annual outage to ensure the safe and reli-
able operation of the power plant. Implementation 
of the second phase of the I&C renewalin Loviisa 
(the LARA project) has been postponed until 2016. 
The systems to be upgraded at the second phase 
include the nuclear island’s I&C systems that have 
the greatest safety significance, as well as the I&C 
systems of most important safety functions, such 
as the emergency power supply. In addition to this 
major modification project, other modification proj-
ects are currently ongoing at the power plant, such 
as an upgrade of the refueling machine and main 
crane, the solidification facility for liquid radioac-
tive waste and the safety valves of steam genera-
tors. The deadline for several projects improving 
safety has been postponed and the starting points 
of many of the modification projects have been re-
vised to such an extent that revising the projects 
has been necessary. The licensee has introduced 
new project management and procurement proce-
dures, and STUK has assessed these procedures. 
4.1 Loviisa nuclear power plant
4.1.1 Overall safety assessment 
of Loviisa power plant
STUK oversaw the safety of the Loviisa power plant 
and assessed its organisation in different areas by 
means of reviewing materials provided by the li-
censee, carrying out inspections in line with the pe-
riodic inspection programme, and by overseeing op-
erations at the plant. On the basis of this regulatory 
oversight, STUK can state that plant operations did 
not cause a radiation hazard to the employees, popu-
lation or the environment. The radiation doses of the 
employees were the lowest in the entire history of 
the plant, partly because of the brief annual outages 
and partly because the operations were improved 
and modifications implemented that also affected 
issues influencing the radiation dose. Radioactive 
releases into the environment were also low; they 
remained below the prescribed limits. Emergency 
preparedness at the Loviisa power plant complies 
with the requirements. The processing, storage and 
final disposal of low and intermediate level waste 
(operating waste) at the power plant have been ar-
ranged in compliance with the requirements.
According to the tests and inspections carried 
out, the condition of the containment and the reac-
tor coolant system, which prevents the release of 
radioactive materials into the environment, comply 
with the requirements. Based on the test results, 
the calculated acceptance criterion for total leak-
age from the outer isolation valves of Loviisa 2 was 
not met, which is why the isolation valves were 
repaired to comply with the leaktightness criteria. 
The inner isolation valves complied with the cor-
responding criterion. In December 2012, a minor 
fuel leak was detected in Loviisa 2. A leaking fuel 
assembly was removed from the reactor during the 
annual outage of 2013.
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Furthermore, several upgrade projects that will im-
prove plant safety which have been designed based 
on assessments of the Fukushima accident are cur-
rently ongoing at the power plant. These changes 
include increased capacity of the battery banks 
for the redundant electricity systems, for example. 
Construction of cooling towers to secure residual 
heat removal from the reactor and the fuel pools 
has also been started. These modifications will im-
prove the provisions for extreme external threats.
Fortum Power and Heat Oy and the Loviisa 
power plant organisation have operated in a sys-
tematic and development-oriented way to ensure 
the safety of the plant. Over the course of the year, 
STUK has focused in its regulation on the pro-
cessing of non-conformances, development of the 
management system and procurement procedures, 
in particular. The power companies have initiated 
measures to develop the management system pro-
cesses, but the development work is still ongoing. 
In 2013, Fortum launched a procurement proce-
dure development project whereby the licensee will 
reform its procurement organisation and procure-
ment procedure. The project has proceeded accord-
ing to plan, and STUK has monitored the project 
results. In the autumn of 2013, STUK ordered a 
study on the safety culture of Fortum’s nuclear 
operations from VTT Technical Research Centre of 
Finland. The purpose of this study is to assess the 
current status of the safety culture, its strengths 
and areas requiring development as well as to as-
sess the functionality and scope of the procedures 
used to assess the safety culture. The study report 
will be completed at the beginning of 2014.
4.1.2 Plant operation, events during operation 
and the prerequisites of safe operation
Compliance with operational 
limits and conditions
The operational limits and conditions (OLC) list 
the values within which nuclear power plant units 
must remain during operation. The OLC must be 
kept up-to-date at all times, i.e. the licensee must 
assess the need to update the OLC when planning 
modifications, for example. The licensee must com-
ply with the OLC. Deviations from the OLC are 
only allowed based on a safety analysis, provided 
that the deviation will not compromise plant safety 
Table 1. Events at the Loviisa plant units subject to special reports or a root cause analysis and/or classified INES 
Level 1 or higher. All events subject to reporting are discussed in Appendix 1 (indicator A.II.1). Events with a spe-
cial report are described in more detail in Appendix 3.
Event Non-compli-
ances with the 
OLC
Special report 
and/or root cause 
report
INES  
rating
Faulty connections in Loviisa 1 I&C system preventing automatic 
starting of the boron feed pumps
• • 1
Some of the OLC requirements were not taken into account 
during the startup stage of the Loviisa 1 annual outage
• • 0
Some of the  OLC requirements were not taken into account 
during the repair of the fuel pool cooling system valve of Loviisa 1
• • 0
Control rod drive mechanism failures at Loviisa 2 • 0
Forgotten wedges kept ice condenser bottom doors closed after 
a repair outage at Loviisa 2
• • 1
Relay faults in emergency diesel generators at Loviisa 2 • 1
Problem with sample flow of an activity monitor during a planned 
release
• • 0
Figure 5. INES classified events at the Loviisa plant 
(INES Level 1 or higher).
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or radiation safety and that STUK has approved 
the deviation. A deviation may be justified to en-
sure occupational safety or to implement a modifi-
cation that will improve safety, for example. STUK 
assesses the OLC and verifies that they are up to 
date when inspecting modifications and reviewing 
analyses, as well as in connection with supervision 
of the plant site.
Issues to be developed in the OLC mainte-
nance procedures were observed in 2013. The 
Loviisa power plant submitted three applications 
for approval to STUK. These applications involved 
changes to the OLC based on modifications that 
had been implemented several months or years 
Figure 7. Daily average gross electrical power of the 
Loviisa plant in 2013.
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%
prior to the application date. These applications 
prove that the OLC have not been continuously 
kept up to date. STUK required in its decision 
that Fortum draft an action plan and a schedule 
on studying whether the OLC are up to date and 
on developing the OLC maintenance procedures. 
Fortum drafted the action plan and further contin-
ued studying the OLC by completing a root cause 
analysis concerning the management of changes 
in the OLC. The measures specified based on these 
studies are currently being processed. STUK will 
continue monitoring their progress.
In 2013, the Loviisa power plant reported five 
events during which the plant was non-compliant 
with the OLC without an advance safety analysis 
and STUK’s permission. In one of these cases, 
the deviation from the OLC was caused by a hu-
man error made when planning repairing of a 
valve. Some of the OLC requirements applied to 
the repair work were not identified at the design 
stage, which means that they were not taken into 
account at the implementation stage. In one case, 
treated evaporator concentrate was drained into 
the sea as planned. However, one of the radiation 
measurements included in the monitoring of emis-
sions into water was unavailable at the time of the 
first emission, and this fact went unnoticed. In the 
three other cases, the OLC deviation was related 
to a switching of the plant unit’s operating mode 
during a startup after an annual outage or a re-
pair outage; the operating mode was changed even 
though the conditions laid down for the new oper-
ating mode had not been met. In two of these cases, 
equipment whose operation had been prevented 
for the duration of the outage were inadvertently 
not restored back to the operating mode. In one 
of the cases, valve malfunctions were still being 
studied; proceeding with the startup of a plant unit 
with unresolved valve malfunctions is not allowed. 
Fortum analysed all five OLC deviations and de-
termined corrective measures to prevent similar 
events from occurring in the future. Because there 
were several events linked to the switching of op-
erating modes, Fortum decided to study the proce-
dures used in more detail. The results of the study 
and corrective measures will be presented in a root 
cause analysis to be drafted by 30 April 2014.
During the year, Fortum submitted to STUK 
for approval 11 amendment proposals for the op-
erational limits and conditions. Most of the amend-
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ments were due to modifications and equipment 
replacements carried out at the plant, as well as 
a systematic review of inservice testing. STUK ac-
cepted seven of the proposed amendments in whole 
and four of the proposed amendments in part. No 
justification was given for some of the proposed 
amendments, which is why STUK was unable to 
assess whether these amendments were acceptable 
and thus decided to accept only some parts of these 
amendments.
Fortum applied for permission from STUK for 
nine planned deviations from the operational lim-
its and conditions (Appendix 1, indicator A.I.2). 
Five of these applications concerned modifications, 
one repairing of a valve and three an unclear item 
in the OLC. As the planned deviations had no sig-
nificant safety implications, STUK approved the 
applications. Further reviews prior to approval 
were requested in one of the cases.
Operation and operational events
STUK oversaw the operation at the plant site on a 
daily basis by inspecting, regular reports on oper-
ating activities and event reports, and by conduct-
Operation and operational events
The load factor of Loviisa 1 was 92.9%, while that 
of Loviisa 2 was 93.1%. The annual outages have 
a major effect on the load factors. The outage of 
Loviisa 1 took 19 days, while that of Loviisa 2 took 
16.5 days. Repair outages due to faults observed in 
the rod cluster control assembly mechanism were also 
implemented at both units. The losses in gross energy 
output due to operational transients and component 
malfunctions were 1.3% at Loviisa  1 and 1.6% at 
Loviisa 2.
In a periodic inspection of the I&C system in 
January, Fortum observed that two boron feed 
pumps at Loviisa 1 would not have automati-
cally started in a case where they would have 
been needed. Automatic starting of the pumps was 
prevented during a repair outage in September 2012 
and the locking was accidentally not removed at the 
plant unit startup stage.
Some of the requirements of the operational 
limits and conditions (OLC) were not taken into 
account during the startup stage of the Loviisa 1 af-
ter the 2013 annual outage. During the startup stage 
of the plant unit, it was noted that two of the valves 
included in the pressure control of the reactor cool-
ant system did not fully open. However, the startup 
of Loviisa 1 – or, in practice, the dilution of the boron 
acid concentration in the reactor coolant system – was 
continued even though the fault had not been fully 
analysed and handled..
Operational transients were observed in a device 
connected to the position data of a valve included in 
the fuel pool cooling system of Loviisa 1. According 
to the OLC, repairs can be implemented during the 
plant unit's power operation, but the valve paired 
with the valve to be repaired in the same pipeline 
must be closed if the work will take more than 24 
hours. In this case, the valve paired with the valve 
being repaired was closed with a delay of more than 
24 hours, i.e. some of the OLC requirements were 
not taken into account when planning the work.
Two control rods at Loviisa 2 jammed during 
testing in September and October. A repair outage was 
implemented to study and eliminate the cause of this 
control rod fault.
The bottom doors of the ice condenser at Loviisa 
2 were kept closed with wedges during said repair 
outage. The wedges were used to prevent unnecessary 
movement of the doors. The employees forgot to 
remove the wedges at the end of the outage. The 
mistake was detected a couple of days later, at which 
time the wedges were removed.
Two of the emergency diesel generators of 
Loviisa 2 did not operate as planned during test-
ing in December 2013. The underlying cause of both 
of the events was a temporary malfunction of an aux-
iliary relay. This fault could have prevented the start-
ing of the diesel generator in case of an emergency. 
The relays in all of the diesel generators at Loviisa 1 
and Loviisa 2 were replaced with new ones. The device 
manufacturer was aware of the increased malfunction 
risk of the old relays, but failed to clearly notify the 
users of the risk.
One of the measurements included in the 
monitoring of radioactive releases did not oper-
ate as planned when treated evaporator concentrate 
was released into the sea from the Loviisa power 
plant.
The events are described in more detail in 
Appendix 3.
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licence, STUK will verify that the reactor core has 
been designed in such a manner that it is safe, and 
check that the work on all equipment and struc-
tures important to plant safety has been completed 
and all malfunctions have been properly studied.
During the annual outage of 2013, STUK ob-
ing one operational inspection. The results of the 
inspections are described in Appendix 5 of this 
report.
No events leading to a reactor trip occurred 
at the Loviisa nuclear power plant. Four events 
were classified as operational transients. A control 
rod dropped to its lower position twice in Loviisa 
1. In Loviisa 2, one of the turbine lines had to be 
stopped because of human errors made in the op-
eration of the main condensate purification system. 
Furthermore, an isolating valve in the steam line 
of a steam generator was closed because of a card 
malfunction in the plant protection system. These 
operational transients are described in more detail 
in Appendix 1 (indicator A.II.1).
The Loviisa power plant drafted special reports 
for other significant events. Seven events for which 
a special report must be drafted were detected 
in 2013 (see the enclosed list). The events are de-
scribed in more detail in Appendix 3.
In 2013, the risks caused by component mal-
functions, preventive maintenance and other 
events causing unavailability of equipment were 
1.4% (Loviisa 1) and 1.0% (Loviisa 2) of the ex-
pected value of the annual accident risk calculated 
using the plant’s risk model. The results were in 
line with those of previous years.
Annual maintenance outages
The refueling outage in Loviisa 1 was completed 
between 18 August and 6 September 2013, and the 
refueling outage of Loviisa 2 was from 7 September 
to 23 September 2013.
Some of the nuclear fuel is replaced with fresh 
fuel during an annual outage. Other measures 
implemented during an annual outage include 
inspecting, maintaining, replacing or modifying 
equipment and structures important to plant safe-
ty. These measures ensure the preconditions for 
operating the power plant safely during the follow-
ing fuel cycles.
STUK is obligated to verify that the licensee 
properly handles radiation and nuclear safety. 
STUK oversees the planning, implementation and 
assessment of annual outages, in practice by re-
viewing documents pertaining to the planning 
and implementation, as well as by conducting in-
spections onsite. The startup of a plant unit after 
an annual outage always requires an inspection 
by, and licence from, STUK. Prior to issuing the 
Annual outage of Loviisa 1 
The annual outage of Loviisa 1 took 19 days. One 
quarter of the fuel was replaced with fresh fuel 
during the annual outage. Furthermore, inspec-
tions, maintenance, repairs and testing of systems, 
equipment and structures were carried out. For 
example, four emergency diesel generators were 
maintained and some switches in the electricity 
system were replaced. No extensive modifications 
were implemented. 
The outage was around 3.5 days longer than 
planned. The delay was caused by the installation 
of measuring piping to prepare the future I&C 
upgrade, and the study and repair of an issue that 
had been overlooked when planning the work. The 
modification influenced leaktightness of the con-
tainment, which is why the piping had to be prop-
erly sealed. Another issue delaying the work was a 
non-conformance observed in the operation of two 
spray valves: when tested, the valves did not fully 
open. The fault was eliminated but its underlying 
cause could not be determined. 
Two exceptional events took place during the 
annual outage: lead blankets that had been acci-
dentally left on top of reactor coolant system pipes 
were detected and the startup of the plant unit was 
continued despite the problems with the operation 
of the pressurizer spray valves (see the full descrip-
tions of these events in Appendix 3). 
Repair outage of Loviisa 1 
Non-conformances in the operation of one of the 
control rods in Loviisa 1 were detected on 24 
November 2013 and 28 November 2013. Fortum 
studied the issue and located the cause of the fault, 
the motor of the control rod drive mechanism, on 
29 November 2013. A decision was made to replace 
the control rod drive mechanism. The plant was 
shut down for the duration of the replacement, i.e. 
there was a repair outage of the plant unit from 29 
November to 2 December 2013.
STUK-B 176
31
4.1 Loviisa NPP
served that most of the measures implemented 
were fine and the operation of the plant was being 
continuously developed. However, both the licensee 
and STUK noted that there is room for improve-
ment in the compliance of the methods used in 
practice and the procedures, in keeping plant docu-
mentation up to date and in the management of 
modifications.
4.1.3 Ensuring plant safety functions
Deterministic safety analyses
An extensive evaluation of the transient and ac-
cident analyses (deterministic safety analyses) 
carried out to verify the safety functions of the 
Loviisa power plant was performed in connection 
with the renewal of the plant’s operating license 
in 2007. The licensee has later supplemented the 
deterministic safety analyses with an extension of 
Annual outage of Loviisa 2
The annual outage of Loviisa  2 took 16.5 days. 
The annual outage was similar to that of Loviisa 
1 in terms of the scope of work. One quarter of the 
fuel in the reactor was replaced. Furthermore, 
one leaking fuel assembly was removed from the 
reactor. The leak was detected during the fuel cycle 
2012–2013. The fuel leak did not influence envi-
ronmental radiation safety, because the emissions 
from a minor fuel leak are small.
The annual outage took a little more than 
24 hours longer than planned. The delay was 
caused by the jamming of two control rods during 
the startup stage. The assemblies started moving 
again when they were moved with an actuator (see 
a full description of the event in Appendix 3).
Repair outage of Loviisa 2
Two control rods at Loviisa 2 jammed during 
testing in September and October. A repair outage 
was realised from 15 to 20 October 2013 to study 
and repair the fault.
The mechanisms of two control rods were re-
placed during the outage. All of the control rods 
operated normally during testing at the startup 
stage of the repair outage and during testing at 
power operation. There is more information on the 
control rods in Chapter 4.1.4.
postulated accidents and in connection with plant 
modifications. The licensee did not submit any up-
dated analyses to STUK in 2013.
Probabilistic risk analyses
The risk of a severe nuclear accident is evaluated 
on the basis of a probabilistic risk analysis (PRA). 
As a rule, PRA calculations use regularly updated 
information on the occurrences of initiating events 
and the unavailability of equipment together with 
a logical model of the plant’s systems and their in-
terdependencies.
The annual probability of a severe reactor ac-
cident calculated for the Loviisa plant units was 
around 2,5 · 10–5/year at the end of 2013, which is 
around 20% lower than in 2012 (3,1 · 10–5/year).
 The risk assessed for the Loviisa power plant in 
2013 was lower than before because of the follow-
ing issues, for example:
•	 Based	on	testing	of	the	shaft	seals	of	the	reactor	
coolant pumps, the seals can withstand higher 
temperatures than previously estimated, which 
means that the probability of seal leaks is lower 
than previously estimated.
•	 New	cable	connections	to	the	new	diesel	emer-
gency power plant were added to improve avail-
ability of the electricity system during a tran-
sient.
•	 A	specific	 type	of	heavy	 lifting	during	outages	
will be performed at a lower height than before. 
This will decrease the damage caused by any 
falling loads.
The accident risk at the Loviisa power plant and 
its changes are discussed in more detail in Section 
A.II.4 of Appendix 1, Accident risk of nuclear facili-
ties.
4.1.4 Integrity of structures and equipment
STUK has verified the integrity of structures and 
equipment important for nuclear safety with the 
help of inservice inspections and by supervising 
and inspecting repairs and modifications. Most of 
the actual repairs and modifications were imple-
mented during the annual outages in the autumn of 
2013. No deviations affecting the use of the inspec-
tion objects were observed in the monitoring and 
inspections of the reactor coolant system or other 
equipment and structures important to safety.
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Reactor coolant system
Fortum has applied from STUK approval for a 
plan on revising the scope and inspection intervals 
for the visual inspections of the interior of the 
Loviisa 1 and Loviisa 2 reactor pressure vessels. 
The previous procedure calls for removing the fuel, 
dismantling the internals and visually inspecting 
them every four years. Fortum proposes chang-
ing the inspection interval so that the dismantling 
and visual inspection of the reactor pressure ves-
sel surface coating and barrel cylinder would be 
implemented every eight years. However, as the 
Loviisa plant units age, the reactor pressure vessel 
components may exhibit damage mechanisms that 
have not been previously identified and that may 
pose a risk to safety. Furthermore, the proposal 
on changing the reactor pressure vessel interior 
inspection interval to eight years accentuates the 
need to obtain reliable information about the con-
dition of all the reactor pressure vessel components 
important to safety, and assessing their operabil-
ity until the next inspection date based on this 
information. Thus, STUK required from Fortum 
a report on how these conditions would be met if 
the new procedures were applied. Fortum submit-
ted supplemented procedures and STUK approved 
them, provided that some of the visual inspections 
of the internals of the reactor pressure vessels 
are replaced with qualified ultrasound inspections 
performed from the outside. If such inspections 
from the outside are not arranged, the internals of 
the reactor must be inspected in the same way as 
before.
Control rods
It was observed in tests implemented in connec-
tion with the startup of Loviisa 2 that two control 
rods of the reactor jammed. When the control rods 
were retested, one of them still jammed. This mal-
function would have prevented the planned gravi-
tational operation of the control rod. The other 
control rods were deemed operable in the retests. 
The malfunctioning control rod was replaced with 
a spare part and inspected by means of disman-
tling. It was noted during the inspection that a 
cylinder roller bearing at the top end of the control 
rod drive mechanism’s motor occasionally jammed 
when it was manually rotated. The radial clear-
ance in between the bearing’s inner and outer race 
was too small, and the bearing rollers did not freely 
rotate between the races. Fortum was initially of 
the opinion that the problem was caused by a fac-
tory defect, but it subsequently turned out that 
the bearing’s customised inner and outer race had 
been accidentally mixed up with the races of a sim-
ilar bearing in another assembly. As a corrective 
measure, Fortum added in the maintenance proce-
dures for the control rod drive mechanism a note 
that the identification numbers of a bearing’s inner 
and outer race must be checked prior to assembly.
Reactor coolant pump seal
It was observed in studies implemented by Fortum 
that wearing of the mechanical shaft seals of the 
reactor coolant pumps, which contain antimony, 
and the dissolution of antimony into the reactor 
coolant system is a significant factor influencing 
the radiation level of the reactor coolant system. 
According to the studies, up to half of the entire 
radiation level of the Loviisa 1 and Loviisa 2 re-
actor coolant systems is caused by the isotopes 
of antimony. As a result of this, Fortum launched 
a development project aiming at replacing these 
seals with seals manufactured from a material 
that does not contain any antimony. No changes 
in the mechanical seal structure have been made. 
Commissioning of the new antimony-free graphite 
seals will clearly reduce the radiation level during 
the plant’s maintenance outages and thus clearly 
reduce the radiation dose of the personnel during 
maintenance. Extensive factory acceptance tests of 
the rubbing-face seals verified that the structure 
will be safe also in the case of the postulated tran-
sients.
A study submitted to STUK in the spring of 
2013 states that the operating experiences from 
the antimony-free seals during the first fuel cycle 
were good. The seal that had been in use for twelve 
months at the time of the 2013 maintenance out-
age was also inspected by means of non-destructive 
methods. The results showed that the condition of 
the antimony-free seal was as good as new. After 
STUK’s approval, the seal was reinstalled in the 
reactor coolant pump and two new seals were in-
stalled in Loviisa 1 and four new seals in Loviisa 
2. The remaining seals containing antimony will be 
replaced as soon as possible during future mainte-
nance outages.
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Lead blankets accidentally left 
in steam generator room
At the beginning of the annual outage, employees 
of Fortum noticed that plastic-covered lead blan-
kets used for radiation protection had been ac-
cidentally left on top of pipes inside the reactor 
pressure vessel’s thermal barrier during the previ-
ous annual outage. Such blankets were found on 
top of reactor coolant and safety injection system 
pipes and on the floor of the room. The blankets 
on the floor had apparently been placed on top of 
some pipes but had dropped onto the floor during 
startup.
Such lead blankets are used as the radiation 
protection to lower the radiation dose of the main-
tenance and inspection personnel. The radiation 
protection blankets should be removed prior to 
startup from all rooms that will be closed when 
the plant is in operation, but not all of the blankets 
had been removed after the annual outage of 2012.
When the blankets had been found, the outer 
surfaces of the affected pipes were cleaned and 
inspected using a variety of methods. The micro-
structure of the steel was also studied at several 
points with replica samples. No indication sug-
gesting that the integrity of the pipes had been 
compromised by the lead blankets was found in 
these studies. In addition to the studies imple-
mented by Fortum, an outside expert assessed the 
potential risks caused by the lead to the surface 
coating, because a comprehensive assessment of 
the consequences of this unexpected event was 
deemed necessary. STUK approved these studies 
and their justification prior to granting permission 
for for startup of the plant unit after the annual 
outage.
Fuel
The fuel elements closest to the reactor pressure 
vessel wall were replaced with protective elements 
manufactured from steel in both plant units of 
the Loviisa power plant in order to slow down the 
radiation embrittlement process of the wall. One 
protective element that could not be inspected as 
planned in 2012, and that was consequently not 
placed back into the reactor, was inspected prior to 
the annual outage in the autumn of 2013. A new 
data collection system of the pool inspection sys-
tem, which will replace the old system, was used 
in this inspection. No significant changes from the 
previous inspections were found in a visual inspec-
tion, a deformation inspection or a length measure-
ment of the protective element. During an inspec-
tion performed in connection with the annual out-
age of the reactor core of Loviisa 1, a new jammed 
spring pack was observed in one of the protective 
elements. It was replaced.
A minor fuel leak was observed in Loviisa 2 in 
December 2012. A leaking fuel assembly that had 
been in the reactor for a period of twelve months 
was removed during the 2013 annual outage. The 
plan is to study the assembly in more detail by the 
end of 2014 to find out why it started leaking.
Maintenance, management of ageing
Inservice inspections
Inservice inspections must be carried out on equip-
ment and structures important to nuclear safety 
as required by the YVL Guides. The inspection 
objects were selected based on an annual inspec-
tion plan laid down by the power company which 
STUK approved prior to the inspections to be car-
ried out during the annual outage. Non-destructive 
inservice inspections of piping have been carried 
out in Loviisa 1 since 2008 and in Loviisa 2 since 
2011. The inspections are carried out in compli-
ance with risk-informed inspection programmes, 
according to which inspection objects important for 
nuclear safety are inspected most often. In addition 
to piping, the inservice inspections of primary com-
ponents and other pieces of pressure equipment 
were carried out in compliance with their inspec-
tion programmes. No significant changes from the 
previous inspections were observed in the inspec-
tions performed in 2013.
Management of ageing
STUK’s Ageing Management Committee plans and 
coordinates STUK’s regulatory duties pertaining to 
the ageing of nuclear facility systems, equipment 
and structures. The regulatory activities focus on 
any structures or equipment important to the nu-
clear safety of the Finnish nuclear power plants 
where faults or increased repair needs have been 
observed. The committee addresses such cases and 
demands corrective measures by the licensees if 
it deems that the condition monitoring or mainte-
nance has been defective. The committee also as-
sesses events at nuclear facilities outside Finland 
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and any links between them and the monitoring 
of the ageing of the Finnish nuclear power plants. 
Issues studied by the committee in Loviisa include 
emergency diesel generators, increased readings of 
steam generator tubes and bimetal welds in steam 
generator collectors because of cracks observed in 
similar welds at other VVER plants.
STUK assessed the condition monitoring of 
plant components important to safety that Fortum 
implements during operation of the plant either in 
real time or by means of periodic measurements 
and observations to verify that the scope and 
implementation method of the condition monitor-
ing of different plant components is sufficient when 
taking into account their impact on safety. STUK 
reviewed plant rounds by the operating group, in-
service testing and other condition monitoring mea-
sures during operation, such as vibration and leak 
monitoring. No significant defects were observed. 
Based on the review results, STUK requested a 
study of the opportunity to develop the long-term 
monitoring procedure of the operability of safety 
systems and safety devices, particularly the analy-
ses of inservice test results by the operating group.
Based on observations made during the struc-
tural engineering review, STUK required that in-
specting the roofs at the plant site must be in-
cluded in the scope of the preventive maintenance 
system. No other significant structural engineering 
observations were made.
Emergency diesel generators
The functionality of a new type of bearing installed 
at the bottom end of the diesel engines’ connect-
ing rods was monitored at the Loviisa plant units, 
because only little operating experience from this 
bearing type is available. The monitoring was im-
plemented by analysing lubricating oil more often 
than normal and performing a visual inspection of 
one bearing in connection with the annual outage. 
No deviation from normal wear was observed in 
the inspected bearing, nor were any abnormalities 
observed in the lubricating oil analyses. The next 
bearing inspection will take place during the 2014 
annual outage.
For the annual outages of Loviisa 1 and Loviisa 
2 in 2013, Fortum acquired new bearings for four 
emergency diesel generators. STUK chose main-
tenance of the diesel generator bearings as the 
object of the operational safety inspection to be 
performed during the annual outage because of 
the abnormal observations regarding the bearings 
made in the 2012 annual outage. Fortum installed 
new spare part bearings that were similar to 
the original bearings during the annual outage. 
Fortum performed a bearing acceptance test and 
the required non-destructive tests on the bearings 
prior to installation to verify integrity and adhe-
sion of the bearing metal.
Containment
STUK noted that the containment complies with 
the design requirements laid down for it. In leak 
tests performed in 2013, four valves in Loviisa 
1 and six valves in Loviisa 2 had to be repaired. 
When these repairs had been implemented, the 
goals laid down in the leak budget were met.
4.1.5 Development of the plant and its safety
I&C renewal in Loviisa power plant
The LARA I&C renewal of the Loviisa power plant 
was launched in 2005. The LARA project will mod-
ernise almost the entire I&C system of the plant 
into a digital equipment platform. The plant’s con-
trol room will be simultaneously modernised. The 
original intention was to carry out the upgrade in 
four phases, but according to the current plan, all 
safety-classified modifications will be implemented 
during phase 2 of the implementation and phas-
es 3 and 4, involving modernisation of the non-
classified operational I&C, are to be combined. In 
Pressure equipment manufacturers and 
inspection and testing organisations 
STUK approved, pursuant to the Nuclear Energy 
Act, one manufacturer of nuclear pressure vessels 
for the Loviisa power plant on application by the 
Loviisa power plant of Fortum Power and Heat 
Oy. In addition, STUK approved,  on application 
by the Loviisa power plant of  Fortum Power and 
Heat Oy and pursuant to the Nuclear Energy Act, 
three testing organisations to carry out tests re-
lated to the manufacture of mechanical equipment 
and structures. Testing operators from two testing 
organisations were approved for carrying out peri-
odic tests of mechanical equipment and structures 
in accordance with YVL Guide 3.8.
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2013, STUK’s regulation and inspections linked to 
the LARA project were focused on processing the 
I&C system specifications in workshops with the 
licensee and the equipment supplier. Development 
of configuration management during design and 
manufacture as well as development of quality 
management continued, and several meetings re-
garding these issues were arranged. In December 
2013 the licensee announced that the implementa-
tion of the I&C renewal’s second phase has been 
further postponed to the year 2016. The delay re-
quires the licensee to take measures to ensure the 
adequacy of the maintenance measures and spare 
part management of the existing I&C systems and 
components that cannot be replaced with new ones 
as planned. The licensee will describe these mea-
sures in more detail in connection with the periodic 
safety review of the Loviisa power plant, at the 
latest in 2015.
Reactor coolant system pressure 
control system upgrade
Fortum plans to implement an upgrade in the pres-
sure control system of the reactor coolant system 
in Loviisa 2 during the 2014 annual outage. A 
similar upgrade was implemented in Loviisa 1 in 
2012. The goal of the upgrade is to improve the 
pressure control system functions and ensure that 
it will remain in good condition until the end of the 
operating license period.
Fortum has taken into account all of the prob-
lems that occurred when implementing the project 
in Loviisa 1 and the problems observed during the 
2012 annual outages in the design, implementa-
tion and carrying out of the modification in order 
to develop its procedures based on the experi-
ences obtained from the similar project in Loviisa 
2. Fortum has improved its testing and inspec-
tion procedures during this project, particularly 
when it comes to electricity and I&C technology. 
Furthermore, project resources were doubled to 
ensure that the required competence will be avail-
able when needed and the work can be completed 
within the planned schedule.
Replacing float balls of the low-pressure 
safety injection system water tank
The conical bottoms of all of the low-pressure 
safety injection system water tanks at the Loviisa 
power plant were repaired during the 2012 annual 
outages. There are four tanks in both plant units. 
There are floating balls in the tanks. The balls set-
tle in the conical bottom part of the tank, seal the 
tank and prevent the nitrogen gas used when pres-
surising the tank from entering the reactor. The 
plan was to replace the balls in all of the pressure 
water tanks with new ones whose sealing surface 
has been milled during the 2013 annual outages, 
but only two balls in the Loviisa 2 tanks were ul-
timately replaced, because of delays in selecting 
the material of the balls and updating the welding 
procedure as well as manufacturing problems. The 
rest of the balls will be replaced during the 2014 
annual outages. The postponing of the replacement 
will not have any significant impact on safety, be-
cause stricter limit values for surface level and 
pressure monitoring of the tanks from the opera-
tional limits and conditions will be applied until 
the balls have been replaced. Furthermore, the op-
erators will release the nitrogen gas from the tanks 
whenever necessary to prevent it from entering the 
reactor coolant system past the balls. The fact that 
the conical bottoms were repaired in 2012 has also 
improved the situation.
Radiation measuring system upgrade
Fortum is about to start an upgrade of a radiation 
measuring system that was commissioned in the 
1990s. The system is used to measure the activity 
concentration of main steam. The radiation mea-
suring system will detect any leaks between the 
reactor coolant system and the secondary circuit. 
Spare parts are no longer available for the old ra-
diation measuring instruments. When upgrading 
the system, Fortum plans to implement structural 
improvements based on operating experience.
At present, the measuring point is in the tur-
bine hall upstream the safety and isolating valves 
in the steam flow direction. The plan is to move the 
measuring point to a location where it will be easi-
er to maintain and where the environmental condi-
tions will be more favourable. Radiation protection 
that will dampen radiation from sources other 
than the source to be measured can be added at the 
new measuring point location. This will make the 
noble gas measuring process more sensitive, which 
means that a leak from the reactor coolant system 
to the secondary circuit will be easier to detect.
STUK has requested that Fortum supplement 
some parts of the conceptual design plan it has 
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submitted to STUK. When supplementing the con-
ceptual design plan, Fortum decided to propose 
new, alternative structural solutions.
Development objects based 
on Fukushima accident
After the Fukushima accident in 2011, STUK 
sent a decision to the licensees concerning pro-
visions and plans to be made by the power com-
panies for natural phenomena and power sup-
ply disruptions. In 2013, STUK approved cooling 
tower design bases submitted by Fortum to secure 
residual heat removal from the reactors and fuel 
pools in a case where heat transfer to the sea has 
been lost. Four cooling towers will be built at the 
plant, two for each plant units. One of the towers 
in each plant unit will take care of residual heat 
removal from the reactor and the other from the 
fuel pools.
Fortum submitted reports on improving flood 
protection of the Loviisa power plant to STUK. 
Fortum must submit a related action plan by the 
end of 2014. STUK approved an implementation 
plan submitted by Fortum on improving the fuel 
pool cooling system. According to the plan, a re-
dundant system for verifying the cooling of the fuel 
pools in the reactor building will be built, and new 
connections will be added for the spent fuel storage 
pools to supply make-up water to the pools. STUK 
also approved Fortum’s plan on improving the 
battery capacity of the uninterrupted power sup-
ply system according to which the target battery 
lifetime is two hours. Some of the battery banks 
were replaced during the 2013 annual outage and 
the rest will be replaced during the 2014 annual 
outage. The battery stands were also replaced with 
models designed to endure earthquakes in con-
nection with the upgrade. Fortum has delivered a 
report on the availability of raw water in accident 
situations to STUK. The report also covers situa-
tions in which both plant units, as well as the fuel 
pools in the containments and in the interim stor-
age for spent nuclear fuel, need to be simultane-
ously cooled down.
Loviisa weather observation system upgrade
The weather observation system at the Loviisa 
power plant is being modernised. The plan is to re-
place both the mast and the equipment. The plant’s 
current weather observation mast dates back to 
the early 1970s and will soon reach the end of its 
service life. STUK approved a conceptual design 
plan for the new the Loviisa power plant weather 
observation system in 2013. The new mast will be 
around 115 metres in height. The plan is to add to 
the weather observation system one marine ob-
servation station around ten kilometres from the 
power plant. The plan is to use modern technol-
ogy in weather measuring to obtain clearly better 
information about the spreading of air than with 
the currently used system. Furthermore, the sys-
tem has been designed to withstand power failures 
lasting several days. The preliminary plan is to 
commission the system in 2016.
Loviisa environmental radiation 
measuring system upgrade
Some of the instruments included in the environ-
mental radiation measuring system at the Loviisa 
power plant have been replaced. The new system 
includes 28 measuring stations, compared to 17 in 
the old one. The system offers more detailed infor-
mation about the radiation status in the surround-
ings of the power plant during normal operation 
and in case of an accident. The system has been 
designed in such a manner that it will operate in-
dependently for several years without any external 
mains current. The new instruments were tested 
in the surroundings of the power plant in addition 
to the old system in 2013. The plan is to officially 
commission the system in 2014.
Repairs, modifications and upgrades
Each of the Loviisa power plant main steam lines 
include two safety valves (with staggered set pres-
sures). These have been qualified for steam flow 
only. The plan is to replace all of the safety valves 
with a lower set pressure (twelve valves in total) 
with new valves that have been qualified also for 
potential water and water/steam flow. Fortum is 
planning to replace the safety valves in Loviisa 2 
during the 2014 annual outage and the Loviisa 1 
valves during the 2015 annual outage. However, 
the design and procurement phase of the upgrade 
regulated by STUK did not proceed in compliance 
with the schedule given by Fortum in 2013.
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4.1.6 Spent nuclear fuel storage and 
NPP operational waste
The processing, storage and final disposal of low 
and intermediate level waste (NPP operational 
waste) at the Loviisa power plant were carried out 
as planned. The volume and activity of operational 
waste in relation to generated electrical power re-
mained low compared with most other countries. 
The contributing factors include the high quality 
requirements for nuclear waste management and 
nuclear fuel, the planning of maintenance and re-
pair operations, decontamination as well as com-
ponent and process modifications. In addition, the 
power plant employs efficient procedures for reduc-
ing the volume of waste destined for final disposal. 
Because of waste monitoring and sorting, some of 
the waste with a very low radioactive substance 
content can be exempted from control. Waste below 
the set activity limits was exempted from control 
at the power plant with STUK’s approval in 2013 
to be processed elsewhere. Waste exempted from 
control included operational waste, scrap metal for 
recycling and hazardous waste to be further pro-
cessed, such as waste oil and waste chemicals.
In 2013, STUK controlled operating waste man-
agement and final disposal of operating waste as 
well as the concrete and rock structures of the 
repository. STUK assessed reports and other docu-
ments submitted to it, performed control inspec-
tions and performed inspections included in the 
periodic inspection programme. At the beginning 
of 2013, the overall responsibility for the repository 
for operating waste during a reform of the division 
of labour in the Loviisa power plant organisation 
was transferred to the operational waste team. The 
reform changed the party in charge of the coordi-
nation and reporting of rock follow-up measure-
ments, for example. Follow-up measurements are 
used to ensure long-term safety of the repository. 
No significant deficiencies or development needs 
were observed during the inspections carried out 
in 2013.
Construction and commissioning of a 
liquid waste solidification facility
Implementation of a modification of the systems 
in the liquid waste solidification facility and trial 
runs were continued at the Loviisa power plant in 
2013. The modifications are implemented to im-
prove the systems and equipment because of tech-
nical deficiencies that were detected during trial 
runs in 2010. STUK approved Fortum’s application 
on continuing the trial runs of the solidification 
facility for liquid radioactive waste with solidifi-
cation of evaporator bottom and resin in compli-
ance with a plan included in the application. The 
Loviisa power plant also submitted updated project 
and commissioning plans to STUK for review. The 
power plant recruited the operating personnel of 
the solidification facility in 2013. Their training 
has already started and will be continued in 2014. 
The operating personnel have participated in the 
trial runs in compliance with STUK’s YVL Guide 
requirements.
The Loviisa power plant was able to complete 
most of the modifications of the first solidification 
facility’s systems and equipment as well as their 
test runs in 2013. STUK performed commissioning 
inspections of the modified systems and equipment 
and approved their trial run reports.
Testing of the solidification facility was con-
tinued in late 2013 by testing the solidification of 
evaporator bottom. The facility’s systems operated 
as planned in connection with the solidification 
test runs, but some leaks were detected in contain-
ers manufactured from reinforced concrete. It was 
noted in inspections after the solidification that 
there were dark spots on the walls of the contain-
ers. These were identified as cracks in further stud-
ies. The fact that the outer surface of the concrete 
structure seemed wet in the area where there were 
such cracks suggested leaks through the container 
wall. The Loviisa power plant discontinued the 
trial runs to study why the containers had been 
damaged. The trial runs will not be restarted un-
til the studies have been completed. STUK will 
Quantities of spent fuel and low-
and intermediate-level waste 
The volume of spent nuclear fuel stored on-site at 
the Loviisa power plant at the end of 2013 was 
4,657 assemblies (560 tU), an increase of 150 as-
semblies (18 tU). The volume of low- and interme-
diate-level waste finally disposed of was 1,886 m³. 
The total increase of volume from 2012 is 49 m³. 
Approximately 57% of the waste has been finally 
disposed of..
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continue assessing the situation once the Loviisa 
power plant has submitted a report on the damage 
in the concrete containers, the underlying reasons 
and planned further measures.
Expansion of repository for low- 
and intermediate-level waste
An expansion of the repository for low- and in-
termediate-level waste (the VLJ repository) was 
initiated at the Loviisa power plant in 2010. The 
expansion will comprise operational waste facility 
3 and a connecting tunnel. The new facility will 
be used for the sorting and temporary storage of 
operational waste.
According to a statement issued by the Ministry 
of Employment and the Economy, the expansion 
could be implemented subject to STUK’s approval 
and regulation. The Loviisa power plant submitted 
the operating license application for operational 
waste Facility 3 to STUK for approval in 2012. 
STUK issued its decision on the application on 
5 February 2013. A commissioning inspection by 
STUK will also be necessary before commissioning 
can take place.
Provisions for the costs of 
nuclear waste management
In compliance with section 88, subsection 2 of 
the Nuclear Energy Decree, Fortum provided the 
Ministry of Employment and the Economy with 
revised and supplemented waste management 
schemes and information on costs and prices of 
nuclear waste management measures. The update 
of the waste management scheme includes a re-
port on nuclear waste management measures and 
an estimate of the remaining waste management 
costs at the end of 2013, 2014 and 2015.
STUK reviewed the documents submitted in 
compliance with the Nuclear Energy Decree and 
submitted a statement regarding them to the 
Ministry of Employment and the Economy. In its 
statements, STUK assessed the technical plans 
and cost estimates on which the financial provi-
sions are based, considered them acceptable and 
stated that they can be used as the basis for the 
cost provisions. Fortum’s extent of liability was 
€1,059.2 million at the end of 2013.
According to the Nuclear Energy Decree, sup-
plemented waste management schemes for techni-
cal and financial plans, as well as related calcula-
tions, must be prepared every three years. The next 
revision will take place in 2016.
4.1.7 Organisational operations 
and quality management
Based on STUK’s regulation, it can be stated that 
with a view to ensuring safety, the organisation 
of Fortum Power and Heat Oy has operated in 
a systematic and development-oriented way. Over 
the course of the year, STUK has focused in its 
regulation on the processing of non-conformances, 
development of the management system and pro-
curement procedures, in particular.
In 2013, Fortum launched an internal procure-
ment procedure development project based on a 
study conducted. The plan with the project is to 
develop both the procurement process and related 
procedures. STUK has monitored progress of the 
project in several follow-up meetings. The project 
has proceeded as planned.
Furthermore, the Loviisa power plant imple-
mented a fairly major organisational reform that 
influenced investments and procurement in the 
spring of 2013. An investment unit was established 
to manage investments and strategic procurement. 
Responsibility for the procurement of spare parts 
was transferred to the maintenance unit in this or-
ganisational reform. Furthermore, work planning 
and the planning of annual outages were merged. 
The maintenance unit is in charge of these duties 
as well. The Loviisa power plant has drafted a 
safety analysis for the organisational reform and 
also updated its management code.
At the end of 2012, the Loviisa power plant ap-
plied for permission to deviate from the process 
management requirements in item 6 of YVL 1.4. 
STUK decided, however, that the Loviisa power 
plant must continue development of its manage-
ment system in compliance with the requirements 
of the YVL Guide. In connection with the periodic 
inspection programme, STUK has also monitored 
the process description and development work.
Fortum updated its management system de-
scription for nuclear operations subject to a licence 
at the end of the year. Over the course of the year, 
an investigation committee appointed by a unit 
of the licensee, Nuclear Safety Oversight (NSO), 
independently assessed the processing of events at 
the Loviisa nuclear power plant. The committee’s 
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report and recommendations have been handed 
over to STUK and the Loviisa power plant. The 
observations and recommendations in the report 
were similar to the observations made by STUK. 
The committee recommended that the Loviisa 
power plant should:
•	 	update	plant	data,	documentation	and	starting	
data used in design
•	 develop	its	procedures	and	add	all	procedures	in	
its process descriptions
•	 improve	its	work	supervision	measures
•	 develop	 the	 quality	management	process	used	
in connection with modifications
•	 better	 utilise	 lessons	 learned	 from	 operating	
events and other events and
•	 introduce	Human	Performance	 tools	 in	 its	 op-
erations.
STUK has requested an action plan for these cor-
rective measures from the Lovissa power plant. 
Furthermore, NSO performed an independent as-
sessment of the scope and functionality of a man-
agement system as laid down in YVL 1.4. The com-
mittee’s report and recommendations have been 
handed over to the Loviisa power plant and STUK 
for information.
In its regulation pertaining to personnel re-
sources and competence management, STUK dis-
covered that the Loviisa power plant has been able 
to improve the quality management and auditing 
competence of its employees by means of training. 
The quality management and radiation protection 
resources are currently fairly meagre when com-
pared to the duties. The power plant’s HR planning 
procedures have been developed since 2011. The 
new deadline for completing the development proj-
ect is 31 March 2014.
In the autumn of 2013, STUK ordered a study 
on the safety culture of Fortum’s nuclear opera-
tions (Nuclear Competence Center NCC) from VTT 
Technical Research Centre of Finland. The purpose 
with this study was to assess the current status 
of NCC’s safety culture, its strengths and areas 
requiring development as well as to assess the 
functionality and scope of the procedures used to 
assess the safety culture. The study report will be 
completed at the beginning of 2014.
STUK oversaw the oral examinations of shift 
personnel where the shift managers, operators and 
trainee operators prove that they are competent in 
all key issues related to plant operation and safety. 
In 2013, STUK granted 22 licenses to shift man-
agers and operators on application by the power 
company and following a successful oral examina-
tion, six of them to new operators. All participants 
passed their examinations in 2013. The new op-
erators achieved good results in the examination, 
which indicates that the basic training programme 
is effective. The operators renewing their licenses 
also achieved good results in the examination, 
which indicates that the power company’s re-
fresher courses and supplementary training are 
effective.
4.1.8 Fire safety
In 2013, STUK reviewed reports, carried out on-
site inspections, implemented a periodic inspec-
tion programme, and sent resident inspectors on 
their rounds to oversee the maintenance of the fire 
protection systems that ensure fire safety at the 
Loviisa power plant.
In a fire protection inspection STUK discovered 
that parts of the galvanised fire water piping at the 
Loviisa power plant are in poor condition. Damage 
caused by corrosion has also been detected in the 
fire water lines’ drip valves. Fortum will replace 
some valves and repair the fire water line piping 
as necessary. STUK requires a fire water system 
condition evaluation by an inspection organisa-
tion as part of the periodical safety review. STUK’s 
inspectors also detected defects in the archiving of 
the annual inspection records for the fire detection 
system. STUK has requested that the maintenance 
procedures be supplemented in terms of the docu-
mentation of work done.
4.1.9 Operating experience feedback
STUK assessed the operating experience feedback 
activities and corrective measures on the basis of 
reports, inspection visits and inspections within 
the periodic inspection programme. Three events 
rated as INES Category 1 took place during the 
course of the year: 1) boron feed pumps failed to 
start because of non-acknowledged simulations in 
Loviisa 1, 2) doors of ice condensers were wedged 
during load operation in Loviisa 1 and 3) relays in 
the diesel generators in Loviisa 2 malfunctioned.
The Loviisa power plant submitted seven spe-
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cial reports on the events in 2013 to STUK. In 
five of these events, the plant did not comply with 
the OLC; three of these non-conformance events 
were linked to the changing of the plant’s operat-
ing mode during startup after an annual outage 
or a repair outage. The Loviisa power plant also 
drafted special reports regarding the jamming of 
control rods in Loviisa 2, and malfunctions of aux-
iliary relays detected during the testing of emer-
gency diesel generators in Loviisa 2. The special 
reports were prepared and delivered to STUK in 
accordance with the requirements, but the power 
company’s investigation of some of the events re-
mained superficial and incomplete. For a more de-
tailed description of the events discussed in special 
reports, see Appendix 3.
Three root cause analyses were performed at 
the Loviisa power plant in 2013. These root cause 
analyses concerned the following events: 1) using 
voltage relays including programmable technol-
ogy that have not been qualified for the required 
safety class, 2) verifying the operability of a pres-
sure equalisation system that was upgraded dur-
ing the 2012 annual outage, and 3) management 
of changes in the OLC and their non-conformance 
with procedures.
In the operating experience feedback review, 
STUK verified procedures and practices related 
to the feedback operations. An operating experi-
ence and safety culture team has been established 
at the Loviisa power plant. It is responsible for 
the maintenance and development of the power 
plant’s operating experience feedback process. The 
operations have been continuously developed, pro-
cedures are currently being improved and some re-
source changes were implemented over the course 
of the year. The inspection included verification 
of the implementation of corrective measures in 
Loviisa and in other power plants on the basis of 
example cases. STUK found that there was room 
for improvement in the follow-up of corrective ac-
tions decided on the basis of operational events at 
the plant, as well as in the assessment of the effec-
tiveness of corrective actions.
Of the latest events at the Loviisa power plant, 
STUK recorded in the International Reporting 
System for Operating Experience (IRS) maintained 
by the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) 
one new report on problems that occurred dur-
ing the 2012 outage with the implementation of 
pressure management during a reactor coolant 
system modernisation project in Loviisa 1. STUK 
also decided to submit a report to IRS on the lead 
mats that were accidentally left on top of the re-
actor coolant system pipes in the lower compart-
ment of the reactor building in Loviisa 1 after the 
2012 maintenance outage. Furthermore, STUK 
will draft an IRS report on the problems with the 
moving of the control rods  during the startup after 
the 2013 maintenance outage in Loviisa 2.
The Loviisa power plant uses methods to assess 
and utilise operating experience from other plants. 
Event reports and events at other plants outside of 
Finland are systematically and comprehensively 
reviewed. Fortum itself conducts pre-screening of 
the reports coming from various sources, mainly 
via the World Association of Nuclear Operators 
(WANO) and the IRS database maintained by the 
IAEA. The plant is in direct contact with other 
VVER plants. All the information on events and 
malfunctions at the other plants is assessed to 
determine whether it applies to the Loviisa power 
plant.
Fortum is performing a variety of studies due 
to the Fukushima accident of 2011 to improve the 
capability of the plant units to cope with a variety 
of natural phenomena and power supply disrup-
tions. A summary of the development measures 
determined because of the Fukushima accident is 
available in Chapter 4.1.5.
STUK has its own operating experience feed-
back methods, which it uses to study and assess 
the operating experience provided by the Finnish 
power plants and the international channels to 
be used as the basis of its requirements, and to 
be able to assess the sufficiency of the procedures 
and measures applied by the power companies. 
In addition to the operating experience feedback 
review included in the 2013 periodic inspection 
programme, STUK has studied the situation at 
the Finnish power plants and the measures taken 
by the licensees based on the events for which an 
IRS report has been prepared during the peri-
odic inspections of the electricity and I&C systems, 
structural engineering and fire protection as well 
as during the periodic inspections performed in 
connection with the annual outages. There are 
summaries of the most important events in 2013 at 
other plants that have also influenced the Finnish 
plants in Chapter 11.
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4.1.10 Radiation safety of the plant, 
personnel and the environment
Occupational radiation safety
STUK carried out a radiation protection inspection 
as part of the periodic inspection programme at the 
Loviisa power plant, focusing on occupational radi-
ation safety in particular. The items to be inspected 
included radiation protection targets and the role 
of radiation protection when processing work per-
mits. The dosimeters used for measuring the occu-
pational radiation doses underwent annual tests. 
The tests comprised irradiating a sample of dosim-
eters at STUK’s measurement standard laboratory 
and reading the doses at the power plant. The test 
results were acceptable.
STUK carried out targeted radiation protection 
inspections during the annual outages. Radiation 
protection activities of the plant’s radiation protec-
tion personnel and employees within the controlled 
area were assessed during these inspections. Based 
on the inspection results, radiation protection at 
the plant is good: no major defects were observed. 
The power plant’s radiation protection organisa-
tion has developed methods to improve the occupa-
tional radiation safety of employees doing specific 
jobs. Individual targets for development were also 
observed in the inspections concerning the ar-
rangements of the protective equipment boundar-
ies of the controlled area and the use of protective 
equipment.
Replacing the seals of reactor coolant pumps 
with seals that do not contain antimony was con-
tinued at the Loviisa power plant to reduce the ac-
tivity level of the reactor coolant system. Two seals 
were replaced in Loviisa 1 and four seals in Loviisa 
2. One seal was replaced during the 2012 annual 
outages of Loviisa 1, which means that a total of 
seven of the twelve reactor coolant pump seals are 
now antimony-free. The dose rates are expected 
to decrease in the next few years, particularly in 
the lower compartment of the reactor building, 
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Figure 9. Annual radiation doses to the most exposed person of the public since the start of operation of the Lo-
viisa nuclear power plant. Over the recent years, the doses calculated based on the radioactive discharges have 
remained below one percent of the set limit, 0.1 milliSv.
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Figure 8. Collective occupational doses since the start of operation of the Loviisa nuclear power plant.
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since activated antimony (Sb-122 and Sb-124) has 
been a major cause of radiation doses at the power 
plant.
Radiation doses
The collective occupational radiation dose for the 
entire year was 0.33 manSv in Loviisa 1 and 0.21 
manSv in Loviisa 2. Refueling outages were imple-
mented at both of the Loviisa plant units. The 
outages were short and did not cause any ma-
jor workload. Because of this and because of the 
improvements made in the plant’s radiation pro-
tection, the collective occupational radiation dose 
was the lowest ever during the operation of the 
power plant. The collective occupational dose at the 
Loviisa power plant was lower than the collective 
doses at plants with pressurised water reactors 
(VVER) in OECD countries. According to the YVL 
Guide issued by STUK, the threshold for one plant 
unit’s collective dose averaged over two successive 
years is 2.5  manSv per gigawatt of net electrical 
power. This means a collective dose value of 1.24 
manSv per Loviisa plant unit. This threshold was 
not exceeded at either of the plant units.
Most of the occupational radiation dose of a 
nuclear power plant worker is accumulated during 
annual outages. The collective occupational ra-
diation dose caused by work carried out during the 
annual outages was 0.30 manSv in Loviisa 1 and 
0.18 manSv in Loviisa 2. The highest individual 
radiation dose incurred amounted to 5.0 mSv in 
Loviisa 1 and to 4.1 mSv in Loviisa 2. The high-
est individual dose incurred at either plant unit 
during the entire year was 8.6 mSv. This dose was 
caused by cleaning work.
The radiation doses for nuclear power plant 
workers remained below the individual dose limits. 
The effective dose for a worker from radiation work 
may not exceed the 20  manSv/year average over 
any period of five years, or 50 manSv during any 
single year.
The individual radiation dose distribution of 
workers at the Loviisa and Olkiluoto nuclear pow-
er plants in 2013 is given in Appendix 2.
Radioactive releases and environmental 
radiation monitoring
Radioactive releases into the environment from 
the Loviisa nuclear power plant remained well be-
low the authorised annual limits in 2013. Releases 
of radioactive noble gases into the air were ap-
proximately 6.5 TBq (as Kr-87-equivalent activity), 
which is approximately 0.05% of the authorised 
limit. The releases of radioactive noble gases were 
dominated by argon-41, the activation product of 
argon-40 originating in the air space between the 
reactor pressure vessel and the main radiation 
shield. Releases of iodine into the air were ap-
proximately 25 MBq (as I-131-equivalent activity), 
which is approximately 0.01  % of the authorised 
limit. Emissions through the vent stack also in-
cluded radioactive particulate matter amounting 
Table 2. NPP originated radioactive nuclides found in the environmental samples of  
the Loviisa power plant in 2013
Sample types containing detected radionuclides. Figures indicate the number of positive samples in a sample group. Several 
different nuclides may be found in the same sample.
Radionuclide 
Type of sample
H-3 Mn-
54
Co-58 Fe-59 Co-
60
Ag-
108
Ag-
110m
Te-
123m
Sb-124 Sb-
125
Total
Air 1 1
Fallout 1 1 6 7 15
Aquatic plants 4 4 8
Perifyton 2 2 1 4 4 2 2 1 18
Sedimenting  
materials 
1 6 1 5 1 1 15
Sediment 2 2
Seawater 2 2
Sludge 3 3
Total 2 4 3 1 26 1 20 3 3 1 64
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to 0.8 GBq, tritium amounting to 0.2 TBq and car-
bon-14 amounting to approximately 0.5 TBq.
The tritium content of liquid effluents released 
into the sea was 16 TBq, which is approximately 
11% of the release limit. Total activity of other 
nuclides released into the sea was about 1.2 GBq, 
which is 0.1% of the plant location-specific release 
limit.
The calculated radiation dose of the most ex-
posed individual in the vicinity of the plant was 
around 0.23 µSv per year, i.e. around 0.2% of the 
set limit (Appendix 1, indicator A.I.5c). The aver-
age person living in Finland receives an equivalent 
radiation dose from radiation sources in nature 
and in space in less than two hours. The dose of 
the most exposed individual in the vicinity of the 
Loviisa power plant was higher than usual in 2013 
because the power plant discharged low-activity 
evaporator bottom into the sea as planned (Fig. 9). 
Larger radiation doses in 2004 and 2009 were also 
caused by the discharge of evaporator bottom into 
the sea. The monitor monitoring the radioactiv-
ity of the discharge line for liquid releases did not 
function as planned during the planned release of 
evaporator bottom in 2013. The release remained 
clearly below the annual release limit based on 
samples taken from the letdown tanks, however. 
There is a more specific description of the event in 
Appendix 3.
A total of 300 samples were collected and ana-
lysed from the land and marine environment sur-
rounding the Loviisa power plant in 2013. External 
background radiation and the exposure to radioac-
tivity of people in the vicinity of the plant were also 
measured regularly. Extremely small amounts of 
radioactive substances originating from the nucle-
ar power plant were observed in some of the ana-
lysed environmental samples. The amounts were 
so small that they are insignificant in terms of the 
radiation exposure of the environment or people.
4.1.11  Emergency preparedness
STUK monitors the capability of the emergen-
cy preparedness organisations of nuclear power 
plants to act under abnormal conditions. No events 
requiring emergency response actions occurred at 
the Loviisa power plant in 2013.
Emergency preparedness at the Loviisa power 
plant complies with the key requirements. The 
emergency preparedness organisation of the 
Loviisa power plant consists of the organisation 
of the Loviisa power plant and of Fortum’s techni-
cal support organisation at Keilaniemi. STUK’s 
inspection of the emergency preparedness arrange-
ments of the Loviisa nuclear power plant included 
the inspection of the emergency preparedness or-
ganisation and its training, drills, equipment and 
facilities, alarm arrangements, environmental ra-
diation measurements, weather observations at the 
plant site, and the status of emergency prepared-
ness procedures. STUK required from the power 
plants systematic monitoring on participation in 
emergency preparedness training and drills as well 
as a report on repairs and changes made during 
the commissioning of the emergency preparedness 
data transfer system. Modifications of emergen-
cy preparedness operations based on the lessons 
learned from the Fukushima accident have been 
completed or are being completed. Some of the new 
requirements laid down in the Government Decree 
on Emergency Response Arrangements at Nuclear 
Power Plants (716/2013) have been met and the 
details of other requirements are further specified 
in the application decision of the YVL Guide.
The emergency preparedness data transfer sys-
tem was upgraded in 2012 and its commissioning 
continued in early 2013. The system is used to 
transfer key measuring parameters of the plant’s 
processes to STUK’s emergency preparedness cen-
tre and Fortum’s emergency preparedness room 
at Keilaniemi. Minor modification needs were ob-
served in the system after its commissioning, and 
these modifications were implemented and tested 
throughout 2013. The data transfer system was 
used in data connection tests and drills, for ex-
ample.
An extensive cooperation drill, Loviisa 13, took 
place at the Loviisa power plant in March. In ad-
dition to the power plant, around sixty central, 
regional and location administration organisations 
participated in the drill. The drill was also a sce-
nario for a drill arranged in the Nordic and Baltic 
countries.
4.1.12  Physical protection
A review of the physical protection at the Loviisa 
power plant by STUK included commissioning a 
new alarm centre and surveillance system, train-
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ing offered to the protection organisation and a 
training plan for a new physical protection tool 
to be commissioned at a later date. The review 
also covered a drill arranged together with several 
authorities. The licensee has developed its inter-
nal training procedures and implemented internal 
drills based on the drill arranged together with 
other authorities. STUK reviewed the physical pro-
tection at the plant also during the annual outage. 
The inspection focused on the resources needed for 
the maintenance of adequate physical protection 
during an annual outage, development measures 
and their status during the outage, and surveil-
lance of the refueling area. The power plant has 
improved the physical protection in accordance 
with the principle of continuous improvement.
An information security review by STUK fo-
cused on I&C systems of the Loviisa power plant. 
Other data system environments of the plant were 
also studied, however. Continuous improvement of 
information security requires further investments 
from the power plant. The Loviisa power plant 
implemented a comprehensive risk assessment 
based on the requirements laid down in a previous 
review. The risk assessment dealt with I&C system 
upgrades. According to STUK’s estimate, the risk 
assessment was carried out using the best informa-
tion security practices.
4.1.13 Safeguards of Nuclear Materials
A total of ten safeguard inspections were carried 
out at the Loviisa power plant in 2013 . This is 
slightly more than usual. STUK performed an 
inspection of the physical inventory of nuclear 
materials together with IAEA and the European 
Commission both before and after the maintenance 
outages. Furthermore, STUK inspected the loca-
tions of the reactor core fuel assemblies prior to 
closing of the reactor cover in Loviisa 1 and Loviisa 
2. STUK performed one interim safeguards inspec-
tion and another together with the Commission. 
A surveillance camera  of the international organ-
isations was maintained in connection with the 
Commission inspection. IAEA performed two un-
announced inspections of the spent fuel storage 
pool during the course of the year. STUK partici-
pated in both inspections. Due to an extra outage 
in the autumn, IAEA, the Commission and STUK 
performed two extra safeguards inspections in 
Loviisa 2 because the preliminary data suggested 
that fuel might have to be transferred with the 
cover open in Loviisa 2. No remarks were made in 
the inspections.
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Figure 10. Amounts of uranium and plutonium at the Loviisa NPP.
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4.2 Olkiluoto nuclear power 
plant units 1 and 2
4.2.1 Overall safety assessment of 
Olkiluoto 1 and Olkiluoto 2
STUK oversaw the safety of the Olkiluoto power 
plant and assessed its organisation in different 
areas by means of reviewing materials provided 
by the licensee, carrying out inspections in line 
with the periodic inspection programme, and by 
overseeing operations at the plant. On the basis 
of this regulatory oversight, STUK can state that 
plant operations did not cause a radiation haz-
ard to the employees, population or the environ-
ment. The radiation doses of the employees were 
the lowest in the entire history of the plant, mostly 
because of plant modifications that reduced the 
humidity level of the steam drained to the turbine 
island. Radioactive releases into the environment 
were also low; they remained below the prescribed 
limits. Emergency preparedness at the Olkiluoto 
power plant complies with the requirements. The 
processing, storage and final disposal of low and 
intermediate level waste (operating waste) at the 
power plant have been arranged in compliance 
with the requirements.
According to the tests and inspections carried 
out, the condition of the containment and the reac-
tor coolant system, which prevents the release of 
radioactive materials into the environment, comply 
with the requirements. One leaking fuel assembly 
was removed from the reactor of Olkiluoto 2 during 
the annual outage.
The plant’s operation has been, for the most 
part, systematic and safe. In 2013, four events 
warranting a special report were reported. These 
events did not have any essential safety signifi-
cance, however. The events are described in more 
detail in Appendix 3.
In the annual outages of the plant units, low 
voltage switchgear was replaced in Olkiluoto 2 in 
compliance with a plan covering a period of several 
years. A large number of maintenance measures 
and inspections are also carried out during each 
annual outage to ensure the safe and reliable oper-
ation of the power plant. Several upgrade projects 
that will improve plant safety which have been 
designed based on assessments of the Fukushima 
accident are currently ongoing at the power plant. 
These modifications will improve the provisions for 
extreme external threats. For example, the modifi-
cations will improve systems used to cool the reac-
tor and add whole new systems for pumping water 
into the reactor in case of a complete loss of AC 
power. Other ongoing projects include an upgrade 
of the power plant’s emergency diesel generators 
where the eight diesel generators will be replaced 
and a ninth generator will be built. Furthermore, 
the plant is planning to build remote shutdown 
stations to improve the functionality of the current 
remote control systems.  An expansion project of 
the spent fuel storage pool proceeded as planned 
in 2013. Preparations for the commissioning of the 
storage pool are ongoing. TVO submitted to STUK 
for approval several applications regarding chang-
es to the operational limits and conditions which 
are part of a reform of said document’s justification 
chapters.
Based on STUK’s oversight and the results of 
operating activities, it can be stated that, with a 
view to ensuring safety, TVO’s organisation has 
operated in a systematic and development-oriented 
way. Over the course of the year, STUK focused 
its oversight on TVO’s management procedures, 
modification and procurement processes, and the 
processing of non-conformances. STUK also moni-
tored TVO’s plans linked to the commissioning of 
Olkiluoto 3. According to these plans, the manage-
ment system and organisation of the Olkiluoto 3 
project will be merged with the management sys-
tem of Olkiluoto 1 and Olkiluoto 2. TVO has sev-
eral ongoing development projects on systematic 
development of the ERP system and management 
system as well as the management of modifica-
tions.
4.2.2 Operation of the plant units, 
events during operation and 
prerequisites for safe operation
Compliance with operational 
limits and conditions
TVO has ensured that the operational limits and 
conditions (OLC) of the Olkiluoto power plant are 
up to date. The OLC list the values within which 
nuclear power plant units must remain during op-
eration. STUK has monitored compliance with the 
requirements and limits laid down in the OLC, the 
process used to ensure that the OLC remain up to 
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Table 3. Events at the Olkiluoto plant units subject to special reports or a root cause analysis and/or classified 
INES Level 1 or higher. All events subject to reporting are discussed in Appendix 1 (indicator A.II.1).
Event
Non-compli-
ances with the 
OLC
Special report INES rating
Defects in maintenance of a reactor coolant pump in Olkiluoto 2 • 0
Non-compliance in management of work pertaining to reactor 
cooling at Olkiluoto 2
• • 0
Material faults detected during maintenance of emergency diesel 
generator at Olkiluoto 2
• 0
Non-conformance with administrative procedures when working 
in a cross-connection room at Olkiluoto 1
• • 0
Operation and operational events
The load factor of Olkiluoto  1 was 97.1% and that 
of Olkiluoto  2 was 93.1%. The annual outages have 
a major effect on the load factors. The outage of 
Olkiluoto 1 lasted a little less than eight days, while 
that of Olkiluoto 2 lasted for more than 18 days. The 
losses in gross energy output due to operational tran-
sients and component malfunctions were 0.35% in 
Olkiluoto 1 and 1.95% in Olkiluoto 2.
A turbine trip occurred in Olkiluoto 2 on 9 
September 2013 because of a tripped earth fault 
protector of a generator's stator. This caused a main-
tenance outage that lasted from 9 September 2013 
to 15 September 2013. Safety functions operated as 
planned during the event, and the event did not com-
promise reactor safety.
A reactor coolant pump was maintained during 
the annual outage of Olkiluoto 2. An impeller was ac-
cidentally replaced with a sealing plug of the wrong 
type in one of the reactor coolant pumps. The wrong 
plug type was detected when more water than normal 
started to leak from the reactor pressure vessel into 
the reactor coolant leakage drain system. The power 
company identified several human errors as the un-
derlying causes of this event. These human errors are 
linked with the plant's work procedures and commu-
nication.
During the annual outage of Olkiluoto 2, TVO 
observed that one of the heat exchangers used to cool 
spent nuclear fuel was dirty. Dirt will reduce the 
performance of a heat exchanger, which is why TVO 
decommissioned the heat exchanger for cleaning. TVO 
inadvertently started this maintenance action at the 
wrong time. Other annual outage works on the cooling 
system were being simultaneously carried out, and 
thus some of the requirements on operability of the 
systems and equipment in the operational limits and 
conditions (OLC) were no longer met.
Material faults were detected during the mainte-
nance of an emergency diesel generator in Olkiluoto 
2. The wound core of a rotor manufactured from flat 
bar copper had been extended with silver solder at 
some points when the rotor was being repaired in 
the autumn. In a visual inspection, the subcontractor 
repairing the generator detected two major indica-
tions in one of the solder joints. Furthermore, small 
indications were detected in two solder joints. In ad-
dition to the indications found in the solder joints, 
two of the eight stator weld joints in the generator 
exciter were cracked. Because of this fault, the weld 
joints of all of the plant's exciters were studied with 
an endoscope. Another similarly cracked joint was 
found. The detected material faults have not rendered 
the emergency diesel generators of the nuclear power 
plants inoperable. There are four diesel generators at 
both of Olkiluoto's operating plants. Their operability 
is tested monthly.
During preparations for an upgrade of the fire ex-
tinguishing system in the cable rooms below the relay 
rooms, employees needed to enter a cross-connection 
room to install a new cable. The employees were al-
lowed to enter the control room's cross-connection 
room alone without supervising operating personnel. 
The event did not comply with a requirement included 
in the operational limits and conditions (OLC) which 
states that the door of the  cross-connection room must 
always be opened by permanent  operating personnel.
The events are described in more detail in 
Appendix 3.
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with a shift supervisor license and two of the shift 
personnel would suffice. STUK wished to eliminate 
the possibility of the OLC being interpreted in this 
way because it is important in case of a transient, 
for instance, that the reactor operator and the 
turbine operator are present in addition to the 
leading shift supervisor. STUK approved 16 of the 
amendments as such or with minor modifications. 
Two amendment proposals were approved partly 
or with additional requirements.
date when modifications, tests and safety analyses 
are reviewed, and supervised the licensee’s actions 
onsite. When annual outages ended, STUK verified 
that the OLC were up to date and the plant unit 
complied with the OLC prior to issuing a permit to 
startup of the plant unit. TVO continued develop-
ment of the OLC to improve their justification and 
clarify the requirements.
In 2013, TVO reported two events during which 
the plant was non-compliant with the OLC without 
an advance safety analysis and STUK’s permis-
sion. All of these non-conformances were uninten-
tional. In one of the cases, the non-conformance 
with the OLC was caused by an administrative 
error in work pertaining to reactor cooling during 
the annual outage. The second case was a non-con-
formance with the administrative procedures when 
working in a cross-connection room in Olkiluoto 
1. The individual events did not put the plant or 
its surroundings at risk. TVO analysed all events 
and defined corrective measures to prevent simi-
lar events from recurring. STUK oversees the li-
censee’s operations at the plant site and carries out 
random inspections to ensure compliance with the 
requirements and limits of the OLC. No non-con-
formances were observed in the 2013 inspections.
Over the course of the year, TVO submitted 
to STUK for approval 18 amendment proposals 
for the operational limits and conditions. Most of 
the amendments were due to modifications and 
equipment replacements carried out at the plant, 
as well as an OLC development project. One of the 
amendments was due to a requirement by STUK 
regarding minimum manning in the plant area 
during power operation. STUK paid attention to 
the fact that the OLC can be interpreted as stating 
that the entire operating shift need not be onsite 
at all times and that the presence of two persons 
Figure 13. Daily average gross power of the Olkiluoto plant in 2012.
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TVO applied for permission from STUK for four 
planned deviations from the operational limits 
and conditions (Appendix 1, indicator A.I.2). All 
of these applications were linked to modifications. 
One of the applications was linked to an upgrade of 
a radiation measuring channel in Olkiluoto 2 and 
three of them were linked to an expansion of the 
spent fuel storage pool. As the planned deviations 
had no significant safety implications, STUK ap-
proved the applications.
Operation and operational events
STUK oversaw the operation on a daily basis at 
the plant site, reviewed regular reports on oper-
ating activities and event reports and performed 
three inspections of operations that focused on the 
responsibilities and duties of the operating unit 
during modifications, actions during an annual 
outage and operating experience feedback. The re-
sults of the inspections are described in Appendix 
5 of this report.
No events leading to a reactor trip occurred 
at the Olkiluoto nuclear power plant during the 
course of the year. Seven events classified as opera-
tional transients occurred. Most of the operational 
transients were caused when .one of the reactor 
coolant pumps slowed down as planned due to a 
disturbance in the external power supply.  One 
turbine trip took place in Olkiluoto 2 because of a 
tripped earth fault protector. A generator breaker 
tripped in Olkiluoto 1 because of a fault in the 
generator exciter surge arrester. One of the opera-
tional transients was caused by the erroneous clos-
ing of an HP turbine control valve in Olkiluoto 1.
Events warranting a special report included de-
fects in the maintenance of a reactor coolant pump 
and the management of work linked to the cooling 
Annual outage of Olkiluoto 2
The maintenance outage of Olkiluoto 2 lasted for 
a little more than 18 days, which was more than 
24 hours longer than expected. The delays were 
caused by the replacement of a pulse sensor of a 
control rod y and problems with creating a vacu-
um in the condenser.
Around one fifth of the nuclear fuel was re-
placed during the annual outage. The most major 
modifications implemented included replacing low 
voltage switchgears of two trains. In addition 
to the modifications, a considerable number of 
inspections, maintenance work, repairs and tests 
were carried out on systems, equipment and struc-
tures.
A fuel leak was detected in the plant unit at the 
end of the fuel cycle in May 2013. The leaking fuel 
assembly was located and removed from the reac-
tor during the annual outage. The fuel leak had 
no significance in terms of the radiation safety of 
the environment, as the released radioactivity was 
contained within the plant.
Wall thicknesses falling below the nominal 
thickness (87.5% of the nominal thickness) were 
observed at several points in erosion corrosion 
measurements of the piping of Olkiluoto 2 dur-
ing the annual outage. TVO proved by means of 
strength calculations that the wall thickness at the 
thinner points is still sufficient. These observations 
are described in more detail in Chapter 4.2.4.
Two events warranting a special report took 
place during the annual outages. An impeller 
was accidentally replaced with a sealing plug 
of the wrong type in one of the reactor coolant 
pumps during the annual outage. The wrong plug 
type was detected when more water than normal 
started to leak from the reactor pressure vessel 
into the reactor coolant leakage drain system. The 
second event occurred when TVO decommissioned 
one of the heat exchangers in order to clean it, 
which caused a non-conformance with some of the 
requirements in the operational limits and condi-
tions on operability of systems and equipment.
Annual outage of Olkiluoto 1
The refueling outage of Olkiluoto  1 lasted for a 
little less than eight days, which was slightly less 
than 24 hours longer than expected. The delay was 
caused by a fault in the surface level measuring 
system of a floor drain in the containment prior to 
startup and problems with the synchronisation of 
a generator breaker in connection with the startup.
During the annual outage, one fifth of the 
nuclear fuel was replaced. No major modifications 
are carried out during a refueling outage; instead, 
the work mainly consists of inspections, mainte-
nance, repairs and tests of systems, equipment and 
structures, such as fuel inspections and leak tests 
of containment isolation valves.
STUK-B 176
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and the unavailability of equipment together with 
a logical model of the plant’s systems and their in-
terdependencies.
The annual probability of a severe reactor acci-
dent calculated for the Olkiluoto plant was around 
1.21 · 10–5/year at the end of 2013, which is around 
10% lower than in 2012 (1.35 · 10–5/year).
The key reason why the core damage fre-
quency was lower than in 2012 is that a system 
was commissioned that will automatically submit 
any report of an oil spill at sea submitted to the 
Satakunta rescue services to the Olkiluoto power 
plant as well. This means that the power plant will 
be more likely to initiate measures to prevent un-
availability of the service water system due to the 
oil spill because it will be informed of the accident 
in due time.
TVO has introduced separate risk models for 
Olkiluoto 1 and Olkiluoto 2. At present, the differ-
ences in core damage frequency are only fractions 
of a percent. The differences between the units will 
increase in the next few years because significant 
plant modifications will be implemented in stages.
The accident risk at the Olkiluoto power plant 
and its changes are discussed in more detail in 
Section A.II.4 of Appendix 1, Accident risk of nucle-
ar facilities.
4.2.4 Integrity of structures and equipment
STUK assessed the integrity of equipment and 
structures important to safety in Olkiluoto 1 and 
Olkiluoto 2 with inservice inspections and by moni-
toring and inspecting repairs and modifications of 
systems, equipment and structures. Most of these 
repairs and modifications were implemented in 
connection with the annual outages in the spring 
of 2013. No observations that would limit the safe 
operation of pressure equipment, piping or other 
equipment and structures were made in these in-
spections.
Reactor coolant system
STUK has asked TVO to study the significance 
of chloride deposits in the reactor control rod ac-
tuators when securing the integrity of the reactor 
coolant system. In 2011, some values exceeding 
the allowed chloride content were detected when 
parts were replaced in compliance with a mainte-
nance plan. Further studies revealed that the al-
of the reactor, material faults detected when main-
taining an emergency diesel generator, and a non-
conformance with the key handover procedure of a 
cross-connection room below the control room. The 
events are described in more detail in Appendix 3.
In 2013, risks caused by component malfunc-
tions, preventive maintenance and other events 
causing unavailability of equipment were 2.8% 
and 11.0% of the expected value of the annual ac-
cident risk calculated using the plant’s risk model 
for Olkiluoto 1 and Olkiluoto 2, respectively. The 
results were in line with those of previous years.
Annual maintenance outages
The Olkiluoto 1 refueling outage was from 12 May 
to 20 May 2013 and the maintenance outage of 
Olkiluoto 2 from 26 May to 14 June 2013 . During 
an annual outage, equipment and structures im-
portant to plant safety are inspected, serviced, 
replaced or modified. These measures ensure the 
preconditions for operating the power plant safely 
during the following fuel cycles. In addition, some 
of the nuclear fuel is replaced with fresh fuel dur-
ing the annual outages. STUK oversees that the 
licensee ensures the safe completion of the annual 
maintenance work and prevents radiation haz-
ards to the plant employees and the environment. 
STUK performed an annual outage inspection in 
compliance with the inspection programme during 
the annual outage.
4.2.3 Ensuring plant safety functions
Deterministic safety analyses
An extensive evaluation of the transient and ac-
cident analyses (deterministic safety analyses) car-
ried out to verify the safety functions of the plant 
has been performed in connection with the periodic 
safety review of 2009. Since then, TVO has fur-
ther supplemented the sections of the transient 
and accident analyses that concern an extension of 
postulated accidents and loss of coolant accidents. 
In 2013, no updated deterministic safety analyses 
were delivered to STUK.
Probabilistic risk analyses
The risk of a severe nuclear accident is evaluated 
on the basis of a probabilistic risk analysis (PRA). 
As a rule, PRA calculations use regularly updated 
information on the occurrences of initiating events 
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lowed values had been exceeded before as well. The 
significance of chlorides to corrosion resistance of 
parts manufactured from non-corrosive materials 
was studied in the case of specific sleeves manufac-
tured from acid-proof steel, for example. The tight-
ly sealing contact surface of these sleeves could 
become susceptible to corrosion when paired with a 
graphite seal. It was determined, however, that the 
chlorides in the seals do not influence the plant’s 
water chemistry because the chloride content is 
very low when compared to the water volume in 
the reactor.
In 2013, TVO submitted a non-conformance re-
port regarding the excessive chloride content and 
the other required reports for approval. STUK ap-
proved these reports with remarks. In its decision, 
STUK required that the power company compare 
the results of trip tests with the results from the 
previous years to ensure that any non-conformanc-
es are detected prior to submitting the startup 
permit application for Olkiluoto 2. Furthermore, 
STUK required that TVO specify the chloride 
contents of the new graphite seals to be installed 
during the annual outage of Olkiluoto 2, study the 
need to replace the graphite seals based on studies 
of the parts to be removed and draft an operational 
policy based on this data to be submitted to STUK 
for approval by 31 December 2013.
During the 2013 annual outage, TVO started 
inspecting the supporting feet of moderator tanks 
in the reactors in Olkiluoto 1 and Olkiluoto 2. A 
decision to inspect the supporting feet was made 
because two cracks were found in almost identical 
supporting structures in Sweden in 2011. The in-
spections were started at the reactor of Olkiluoto 2 
with a camera. Six of the eighteen supporting feet 
were inspected before the camera got stuck close to 
the bottom of the reactor. The interrupted inspec-
tion was complemented by verifying by means of 
ultrasonic testing the integrity of the seal weld 
connected to the reactor sheath in all of the sup-
porting feet. A wider area of the reactor pressure 
vessel sheath close to the supporting feet was 
also inspected with the ultrasound device. These 
inspections verified that there are no cracks ex-
tending up to the reactor pressure vessel’s interior 
surface coating in the supporting feet, and that the 
wall of the reactor pressure vessel is intact in the 
studied areas. The plan is to continue the inspec-
tions during the 2014 annual outage.
An indication at one of the welded joints of the 
reactor feedwater system has been monitored by 
means of ultrasound and eddy current examina-
tions during inservice inspections since the indica-
tion was detected in 2003. The indication’s depth 
(around 10 mm) has not changed in any significant 
manner. The same qualified inspection methods 
have been consistently used. The nozzle has also 
been inspected with a new ultrasound technique 
since 2011. The inspection was carried out under-
water. It was a combination of the eddy current 
method to detect indications close to the surface 
and multi-channel phased ultrasound technology 
to detect indicators deeper down. The depth of the 
indication when measured with this method was 
15.3 mm in 2011, 2012 and 2013. The weld was 
also inspected from the outside using the phased 
method in 2013. The depth of the indication when 
measured in this manner was 23 mm, which sug-
gests that the weld only has 10–11 mm of intact 
neck left. A separate eddy current inspection was 
also carried out to verify that the fault has not 
penetrated the wall. According to strength calcula-
tions made with the new fault size, the indication 
still complies with the size criteria laid down in 
the standard (ASME XI), and it is not possible, 
based on the measuring data, that the indication 
could increase to close to the acceptance limit de-
termined based on the fracture mechanism within 
the next few years. TVO has proposed to STUK 
that the fault be annually inspected and assessed 
during the following three years. STUK approved 
TVO’s proposal.
Fuel and control rods
No abnormal observations were made during the 
fuel inspections in connection with the Olkiluoto 
1 annual outage. The assemblies and channels be-
haved normally when taking into account their 
burnup. Two irradiated fuel assemblies were re-
paired in Olkiluoto 2 in late 2013. A leak was de-
tected in one of the assemblies during the annual 
outage. When inspecting the assembly, it was also 
noted that the supporting structures of the as-
sembly had been dislocated. A similar bundle that 
was inspected during the 2011 annual outage was 
also inspected after the annual outage to study 
the underlying cause for the damage and non-con-
formances. It is likely that the supports moved 
after the previous inspections when an old guide 
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thimble was used to place the fuel assembly into 
the channel. The plan is to place the assemblies 
back into the reactor once repaired.
The planned visual inspections and dimen-
sion measurements of the fuel assemblies and 
channels were implemented during the fuel cycle 
2012–2013. All of the planned inspections were 
performed, except for the channel dimension mea-
surements: fewer dimension measurements than 
planned were performed in Olkiluoto 2.
Maintenance and management of ageing
Inservice inspections
TVO submitted the inservice inspection plans re-
garding the 2013 inspection programmes to STUK, 
and STUK approved the plans before the inspec-
tions to be implemented during the annual outages 
were started. The plans concerned volumetric and 
visual inspections of the reactor pressure vessels in 
the plant units and inservice inspections of equip-
ment. Risk-informed methods are used in the non-
destructive testing of piping. The risk-informed 
methods involve inspecting points important to 
safety more often than other points. No significant 
changes from the previous inspections were ob-
served in the inspections performed in 2013.
Wall thicknesses falling below the nominal 
thickness were observed in erosion corrosion mea-
suring of the turbine island’s main condensate pip-
ing system during the annual outage of Olkiluoto 
2. TVO repaired these areas by means of deposition 
welding. STUK required that follow-up measure-
ments of the thinner areas be taken during the 
2014 annual outage. The wall thickness of some 
pipes was also deemed thinner than normal in ero-
sion measurements in Olkiluoto 1. TVO proved by 
means of strength calculations, however, that the 
wall thickness at the thinner points is still suf-
ficient.
According to the erosion inspection report, TVO 
plans to replace the above-mentioned deposition 
welded elbow pipe section in Olkiluoto 1 and de-
termine by means of ultrasound studies whether 
there is need to replace the other lines. TVO will 
either repair any points where the wall thickness 
has fallen to the calculated minimum by means of 
deposition welding or replace these pipes. STUK 
will assess the deposition welding of the piping and 
follow-up measures of the erosion inspections in 
connection with its inspections. The nuclear safety 
class of the piping to be subjected to erosion inspec-
tions is not high, although these pipes are signifi-
cant in terms of pressure equipment safety.
Management of ageing
STUK’s Ageing Management Committee plans and 
coordinates STUK’s regulatory duties pertaining 
to the ageing of nuclear facility systems, equip-
ment and structures. The regulatory activities fo-
cus on any structures or equipment important to 
the nuclear safety of the Finnish nuclear power 
plants where faults or increased repair needs have 
been observed. The committee addresses such cas-
es and demands corrective measures by the licens-
ees if it deems that the condition monitoring or 
maintenance has been defective. The committee 
also assesses events at nuclear facilities outside 
Finland and any links between them and the moni-
toring of the ageing of the Finnish nuclear power 
plants. In Olkiluoto, the committee has focused on 
the prolonged operating times of relief valves, the 
condition of concrete structures in the service wa-
ter systems, emergency diesel generators and the 
supporting feet of the moderator tank because of 
the cracks observed at a Swedish sister plant (see 
above).
STUK assessed the condition monitoring of 
plant components important to safety that TVO 
implements during operation of the plant either in 
real time or by means of periodic measurements 
and observations to verify that the scope and im-
plementation method of the condition monitoring 
of different plant components is sufficient when 
taking into account their impact on safety. STUK 
inspected plant rounds by the operating group, 
inservice testing and other condition monitoring 
measures during operation, such as vibration and 
leak monitoring. Based on the inservice testing 
results reviewed during the inspection, it seemed 
that the functional capacity of the heat exchangers 
in the residual heat removal chain had gradually 
decreased to such an extent that one of them only 
barely met the heat transfer criterion. This is why 
STUK required that TVO study the underlying 
reasons for the permanent decrease of the heat 
transfer capacity of these heat exchangers and as-
sess whether similar decreases have occurred in 
any other heat exchangers important to safety. No 
significant defects were observed in the inspection, 
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however.
The condition of a channel on the inlet side of 
the Olkiluoto 2 turbine island is being monitored 
because minor washing off of the bonding agent of 
the concrete structure’s board form surfaces has 
been detected. The status of the channel was last 
inspected during the 2013 annual outage and no 
significant changes were observed.
Emergency diesel generators
The risk of the bottom bearings of the connect-
ing rods in the emergency diesel generators at 
the Olkiluoto plant being damaged is being stud-
ied based on international operating experience. 
Damage has been observed at other plants in bear-
ings manufactured by the manufacturer of the 
bearings used in the engines. STUK required that 
TVO study how reliable operation of the diesels 
can be verified. According to a report submitted 
by TVO, the bearings susceptible to damage have 
been used in engines that are not of the same 
type as the engines in Olkiluoto. According to the 
report, the dimensions of the bearing strips in the 
Olkiluoto diesel engines are not the same as those 
of the susceptible bearing type, which means that 
the bearings will be subjected to lower pressure, 
lower circumferential speed and lower risk of pre-
mature wear. STUK approved the report on 17 
June 2013.
A crack was observed in a solder joint of a core 
winding during an overhaul of an emergency diesel 
generator in Olkiluoto 1. The rotor’s wound core, 
which is manufactured from flat bar copper, had 
been extended with silver solder at some points. 
An indication was observed in a visual inspection 
of one of these solder joints. TVO ordered a dam-
age study which proved that there were cracks 
in the solder joints already when they were made 
in the 1970s. It was verified by means of electron 
microscopy that ageing phenomena during opera-
tion (such as sparking or fatigue) had not occurred. 
The windings that had been cut in order to perform 
the damage study were repaired with a qualified 
soldering method.
Cracks were also found in two stator weld joints 
of the generator’s exciter during the same over-
haul. An event report and a weld repair plan were 
drafted. The weld joints of the exciters that were in 
operation at the power plants were also inspected 
because of this observation. One broken weld was 
detected. It will be repaired during maintenance 
once the overhaul of the current generator is com-
plete. The detected faults have not rendered the 
emergency diesel generators of the nuclear power 
plants inoperable. There are four diesel  genera-
tors at both of the operable Olkiluoto plants. Their 
operability is tested monthly.
Containment
STUK noted that the containment complies with 
the design requirements laid down for it. No sig-
nificant observations were made in the latest leak 
tests performed in 2012.
4.2.5 Development of the plant and its safety
Construction of an remote 
shutdown station in Olkiluoto
Pursuant to a government decree, a nuclear power 
plant must have a remote shutdown station in-
dependent of the control room, and the necessary 
local control systems for shutting down and cooling 
the nuclear reactor, and for removing residual heat 
from the nuclear reactor and spent fuel stored at 
the plant in a situation where operations in the 
main control room are not possible.
TVO is in the process of constructing remote 
shutdown stations for the Olkiluoto units currently 
in operation in compliance with the requirements 
set out in STUK’s implementation decision re-
garding YVL Guide 5.5 and in the periodic safety 
assessment of Olkiluoto. STUK reviewed and ap-
proved a conceptual design plan for the remote 
shutdown stations in 2012. Final design documen-
tation is expected to be completed in early 2014. 
The plan is to commission the remote shutdown 
stations in Olkiluoto 2 in 2015 and in Olkiluoto 1 
in 2016.
Replacing diesel generators
In 2012, STUK approved a conceptual design plan 
submitted by TVO on replacing all of the emergen-
cy diesel generators in Olkiluoto 1 and Olkiluoto 
2. There are four emergency diesel generators in 
both of the currently operating Olkiluoto plants. 
Furthermore, a ninth emergency diesel generator 
will be shared by the plant units. It will be used 
during upgrades, for instance, to replace the plant 
unit’s own diesel generator that is being upgraded. 
In addition to the diesel generator upgrade, the 
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plan is to improve the cooling of the diesel engines 
by building an air cooling system independent of 
the service water cooling system.
STUK approved the updated conceptual design 
plan for the diesel generator upgrade in early 2013. 
According to a preliminary estimate, the emergen-
cy diesel generator to be shared by the plant units 
will be installed and commissioned in the spring of 
2016. It has been estimated that the installation 
and commissioning of all the new diesel generators 
will be completed by the spring of 2020. TVO has 
selected Wärtsilä Finland as the new emergency 
diesel generator supplier.
Auxiliary feed water system 
recirculation line modification
TVO submitted pre-inspection documents for a 
modification of a recirculation line in the auxiliary 
feed water system to STUK for approval. The modi-
fication consists of draining the recirculation lines 
to the demineralised water storage pools that are 
also used as the water source by the auxiliary feed 
water system. In addition to the pipe, the neces-
sary drain valves and strainers to prevent foreign 
objects from entering the storage pools will be in-
stalled in the lines. The modification will not influ-
ence the auxiliary feed water system in any other 
operating mode apart from the recirculation mode. 
At present, the water that has flowed through the 
pump in recirculation mode is cooled using a sep-
arate cooler from where the heat is transferred 
via an intermediate circuit to the service water 
system. If the service water cooling is lost, the 
temperature of the recirculated water will quickly 
increase, which will eventually lead to a loss of the 
auxiliary feed water system pumps. The plan is to 
implement the modification in Olkiluoto 1 in 2014 
and in Olkiluoto 2 in 2015.
Changed schedule of design of 
reactor surface level measuring
The reactor surface level is measured in Olkiluoto 
1 and Olkiluoto 2 only with one method. STUK has 
requested that TVO study the opportunity to mea-
sure the surface level in the reactor pressure vessel 
with an alternative method, but TVO has so far 
failed to propose a viable alternative. The plan is to 
commission the alternative measuring method in 
2016 and 2017.
Low-voltage switchgear upgrade project
TVO has initiated a  low voltage switchgear up-
grade project in Olkiluoto 1 and Olkiluoto 2. The 
key reasons for replacing the switchgears are an 
increase in maintenance costs due to the ageing of 
the original equipment, and the need to modernise 
the switchgear to correspond to the current re-
quirements regarding plant and personnel safety. 
The upgrade mainly concerns the switchgears and 
associated transformers of electricity systems im-
portant to safety. TVO already replaced the me-
dium voltage switchgears (6.6 kV) in 2005 and 
2006. The voltage in the plant units’ low voltage 
networks varies from 24 VDC to 660 VAC. The 
switchgears are used to supply the required elec-
trical power to the plant units’ I&C systems and 
components that are important to safety.
According to the current plan, the low voltage 
switchgears will be replaced during the plant 
units’ annual outages between 2010 and 2016. 
TVO continued the work during the 2013 annual 
outage of Olkiluoto 2 by replacing the switchgear 
two trains. STUK reviewed the documents for 
the switchgear project and oversaw the execution 
of the work onsite. TVO intends to continue the 
project in Olkiluoto  1 during the 2014 annual 
outage by replacing the switchgear of two sub-
systems.
Development of operational 
limits and conditions
The OLC development plan states that TVO im-
proves the justification for requirements and clar-
ifies the requirements when necessary. In 2011, 
TVO conducted internal discussions regarding the 
need to amend the OLC and produced amendment 
Pressure equipment manufacturers and 
inspection and testing organisations 
A total of 24 nuclear pressure equipment manu-
facturers were approved for the Olkiluoto plant 
(plant units Olkiluoto 1, 2 and 3). STUK approved 
17 testing organisations to carry out tests related 
to the manufacture of mechanical equipment and 
structures. Testing operators from three testing 
organisations were approved to carry out periodic 
tests of mechanical equipment and structures pur-
suant to YVL 3.8.
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proposals. TVO submitted the first four amend-
ment proposals to STUK for approval in 2012. In 
2013 TVO submitted six amendment proposals to 
STUK for approval. The development project will 
be continued in 2014 and possibly also later.
Abnormal and emergency 
operating procedures
TVO continued an upgrade project of the abnor-
mal and emergency operating procedures that was 
started based on the results of the periodic safety 
review. The goal of the project is to improve the 
procedures by describing the measures in more de-
tail. Furthermore, flowcharts included in the emer-
gency operating procedure have been redrawn and 
background materials for the procedures have been 
updated to comply with the updated procedures.
TVO submitted updated versions of the emer-
gency operating procedure and the abnormal op-
erating procedures concerning outages to STUK 
at the beginning of 2013. TVO will update the 
abnormal operating procedures not pertaining to 
outages by 2015. The modifications implemented 
because of Fukushima will also cause changes in 
the procedures.
STUK assessed TVO’s procedures and their val-
idation, and verified that the updated procedures 
are proper in terms of content and structure. TVO 
uses three methods to validate procedures: review-
ing them by reading, comparing them with the 
plant and performing simulator runs. The review 
by reading and comparison with the plant were ap-
plied to all of the procedures submitted to STUK in 
early 2013. Simulator validation was applied only 
to procedures where TVO felt that it offered addi-
tional benefits when compared to the other valida-
tion methods. Minor revisions and additions were 
made to some of the procedures as a result of the 
validation. STUK found that the procedure valida-
tion methods need some improvement, particularly 
as it comes to the simulator run.
Development objects based 
on Fukushima accident
After the Fukushima accident in 2011, STUK sent 
a decision to the licensees concerning provisions 
and plans to be made by the power companies for 
natural phenomena and power supply disruptions. 
In 2013, TVO submitted to STUK reports on the 
opportunity to use a water supply system indepen-
dent of existing plant systems to cool the reactors 
of Olkiluoto 1 and Olkiluoto 2. The proposed solu-
tion consists of supplying make-up water from the 
fire water system to the reactor after depressurisa-
tion. System design based on the proposed solution 
is currently underway.
STUK approved TVO’s plant modification plans 
to improve independence of the auxiliary feed wa-
ter system from the service water cooling system. 
TVO also delivered to STUK a report on adequate 
volume and availability of water for the simultane-
ous cooling of all reactors, fuel pools and spent fuel 
storage during long-lasting accidents which involve 
loss of the normal heat sink. Furthermore, TVO 
has drafted a study on acquiring portable electric 
generators and pumps. Portable generators are to 
be used for purposes such as recharging the un-
interruptible power supply batteries during long-
lasting accidents. The portable fire water pumps 
can be used to fill up the containment in case of a 
severe accident and supply make-up water to the 
fuel pools in the reactor building and the spent 
fuel storage facility. According to TVO’s assess-
ment, the earthquake resistance of the Olkiluoto 
1 and Olkiluoto 2 fuel pools and fire extinguishing 
systems is high. Based on the assessment results, 
improvements to the fire extinguishing system are 
being planned. They will be implemented in 2014.
Radiation monitor upgrade
TVO has upgraded the fixed radiation measuring 
systems in Olkiluoto 1 and Olkiluoto 2. The latest 
upgrades were improvements of the release and 
activity measuring systems in case of an accident 
in the vent stack and room radiation measuring 
systems. During the 2013 annual outage, two up-
graded and one new measuring channel were com-
missioned in Olkiluoto 2. All of the new monitors 
used for measuring during an accident were com-
missioned by the end of 2013.
The measuring instrument modernisation proj-
ect will improve and standardise the plant’s op-
erating equipment base. The latest items to be 
upgraded are the radiation measuring instruments 
used to monitor releases during normal operation 
of the plant.
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4.2.6 Spent nuclear fuel storage and 
NPP operational waste
The processing, storage and final disposal of low 
and intermediate level waste (NPP operational 
waste) at the Olkiluoto power plant were carried 
out as planned. The volume and activity of op-
erational waste in relation to generated electrical 
power remained low compared with most other 
countries. The contributing factors include the high 
quality requirements for nuclear waste manage-
ment and nuclear fuel, the planning of mainte-
nance and repair operations, decontamination as 
well as component and process modifications. In 
addition, the power plant employs efficient proce-
dures for reducing the volume of waste destined 
for final disposal. Because of waste monitoring and 
sorting, some of the waste with a very low radio-
active substance content can be exempted from 
control. Waste below the set activity limits was 
exempted from control at the power plant with 
STUK’s approval in 2013 to be processed else-
where. Waste exempted from control included 
operational waste, scrap metal for recycling and 
hazardous waste to be further processed, such as 
waste oil and pickling solutions.
In 2013, STUK regulated operating waste man-
agement and final disposal of operational waste 
as well as the concrete and rock structures of the 
repository. STUK assessed reports and other docu-
ments submitted to it, performed control visits and 
performed inspections included in the periodic 
inspection programme. STUK accepted the new 
limit values for the operational waste released 
from control at the Olkiluoto plant units on 20 
August 2013. The approval decision also includes 
limit values for the operational waste of Olkiluoto 
3. These limit values will apply once the permit 
for achieving criticality of the plant unit has been 
granted. No significant deficiencies or development 
needs were observed during the inspections carried 
out in 2013.
Expansion of spent fuel storage facility
TVO will add three new pools to the spent fuel 
storage facility (KPA storage) in Olkiluoto. At the 
same time, the structures of the storage facility 
will be modified to comply with the current safety 
requirements. The original KPA storage capacity 
in Olkiluoto would have been sufficient until 2014, 
and the expansion will increase the capacity for 
the spent fuel coming from the Olkiluoto plant 
units 1, 2 and 3.
TVO submitted the documentation regarding 
expansion of the storage facility to STUK for ap-
proval at the end of 2009. The extension of the stor-
age facility is designed to meet the current safety 
requirements, the most significant of which are its 
earthquake resistance and its ability to withstand 
the crash of a large aircraft. The structures of the 
existing part of the storage facility will be simul-
taneously renovated to comply with the current 
requirements.
In 2013, work on the expansion of the storage 
facility continued with indoor work, such as lining 
the pool and installations of the expanded systems. 
Work on the airplane crash structures outside the 
facility has also started. Expanded systems have 
been tested as they are completed. TVO reviewed 
the operational limits and conditions for the stor-
age facility and submitted the necessary changes 
to STUK for approval.
The storage facility expansion was changed into 
a controlled area in 2013 to complete the merger 
of the already existing facility with the expansion. 
Prior to changing the expansion into a controlled 
area, STUK performed an inspection to verify that 
the requirements laid down for controlled areas 
are met.
An inspection of the storage facility expansion 
was performed in 2013. In the inspection, STUK 
assessed the licensee’s procedures in commission-
ing of the expanded storage facility. The require-
ments laid down in this inspection involved the 
procedures used when inspecting the welds in the 
pool lining.
Quantities of spent fuel and low- and 
intermediate-level waste in Olkiluoto
The volume of spent nuclear fuel on-site at the 
Olkiluoto plant at the end of 2013 was 8,096 as-
semblies* (1,292 tU, tonnes of original uranium) 
with an increase of 212 assemblies (37 tU). The 
volume of low- and intermediate-level waste fi-
nally disposed of was 5,681 m³ at the end of 2013. 
The total increase of volume from 2012 is 42 m³. 
Approximately 93% of the waste has been finally 
disposed of..
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Provisions for the costs of 
nuclear waste management
In compliance with section 88, subsection 2 of the 
Nuclear Energy Decree, TVO provided the Ministry 
of Employment and the Economy with the revised 
and supplemented waste management schemes 
and information on the costs and prices of nuclear 
waste management measures by the end of June. 
The update of the waste management scheme 
includes a report on nuclear waste management 
measures and an estimate of the remaining waste 
management costs at the end of 2013, 2014 and 
2015.
STUK reviewed the documents submitted in 
compliance with the Nuclear Energy Decree and 
submitted a statement regarding them to the 
Ministry of Employment and the Economy. In its 
statements, STUK assessed the technical plans 
and cost estimates on which the financial provi-
sions are based, considered them acceptable and 
stated that they can be used as the basis for 
the cost provisions. TVO’s extent of liability was 
€1,317.8 million at the end of 2013.
According to the Nuclear Energy Decree, sup-
plemented waste management schemes for techni-
cal and financial plans, as well as related calcula-
tions, must be prepared every three years. The next 
revision will take place in 2016.
4.2.7 Organisational operations 
and quality management
Based on STUK’s oversight and the results of op-
erating activities, it can be stated that, with a view 
to ensuring safety, TVO’s organisation has operat-
ed in a systematic and development-oriented way. 
During the year, STUK has focused its oversight 
activities on TVO’s human resources planning, de-
velopment of the modification work process, and 
the quality management competence of the pro-
curement personnel. One of the particular focus 
areas has been TVO’s preparations for the commis-
sioning of Olkiluoto 3, including the integration of 
the project organisation and management system 
to the organisation and management system of the 
existing plant units.
At present, TVO strongly invests in the develop-
ment of its operations. The goal with the manage-
ment process development is to standardise the 
company’s management methods and leadership. 
Furthermore, TVO has started a group-level ERP 
development project that aims to ensure the use of 
the proper systems to support the processes. The 
modification work process will also be developed as 
part of the ERP development project. The process 
description will be complete by the end of 2013 and 
the related procedures will be completed by the 
2014 annual outage. Training and implementation 
of the renewed process will start after the annual 
outage. Key changes from the current modification 
work process will include focusing on a proactive 
approach and dividing the process into clear-cut 
stages. STUK is of the opinion that the current 
development work has proceeded well.
TVO has used verbal descriptions in the ERP 
system, procedures and operating principles as 
the basis when describing the processes. The pro-
cesses will be described in a standardised manner 
complying with the instructions and indicators will 
be determined for them. STUK has also requested 
that TVO describe the duties and responsibilities 
of the process owner and how these duties and re-
sponsibilities are different from the duties and re-
sponsibilities of the line organisation supervisors. 
An independent assessment of the functionality 
of TVO’s management system has been performed 
and discussed by the management group.
The volume of training offered by TVO has 
evened out and increased training will probably 
not be necessary in the future. The number of 
people working at the personnel development of-
fice, which is in charge of general training, has 
decreased. Development of the procedures and 
methods pertaining to TVO’s HR planning and 
allocation of resources has not proceeded in line 
with the schedule laid down by STUK. TVO must 
submit a plan and schedule for the resource man-
agement development project to STUK by the 
end of Q1/2014. The number of people working at 
the quality and environment office has increased 
from last year, and additional resources have been 
allocated to the development of the quality assur-
ance of procurement, for example. Development 
plan goals also include increasing the number of 
lead auditors and standardising supplier approval 
practices. TVO did not submit the name of a deputy 
for the person who is responsible for emergency 
preparedness and physical protection to STUK for 
approval in 2013.
STUK oversaw the oral examinations of shift 
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personnel where the shift managers, operators and 
trainee operators prove that they are competent in 
all key issues related to plant operation and safety. 
In 2013, STUK granted 22 licenses to shift man-
agers and operators on application by the power 
company and following a successful oral examina-
tion, six of them to new operators. All participants 
passed their examinations in 2013. The new op-
erators had good results in the examination, which 
is an indirect indication that the basic training 
programme is effective. The operators renewing 
their licenses also had good results in the examina-
tion, which, for its part, indicates that the power 
company’s refresher and supplementary training 
is effective.
4.2.8 Fire safety
In 2013, STUK reviewed reports, carried out on-
site inspections, implemented a periodic inspection 
programme, and sent resident inspectors on their 
rounds to oversee the maintenance of the fire pro-
tection systems and arrangements that ensure fire 
safety at the Olkiluoto power plant.
In a fire protection inspection carried out by 
STUK at Olkiluoto, the processing of previous 
issues was continued, TVO’s plans pertaining to 
the condition of fire extinguishing piping were as-
sessed and functionality of TVO’s fire protection 
organisation was assessed. Based on the inspection 
results, STUK required that TVO verify the suf-
ficiency of the fire brigade personnel by also taking 
into account the additional personnel required by 
Olkiluoto 3 and the Posiva repository. TVO will 
submit a report regarding the issue to STUK.
TVO has renovated some cable penetrations 
in the intermediate floor between the relay rooms 
and the cabling rooms. Modifications of control 
room facilities and fire compartments in Olkiluoto 
1 and Olkiluoto 2 were completed. TVO is currently 
improving the earthquake resistance of fire water 
systems.
The fire safety organisation will also be re-
sponsible for preparation for an oil spill. In case 
of an accident, oil containment booms of 400 and 
600 metres can be placed between islands in the 
area. However, drawing the wire needed to put 
the booms in place with the current machinery is 
slow. An order has been placed for an anchoring 
system to keep the booms in place. The system 
includes buoys and warning lights. The booms are 
stored onsite. Booms for the water intake channel 
are stored in a container from where they can be 
quickly installed.
4.2.9 Operating experience feedback
STUK assessed the operating experience feedback 
activities and corrective measures on the basis of 
reports, inspection visits and inspections within 
the periodic inspection programme. There are de-
velopment actions in progress in both the internal 
and external operating experience activities at the 
Olkiluoto power plant.
No INES Category 1 events occurred at 
Olkiluoto over the course of the year nor were any 
root cause analyses made.
TVO drafted eleven event reports and seven 
operational transient reports on unexpected op-
erational incidents during 2013. Ten of these were 
submitted to STUK for information. TVO drafted 
four special reports over the course of the year. 
These are described in more detail in Appendix 3.
In the operating experience feedback inspection, 
STUK verified methods, procedures and new prac-
tices related to the feedback operations. Despite 
personnel changes, operations were found to be 
well organised and directed, and had adequate 
resources. The operating experience feedback team 
meets every two weeks. The team discusses experi-
ence feedback from Finland and from abroad, as 
well as the utilisation of the feedback in the im-
provement of operations. Expertise has been added 
to the team by including a simulator trainer from 
Olkiluoto 3 and the project’s safety engineer.
Of all the events that occurred in 2013 in 
Olkiluoto, STUK decided to draft one new report 
on problems with the cracks in the stator welds 
of the emergency diesel generators’ exciters in 
Olkiluoto 1 and Olkiluoto 2 for the International 
Reporting System for Operating Experience (IRS) 
maintained by the International Atomic Energy 
Agency (IAEA).
The Olkiluoto power plant uses methods to as-
sess and utilise operating experience from other 
plants. TVO has utilised Nordic cooperation in the 
preselection of reports from the World Association 
of Nuclear Operators (WANO), the IRS database 
maintained by the IAEA and reports from the plants 
in the United States. TVO develops methods and 
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procedures for operating experience feedback activi-
ties during construction and commissioning. A new 
procedure on utilising events that occur at Olkiluoto 
3 in Olkiluoto 1 and Olkiluoto 2, as well as in the 
planned Olkiluoto 4, was published in late 2013.
TVO is performing a variety of studies due to 
the Fukushima accident of 2011 to improve the ca-
pability of the plant units to cope with natural phe-
nomena and power supply disruptions. A summary 
of the development measures determined because 
of the Fukushima accident at the Olkiluoto plant 
unit is available in Chapter 4.2.5.
4.2.10 Radiation safety of the plant, 
personnel and the environment
Occupational radiation safety
STUK carried out a radiation protection inspection 
as part of the periodic inspection programme at the 
Olkiluoto power plant, focusing on occupational 
radiation safety in particular. The items to be in-
spected included radiation protection targets and 
the role of radiation protection when processing 
work permits. The dosimeters used for measuring 
the occupational radiation doses underwent annu-
al tests. The tests comprised irradiating a sample 
of dosimeters at STUK’s measurement standard 
laboratory and reading the doses at the power 
plant. The test results were acceptable.
STUK carried out targeted radiation protec-
tion inspections during the annual outage at the 
Olkiluoto plant units. Radiation protection activi-
ties of the plant’s radiation protection personnel 
and employees within the controlled area were 
assessed during these inspections. Based on the 
inspection results, radiation protection at the plant 
is good: no major defects were observed. Individual 
development areas were revealed in the inspec-
tions concerning the use of personal protective 
equipment in the controlled area and the employ-
ees unnecessarily spending time in a radiation 
work environment.
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Figure 14. Collective occupational doses since the start of operation of the Olkiluoto units 1 and 2.
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Figure 15. Annual radiation doses to the most exposed person of the public since the start of operation of the 
Olkiluoto units 1 and 2. Over the recent years, the doses calculated based on the radioactive discharges has 
remained below one percent of the set limit, 0.1 milliSv.
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Radiation doses
The collective occupational dose of employees for 
the entire year was 0.14 manSv in Olkiluoto 1 and 
0.51 manSv in Olkiluoto 2. The collective occupa-
tional radiation dose of Olkiluoto employees was 
the lowest ever recorded during the operation of 
the power plant. The collective occupational radia-
tion doses of employees in Olkiluoto were smaller 
than the average doses of employees working in 
boiling water reactors in OECD countries.
According to the YVL Guide issued by STUK, 
the threshold for one plant unit’s collective dose 
averaged over two successive years is 2.5  manSv 
per gigawatt of net electrical power. This means 
an average annual dose value of 2.20 manSv per 
Olkiluoto plant unit. This threshold was not ex-
ceeded at either of the plant units.
Most of the occupational radiation doses of 
nuclear power plant workers are accumulated dur-
ing annual outages. The collective radiation dose of 
employees due to operations during the outage in 
Olkiluoto 1 was 0.09 manSv, and the collective ra-
diation dose due to operations during the outage in 
Olkiluoto 2 was 0.47 manSv. The radiation levels at 
the turbine plants continued to decrease thanks to 
the new steam dryers that were installed in 2005 
and 2006.
The highest individual radiation dose accumu-
lated was 3.8 mSv in Olkiluoto 1 and 7.4 mSv in 
Olkiluoto 2. The highest individual dose incurred 
at either plant unit during the entire year was 
8.1 mSv. This dose was caused by inspection work. 
The highest individual radiation doses have been 
less than 10 mSv during the last seven years. The 
radiation doses for nuclear power plant workers re-
mained below the individual dose limits. The effec-
tive dose for a worker from radiation work may not 
exceed the 20 manSv/year average over any period 
of five years, or 50 manSv during any single year.
The radiation dose distribution of workers at 
the Olkiluoto and Loviisa nuclear power plants in 
2013 is given in Appendix 2.
Radioactive releases and environmental 
radiation monitoring
Radioactive releases into the environment from the 
Olkiluoto nuclear power plant remained well below 
authorised annual limits in 2013. Releases of noble 
gases into the air were approximately 0.2 TBq (as 
Kr-87-equivalent activity), which is approximately 
0.002% of the authorised limit. Releases of iodine 
into the air were approximately 91 MBq (as I-131-
equivalent activity), which is approximately 0.09% 
of the authorised limit. Releases through the vent 
stack also included radioactive particulate mat-
ter amounting to 20  MBq, tritium amounting to 
0.6 TBq and carbon-14 amounting to approximate-
ly 0.8 TBq. The tritium content of liquid effluents 
released into the sea, around 1.5 TBq, was around 
8% of the annual release limit. The total activity 
of other radionuclides released into the sea was 91 
MBq, which is approximately 0.03% of the plant 
location-specific release limit.
The calculated radiation dose of the most ex-
Table 4. NPP originated radioactive nuclides found in the environmental samples 
of the Olkiluoto power plant in 2013.
Sample types containing detected radionuclides. Figures indicate the number of 
positive samples in a sample group. Several different nuclides may be found in the 
same sample.
Radionuclide
Type of sample
H-3 Mn-54 Fe-59 Co-60 Sb-124 Total
Air 1 1 2 1 5
Aquatic plants 1 7 8
Perifyton 1 5 6
Sedimenting 
materials
10 10
Sediment 3 3
Rainwater 1 1
Kaatopaikan 
valumavesi
1 1
Total 1 3 1 28 1 34
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posed individual in the vicinity of the plant was 
around 0.05 µSv, i.e. less than 0.05% of the set lim-
it (Appendix 1, indicator A.I.5c). An average person 
living in Finland receives the equivalent radiation 
dose from radiation sources in nature and in space 
in about 20 minutes.
A total of 300 samples were collected and 
analysed from the land and marine environment 
surrounding the Olkiluoto power plant in 2013. 
External background radiation and the exposure 
to radioactivity of people in the vicinity of the 
plant were also measured regularly. Extremely 
small amounts of radioactive substances originat-
ing from the nuclear power plant were observed in 
some of the analysed environmental samples. The 
amounts were so small that they are insignificant 
in terms of people’s radiation exposure.
4.2.11 Emergency preparedness
STUK monitors the capability of the emergen-
cy preparedness organisations of nuclear power 
plants to act under abnormal conditions. No events 
requiring emergency response actions occurred at 
the Olkiluoto power plant in 2013.
Emergency preparedness at the Olkiluoto pow-
er plant complies with the main requirements. 
STUK’s inspection of the emergency prepared-
ness arrangements of the Olkiluoto nuclear power 
plant included the inspection of the emergency 
preparedness organisation and its training, drills, 
equipment and facilities, alarm arrangements, en-
vironmental radiation measurements and weather 
observations at the plant site. Modifications of 
emergency preparedness operations based on the 
lessons learned from the Fukushima accident have 
been completed or are being completed. Some of the 
new requirements laid down in the Government 
Decree on Emergency Response Arrangements at 
Nuclear Power Plants (716/2013) have been met 
and the details of other requirements are further 
specified in the application decision of the YVL 
Guide.
An emergency preparedness drill to test the 
forming of the preparedness organisation, launch 
of operations, and assessment of situations was or-
ganised at the Olkiluoto power plant in November 
2013. STUK oversaw the drill onsite.
4.2.12 Physical protection
The inspection performed during the annual out-
age focused on the resources needed for the main-
tenance of adequate physical protection during an 
annual outage, development measures and their 
status during an outage, and surveillance of the 
refueling area. During the 2013 annual outage, 
physical protection was implemented according to 
plan and no non-conformances were observed.
Focus areas in the physical protection inspec-
tion included training and drills on maintaining 
physical protection, status with the requirements 
posed in previous inspections, development mea-
sures and the status of the physical protection at 
Olkiluoto 3 during construction. TVO presented its 
plan on naming a deputy for the person in charge 
of physical protection. The training programme for 
2013 was completed according to plan. All of the 
reviewed non-conformance reports were properly 
processed and none of the non-conformances had 
been caused by any illegal activities. TVO has 
planned an improvement of the surveillance sys-
tems and also started the improvement of some of 
the system components.
In an information security inspection of the 
Olkiluoto power plant, STUK assessed technical 
information security solutions for the reactor units 
and information security of the Olkiluoto 3 con-
struction site. STUK inspected the implementation 
of physical protection for the spent fuel storage 
facility expansion.
Based on the assessment results, STUK es-
timated how the processes related to physical 
protection are described in the ERP system, how 
physical protection is taken into account in the risk 
management process, and how the management 
can verify the functionality of physical protection. 
Furthermore, discussions on how physical protec-
tion has been taken into account when assess-
ing and developing the organisation culture were 
conducted. Based on the inspection results, STUK 
required that the descriptions included in the ERP 
system must be updated to comply with the activi-
ties in practice.
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4.2.13 Safeguards of Nuclear Materials
A total of fourteen inspections of TVO’s operat-
ing plants and the spent fuel storage facility were 
performed. STUK performed, together with IAEA 
and the European Commission, inspections on the 
physical inventory of nuclear materials at both 
plant units and the spent nuclear fuel storage fa-
cility both before and after the annual outages. 
The amount of nuclear material in the spent nu-
clear fuel storage facility was verified separately 
because the verification could not be implemented 
simultaneously with the reactor units due to the 
construction of the expansion . Furthermore, STUK 
inspected the locations of the reactor core fuel as-
semblies prior to the closing of the reactor cover in 
Olkiluoto 1 and Olkiluoto 2. STUK also performed 
two interim safeguards inspections of all three 
sites and one review of the accounting of uranium 
batches abroad that are currently being managed 
by the TVO uranium procurement office.
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Figure 16. Amounts of uranium and plutonium at the Olkiluoto NPP.
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4.3 Regulatory oversight of the 
construction of Olkiluoto 3
4.3.1 Overall safety assessment of Olkiluoto 3
The overall safety assessment of Olkiluoto 3 dis-
cusses the observations made by STUK on the 
basis of a review of plans, the oversight of manu-
facturing, construction, installation and commis-
sioning operations, results of the construction in-
spection programme during construction, oversight 
of the plant supplier and its subcontractors, and 
experience acquired as a result of interactions be-
tween STUK, TVO and the plant supplier.
Detailed design of the plant systems continued 
in 2013. The licensee submitted to STUK for ap-
proval  some nuclear island process and electricity 
system plans, which needed reapproval by STUK 
because they had been modified. Some of the revi-
sions have been made as a result of the require-
ments STUK has imposed on systems design, but 
the majority of revisions have arisen from the 
licensee’s and the plant supplier’s own require-
ments. Several updates and additions have also 
been submitted for the equipment plans. Most of 
the plans have been of a good quality after STUK 
remarked about the quality of plans in connec-
tion with reviews performed in compliance with 
the construction inspection programme a couple 
of years ago. The licensee also develops its own 
safety assessment policies to ensure that the safety 
requirements are met and compliance with the 
safety requirements can be verified more easily.
The most important part of plant design 
that has not been fully processed yet are the 
plant’s I&C systems. STUK has required that TVO 
submit unambiguous requirements for the design 
of the overall architecture of the I&C systems, and 
that the I&C architecture created on the basis of 
the requirements is described. In terms of safety, it 
is important to specify unambiguous requirements 
for the independence of the various I&C systems 
involved in the architecture, because the I&C sys-
tems will back each other up. TVO submitted the 
general architecture design documents to STUK in 
the spring of 2013. At the end of the year, the docu-
ments were still being processed.
Furthermore, STUK has requested TVO take 
into account the possibility of faults in the I&C 
system software and possible consequences of such 
faults when assessing the implementation of the 
plant’s general design bases. Several meetings on 
the analysis methods to be used were conducted 
with TVO and the plant supplier in the autumn of 
2013, and STUK expects TVO to submit a proposal 
on the analyses to be drafted for the consequences 
of potential software faults.
Except for some final touches, con-
struction work on the Olkiluoto  3 buildings is 
completed. STUK oversaw and inspected grout-
ing, anchoring and injecting related to component 
installations as well as the installation of steel 
platforms. In 2013, STUK started commission-
ing inspections of the buildings by inspecting the 
containment’s concrete slab, the interior concrete 
structures and the concrete part of the contain-
ment walls. The procedures applied by the licensee 
and the plant supplier in verifying readiness for 
commissioning inspections have proven functional.
Manufacture of equipment and piping contin-
ued in 2013. STUK’s construction inspections, in-
tended to ensure that the manufacture of compo-
nents complies with requirements, still revealed is-
sues preventing the inspections from being carried 
out as planned. The most severe of these issues 
concerned the equipment’s readiness for inspec-
tion and open issues related to construction plans. 
STUK required that the licensee and plant sup-
plier revise their procedures to enable inspections.
Testing of equipment and systems in the turbine 
island continued. The absence of operational I&C 
at the nuclear island prevented test operation ex-
cept for the commissioning of individual equipment 
independent of the plant I&C. Also the fact that 
installation of some of the equipment and piping of 
the nuclear island is also incomplete prevents the 
commissioning of process systems. Test runs of elec-
trical systems, on the other hand, continued with 
the help of temporary control automation. STUK 
monitored the progress of commissioning in connec-
tion with its onsite inspection visits and assessed 
sufficiency of the licensee’s actions in construction 
inspection programme inspections. STUK reminded 
the licensee that result reports for commissioning 
tests were not completed immediately after comple-
tion of the tests. They should be completed immedi-
ately after the tests to ensure that all the persons 
who participated in the test are still present and 
remember the tests clearly. No other significant 
non-conformances or defects were observed.
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Besides technical trial runs, commissioning also 
includes verification of the organisational capa-
bilities to operate the plant in a safe manner. Safe 
operation requires, for example, the availability 
of a sufficient number of licensed operators and 
maintenance personnel familiar with the plant. 
The required operating procedures must also be 
available for the plant. The unfinished state of sys-
tem design has prevented the training simulator 
at the plant from being finalised and the simula-
tor training of operators from being started. The 
production and validation of operating procedures 
has also been delayed due to the unfinished state 
of system design.
At TVO’s request, STUK began a pre-review of 
the operating license application documents before 
the submittal of the actual application. The docu-
ments submitted for pre-review must form a logical 
entity, and represent  the final plant design. The 
pre-review will balance the workload of the various 
parties to the process as completed thematic sec-
tions are reviewed in advance. All the documents 
that are delivered to STUK in connection with an 
operating license application will be reviewed by 
STUK at the operating license stage as a whole, 
and STUK will approve their key parts before de-
livering a safety assessment and a statement on 
the operating license application to the Ministry 
of Employment and the Economy. In 2013, STUK 
pre-reviewed a chapter of the final safety analysis 
report concerning processing of radioactive waste 
and submitted its observations regarding the text 
to TVO. Furthermore, STUK processed a chapter of 
the safety analysis report on the accident analysis 
methodology and performed comparative analyses 
to verify correctness of the accident analyses made 
by the plant supplier. No major discrepancies were 
observed in the results of the analyses made. More 
comparison analyses will be made in 2014.
Based on the construction inspection pro-
gramme and other oversight activities by STUK, 
the methods, operations and adequacy of TVO’s 
organisation have mainly been found to be at a 
good  level, for example as far as the commission-
ing of the plant  is concerned. STUK encouraged 
the licensee to further improve the processing and 
closing of open items in the project to avoid them 
from being transferred to the commissioning and 
operating license stages. Furthermore, STUK re-
quired from TVO a report on how the procedures 
included in the management system of TVO, and 
of the Olkiluoto 3 project and the instructions in 
the project manuals will be reconciled prior to the 
loading of nuclear fuel, so that no confusion about 
which instructions are to be followed will occur.
In 2013, STUK ordered a study on the status 
of the safety culture at the Olkiluoto 3 construc-
tion site. According to the study results, the safety 
culture of the Olkiluoto 3 project has improved 
over the past few years and also communication 
between the involved parties has improved. The 
study recommended that TVO and the plant sup-
pliers should try to reach a consensus about the 
safety culture and continue supporting the work of 
the safety coordinators.
During construction, TVO and the plant sup-
plier have taken into account modification needs 
that have emerged as design of the various areas 
of technology has become more detailed. Defects 
detected in manufacturing and installation have 
either been corrected so that the original quality 
requirements are met, or it has been demonstrated 
by means of additional inspections or analyses that 
the requirements are met. The flaws in the work 
of various parties and in product quality have re-
sulted in additional work to assess and rectify the 
problems. This has had an impact on the progress 
of the project but not on the compliance with qual-
ity requirements. In summary, based on the results 
of regulatory oversight, STUK is able to state 
that the original safety targets of the plant can be 
achieved.
4.3.2 Design
Plant and system design
STUK continued to review the detailed design of 
process systems, support systems and electric-
ity systems. Almost all of the system descriptions 
corresponding to the final system design of the 
process and ventilation systems were processed 
in 2012. Only a few remaining descriptions were 
submitted in 2013. STUK has approved most of the 
process, support system and electricity system de-
signs, but some of them will still have to be revised 
prior to the operating license stage to take into 
account requirements laid down in STUK’s deci-
sions. Furthermore, TVO announced that the plant 
supplier will make some additional plant system 
modifications that will require STUK’s approval.
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The most important part of plant design that 
has not been fully processed yet are the plant’s 
I&C systems. In 2013, STUK approved the I&C 
system design processes, and STUK has reviewed 
most of the I&C architecture design processes. 
STUK has also approved the I&C system platforms 
in so far as the approval can be given prior to a test 
run. In relation to the design of the I&C systems, 
STUK has required that TVO and the plant sup-
plier specify unambiguous design requirements 
for the overall architecture of I&C systems, and 
that the I&C architecture created on the basis of 
the requirements is described. In terms of safety, 
it is important to specify unambiguous require-
ments for the independence of the various I&C 
systems involved in the architecture, because the 
I&C systems will back each other up. TVO submit-
ted the general architecture design documents to 
STUK in the spring of 2013. At the end of the year, 
the documents were still being reviewed. TVO also 
submitted the first plans regarding individual I&C 
systems to STUK at the end of the year.
Fault analyses of the plant and system design
An unfinished issue in relation to fault analyses 
important to safety has been determining the ap-
proval criteria for software faults in I&C systems. 
In 2011, STUK required TVO to investigate further 
and account for the impacts of faults and mal-
functions in I&C systems of lower safety classes 
on the electrical systems and other functions of 
higher safety classes. In the spring of 2013, TVO 
requested from STUK more detailed instructions 
on how faults in I&C software should be taken 
into account in plant design, and how the possible 
consequences of software faults should be assessed. 
In its decision on the issue made in 2013, STUK 
required that TVO take into account the possibility 
of faults in the I&C system software, and the pos-
sible consequences of such faults, when assessing 
the implementation of the plant’s general design 
bases. Several meetings with TVO and the plant 
supplier on the analysis methods to be used were 
arranged during the autumn. STUK is still waiting 
for TVO’s response on the analyses to be drafted on 
the consequences of possible software faults.
In 2013, STUK reviewed the failure mode and 
effects analysis method description for I&C sys-
tems and I&C devices (the non-programmable 
part) and issued a clarification request stating that 
the description must be revised to comply with the 
requirements by the end of February 2014. STUK 
also simultaneously offered its view on the I&C 
fault analyses as a whole, the goals of single analy-
ses and potential problems.
No common-cause failure or failure mode and 
effects analyses pertaining to the process and elec-
tricity systems or devices were submitted to STUK 
for processing during the year under review. STUK 
has observed some defects in the previous analy-
ses, which is why the analyses must be revised.
Transient and accident analyses
The review of the methodology reports of the tran-
sient and accident analyses for the Olkiluoto 3 fi-
nal safety analysis report began in the autumn of 
2012 and preliminary review observations were 
processed with TVO and the plant supplier in work 
meetings. The  observations were submitted in a 
letter in early 2013. The letter required that TVO 
take into account the questions and comments 
when drafting its operating license application.
Transient and accident analyses drafted in 
compliance with the methodology reports have 
been unofficially submitted to STUK to be used as 
an aid when reviewing the methodology reports. 
TVO has announced that errors detected in three 
computation codes will cause minor changes in 
the results of a couple of the analyses. Code error 
To verify the correctness of the plant supplier's 
transient and accident analyses, STUK has or-
dered comparison analyses with the same initial 
data. The methods and  codes used in the compari-
son analyses are not the same as those used by the 
plant supplier.
Of the transient and accident analyses ordered 
by STUK, the calculations of the reactor coolant 
pump trip during the first fuel cycle and steam line 
break analyses were completed in 2013. The com-
parison analyses of radiation doses to the popula-
tion due to accident releases were also completed 
in 2013, and the results were acceptable. Based on 
these comparison analyses made by an indepen-
dent party, the plant supplier's analysis results 
can be considered acceptable.
More comparison analyses will be made in 
2014.
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reports describing the impact of the errors will be 
submitted to STUK in connection with the next of-
ficial analysis report update.
In 2013, STUK also reviewed analyses on the 
cooling of the spent fuel pool by means of evapora-
tion in case of a potential loss of the  pool cooling 
system, and radiation doses caused by a potential 
large passenger airplane crash in the immediate 
surroundings of the plant. No significant deficien-
cies were found in the reviews.
Probabilistic risk assessment
The review of the probabilistic risk assessment 
(PRA) of Olkiluoto 3 focused in 2013 on ensuring 
the realisation of the fundamental design prin-
ciples in the detailed design documents of systems 
and structures (including I&C architecture, system 
descriptions, topical reports and fault analyses). In 
addition, the goal has been to ensure that adequate 
provisions sufficient precautions are in place re-
garding area events (internal fires and flooding), 
as well as external events, with the help of e.g.  the 
latest update of Olkiluoto’s PRA model. Revisions 
of the materials delivered for information are ex-
pected since the detailed design, particularly that 
of I&C systems, is still in progress.
Radiation safety
In connection with the suitability assessment of 
electrical and I&C equipment, STUK also reviewed 
compliance with requirements regarding the radia-
tion resistance of equipment in normal operation 
and during accidents. STUK also took part in the 
factory acceptance testing of the components of 
the Olkiluoto 3 radiation measurement systems in 
2013. At the licensee’s request, the deadlines for 
updating several radiation measurement system 
design documents were postponed in 2013.
Plant fire safety
In 2013, STUK completed a review of the updated 
fire hazard analyses (FHA) regarding the suffi-
ciency of fire compartmentalisation structures and 
the protection of penetrations. In addition to the 
structural fire hazard analyses, the review of fire 
hazard functional analyses (FHFA) was completed. 
STUK required that the FHA and FHFA analyses 
be verified to ensure that they are up to date in 
terms of actual plant design. STUK will also verify 
the sufficiency of the results of fire safety studies 
on fire-retardant power and I&C cables performed 
by VTT Technical Research Centre of Finland in 
2011 in terms of actual plant design.
Design of components and structures
STUK continued reviewing the detailed plans of 
safety class 2 equipment and structures in 2013. 
The key plans include the construction and imple-
mentation plans of steel structures, the construc-
tion plans of mechanical equipment, and updated 
construction plans. STUK has also reviewed and 
approved containment testing plans related to the 
commissioning of the nuclear power plant unit.
STUK has reviewed and approved nearly all 
construction plans of safety-classified concrete 
structures. In 2013, STUK approved non-confor-
mance reports regarding the containment liner 
after an extensive verification process by means 
of tests and analyses. Revised plans to specify the 
structural descriptions of the fuel pool steel lining 
were also approved.
Furthermore, in 2013 STUK reviewed most 
of the design documents for the steel platforms 
that were originally intended to be used only as 
maintenance platforms. The safety significance of 
the steel platforms has increased because process 
piping and equipment important to safety will be 
supported on them, unlike in the original plans. 
This applies to around 200 steel platforms. The 
steel platforms have been used for component in-
stallation purposes after construction inspections 
done in stages. Compliance with the requirements 
set by plant operation will be confirmed before the 
final commissioning of the steel platforms. STUK 
has done inspection visits to the site and verified 
that TVO’s inspections have progressed in line 
with the approved procedure. STUK will review 
the final design documentation of steel platforms 
before starting its own commissioning inspections 
where compliance with the requirements will be 
ultimately verified.
In 2013, STUK continued reviewing final 
strength analyses of the main components of the 
reactor coolant system. STUK was provided with 
supplementary and modification documentation 
on the strength analyses, where the modifications 
made during manufacture had been taken into 
account. The basic inspection plans of inservice 
inspections, periodic inspection programmes and 
qualification documentation concerning inspection 
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systems compliant with YVL Guide 3.8 regarding 
pressure vessels, heat exchangers, pumps, valves 
and pipelines continued in 2013.
Design of the nuclear island piping also con-
tinued in 2013. Calculations of piping support 
structures and piping stress analyses, as well as 
construction plans and construction plan updates 
concerning safety class 1 and 2 components were 
submitted to STUK for review. The review work-
load of STUK remained high in 2013 due to the 
large volume of design modification documents.
Review of the design of the I&C of fuel handling 
systems and safety class 3 cranes continued in 
2013. The design documentation of electrical and 
I&C systems of safety class 3 equipment must be 
approved and the equipment tested before use, but 
some of the cranes have been used for installation 
work at the Olkiluoto 3 construction site before 
these measures. However, approval of the design 
and tests is a prerequisite for the final commission-
ing of lifting and transfer equipment before fuel is 
transferred into the reactor.
4.3.3 Construction
Except for some final touches, construction work 
on the Olkiluoto 3 buildings is completed. In 2013 
STUK oversaw and inspected grouting, anchoring 
and injecting related to component installations, as 
well as the installation of steel platforms.
In November 2013, STUK started commission-
ing inspections of the buildings by inspecting the 
containment’s concrete slab, the interior concrete 
structures and the concrete part of the contain-
ment wall. Commissioning inspections of the moni-
toring systems related to the containment struc-
tures started in December 2013.
The procedures to determine readiness to start 
commissioning inspections have proven functional. 
These procedures have served to ensure that the 
plant supplier and TVO have reviewed and ap-
proved the structures and their testing plans be-
fore STUK is invited to complete its inspections.
4.3.4 Manufacture of components and piping
The manufacture of Olkiluoto  3 components and 
piping continued in 2013. STUK oversaw and in-
spected the manufacture of safety class 1 and 2 
piping, tanks, heat exchangers, pumps, valves and 
steel structures. STUK also oversaw and inspected 
the manufacture of fuel handling equipment as 
well as the emergency diesel generators and their 
auxiliary equipment.
STUK’s construction inspections, intended to 
ensure that the manufacture of components com-
plies with requirements, still revealed issues pre-
venting the inspections from being carried out as 
planned. The most severe of these issues concerned 
the equipment’s readiness for inspection and open 
issues related to construction plans. As early as in 
2008, STUK required TVO and the plant supplier 
to ensure before the inspections that the prerequi-
sites for construction inspection exist. TVO and the 
plant supplier have changed their supervision and 
inspection procedures with the aim of ensuring 
readiness for inspection prior to STUK’s inspec-
tions.
The manufacture of auxiliary equipment for the 
emergency diesel generators continued in 2013. 
Changes to the pipe system design delayed the 
manufacture and installation of prefabricated 
pipes in the diesel generator facility. Prefabrication 
of the emergency diesel generators’ auxiliary sys-
tem piping continued in France. A large number of 
faulty welded joints were detected in a radiograph-
ic inspection of the prefabricated piping. The plant 
supplier required re-welding of these prefabricated 
elements. The licensee required comprehensive 
radiographic inspections prior to installation of the 
piping to verify that the piping complies with the 
requirements. Most of the inspections will be per-
formed in 2014. Repairs and inspections delayed 
signifigantly the progress of the installation work 
in the diesel building in 2013.
4.3.5 Installation
Installation of the internals of the reactor pres-
sure vessel, installation of the rod control rod drive 
mechanisms and accessories of the reactor pres-
sure vessel head were completed in 2013.
The plant supplier did not comply with the ap-
propriate quality requirements when abrading the 
welds of the reactor coolant system piping, which 
means that the roughness of the surface profile 
will make, among other things, future inservice 
inspections more difficult. inservice inspection abil-
ity of the joints will be verified in 2014 after the 
qualification of an appropriate inspection method.
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Lining of the reactor building and the fuel 
building pools and installation of filters were com-
pleted in 2013.
The plant supplier continued piping and sup-
port installation in the reactor building in 2013. 
Formed parts  of small-diameter piping had to be 
repaired/replaced because of detected superficial 
faults. Part of the piping in the nuclear island 
was high-pressure washed to remove impurities 
from the interior surface of the pipes. STUK has 
followed the progress of pipe installations and the 
activities by the licensee, plant supplier and the 
plant supplier’s subcontractors. In 2013, STUK 
paid attention to the personnel resources of the 
plant supplier and the licensee in welding work 
supervision. STUK required that the previously 
issued supervision plan be followed. The licensee’s 
resources were deemed sufficient, but defects were 
observed in the plant supplier’s resources.
Problems with the design and manufacture of 
auxiliary equipment continued to delay the instal-
lation work in the diesel buildings in 2013.
Most of the electrical equipment and cabling 
in the nuclear island and most of the contain-
ment cable penetrations were completed in 2013. 
However, nuclear island I&C systems were not in-
stalled because the systems are still unfinished. In 
2013, STUK oversaw the installation of electrical 
equipment and cabling and preliminary electricity 
system commissioning activities onsite.
Some of the low voltage cable trays on the 
plant’s main cable routes are too full, which 
is why cables have been and will be rerouted. 
Furthermore, some cable trays have been made 
wider and several parallel trays have been in-
stalled in some places. Some cables have also been 
installed on top of each other on the trays. In 2013, 
STUK reviewed a report on acceptability of the 
multi-layer cable installation method. The report 
supplemented a cable dimensioning report already 
approved by STUK. STUK approved the proposed 
multi-layer installation principles. In connection 
with an electrical engineering inspection, STUK 
requested from TVO a report on how compliance 
with the requirements of the electric shielding 
and power distribution of ‘parallel cabling’ can be 
proven. The term ‘parallel cabling’ refers to power 
being supplied to one electric consumer with more 
than one cable.
STUK inspected TVO’s installation supervision 
in several inspections carried out in accordance 
with the inspection programme for the construc-
tion stage and in connection with regulatory activi-
ties onsite to verify the sufficiency of TVO’s super-
vision methods. During the daily inspection rounds 
compliance with approved procedures was moni-
tored, among other things. STUK also participated 
in quality audits of subcontractors carried out by 
the plant supplier and TVO onsite. No significant 
deviations were observed.
4.3.6 Commissioning
Equipment and system test runs
Testing of equipment and systems in the turbine 
island actively continued in 2013. In the nuclear 
island, the absence of operational I&C still pre-
vents any large-scale testing. Furthermore, some of 
the equipment and piping installation work in the 
nuclear island are still incomplete.
The next important milestone in the testing of 
the nuclear island will be the pressure and leak 
tightness tests of the containment. The plan is to 
complete these tests in early 2014. In 2013, the 
plant supplier focused, in terms of the commission-
ing of the reactor island, mainly on preparing the 
testing of the containment: leak tightness testing 
of the containment isolation and testing of the 
doors leading to the containment (personnel air-
lock, emergency airlock and material hatch) start-
ed in early 2013. The previously started testing of 
electricity systems continued. A temporary control 
I&C system is used in the testing because the final 
operational I&C has not been installed yet. Testing 
of the building technology systems (such as tele-
phone systems, fire detection systems and lighting 
systems) has also continued at the reactor island.
STUK has supervised the commissioning tests 
(such as the personnel airlock, material hatch 
and leak tightness tests of isolation valves) onsite. 
STUK regularly oversees the commissioning of 
electricity systems. The  licensee’s actions have 
been pertinent in connection to any problems in 
the commissioning of the electricity systems. TVO’s 
own supervision of commissioning activities  were 
reviewed in the spring as part of the construction 
inspection programme. The inspection focused on 
the performance of test runs and the processing of 
documents including test results. TVO’s own super-
vision was deemed comprehensive in the inspec-
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operating interfaces, have been delayed due to the 
delays in the I&C design.
4.3.7 Reviewing documents related to 
operating license application
STUK has agreed with TVO that STUK may re-
view parts of the operating license application doc-
uments before the delivery of the actual operating 
license application. This will balance the workload 
of the various parties as completed thematic sec-
tions are reviewed in advance. The documents sub-
mitted for advance processing must form a unified 
whole, and represent the final plant design. As a 
result of the pre-review, STUK presents a decision 
including potential observations and requests for 
further clarifications. The pre-review also functions 
as practice for the review procedures planned for 
the operating licensing stage. All the documents 
that are delivered to STUK in connection with an 
operating license application will be reviewed by 
STUK at the operating license stage as a whole, 
and STUK will approve their essential parts before 
delivering a safety assessment and a statement on 
the operating license application to the Ministry of 
Employment and the Economy.
The pre-review of the operating license applica-
tion documents began in 2012 with the review of 
the methodology reports and radiological analyses 
presented in Chapter 15 of the final safety analysis 
report. Chapter 11, Processing of radioactive waste, 
was also submitted for pre-review in 2013. STUK’s 
review comments were sent to TVO as an appendix 
to the decision.
4.3.8 Organisational operations 
and quality management
Organisation and performance 
of management system
The total number of personnel working at the 
Olkiluoto 3 project site towards the end of 2013 
was around 2,160, of which around 1,815 people 
were from the plant supplier’s site organisation 
and around 345 people from TVO’s project organ-
isation. TVO’s project organisation consists of proj-
ect personnel (around 65), TVO’s line organisation 
personnel (around 80) and consultants (around 
200). The number of people in the plant supplier’s 
construction site organisation has decreased from 
tion. However, STUK voiced its concern regarding 
the fact that it takes a long time to draft result re-
ports after testing, even though the actual results 
are written down during the test.
Inspecting of commissioning test programs is 
an important element of STUK’s regulatory work. 
STUK has approved all the turbine island com-
missioning testing programs plans that require 
STUK’s approval. In 2013, a couple of dozen test 
programmes were submitted to STUK for ap-
proval. STUK posed some requirements concern-
ing the test programmes but no major defects 
were observed. Relatively few test programmes 
were submitted to STUK because most of the re-
actor island system test programmes will not be 
updated until the I&C design has been completed. 
Furthermore, TVO announced that several of the 
already approved test programmes will be revised, 
which means that they have to be submitted for 
approval again.
Preparations for future 
operation of the plant unit
Besides technical test runs, commissioning also in-
cludes verification of the organisation’s capability 
to operate the plant in a safe manner. The prereq-
uisites of safe operation include for example an 
adequate number of licensed operators and the 
necessary plant documentation, such as procedures 
and the operational limits and conditions.
The plant supplier has not been able to pro-
vide operator trainees with the required simulator 
training yet because the simulator does not yet 
correspond to the final plant design. This is caused 
by the fact that the I&C design is incomplete. In 
an inspection as part of the construction inspection 
programme in March 2012, STUK required that 
TVO produce a plan on how TVO will approve the 
simulator for training while the current situation 
prevails. TVO submitted the plan to STUK in the 
spring of 2013 and STUK approved it as such. The 
simulator will be updated once the I&C design is 
complete. When this has been done, several test 
cases will be run on the simulator. The test runs 
will be performed to assess whether the simulator 
describes the plant accurately enough for it to be 
used in training.
The preparation of plant procedures and the 
operational limits and conditions, as well as the 
validation of procedures and control room and 
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tors working at the construction site was improved 
in 2013. For example, TVO selected six of the larg-
est companies working at the construction site 
and appointed a TVO delivery controller for them. 
Most of these companies do installation work at 
the plant site. The delivery controllers submit bi-
annual reports to the heads of their units at TVO. 
Any issues needing more studies will be discussed 
together with the companies being supervised and 
the plant supplier. Commissioning and related or-
ganisations have not yet been assessed in terms of 
the need for delivery control. A separate survey on 
the need to apply delivery control to the I&C sys-
tem will also be made.
STUK noted, in connection with the inspections 
included in the scope of the construction inspection 
programme, that experienced auditors of TVO have 
been lost. Thus, TVO must ensure that the audit-
ing activities will remain proper by determining 
requirements for auditor qualifications and experi-
ence.
TVO’s design data review
During the Olkiluoto 3 project, STUK has paid 
attention to the fact that there have been defects 
in many of the licensing documents submitted to 
STUK for reviwing. Furthermore, documents which 
have not been approved by TVO have been submit-
ted to STUK for reviewing. STUK has required 
that TVO revise its document management process 
so that no unfinished issues will be submitted to 
STUK for reviewing and the assessment on compli-
ance with safety requirements made in connection 
with TVO’s own review will be clearly traceable. 
In connection with the inspections made in 2013, 
TVO presented to STUK its development measures 
which aim to ensure that compliance with safety 
requirements is verified more thoroughly. STUK 
will monitor sufficiency of the licensee’s measures 
in connection with the inspections included in the 
scope of the construction inspection programme.
Safety culture
In 2013, STUK ordered a study on the status of the 
safety culture at the Olkiluoto 3 construction site. 
Based on the study results, one can state that the 
safety culture of the Olkiluoto 3 project has im-
proved over the past few years. The study results 
also show that communication between the organ-
isations working at the plant site in issues pertain-
last year.
In 2011, TVO performed an assessment of the 
performance and scope of the Olkiluoto 3 project 
management system. Many improvement areas 
were observed in this assessment. These areas 
were developed in 2012 and 2013. Areas requiring 
improvement included standardisation of work 
planning between the Olkiluoto 3 project and the 
operating plants and standardisation of indicators 
used for the project and during the operational 
stage.
The management system of the Olkiluoto 3 
project is part of TVO’s management system. In 
compliance with the project contract, the plant 
supplier’s instructions are followed. In addition 
to the plant supplier’s instructions, there is a 
separate quality system for the Olkiluoto 3 proj-
ect of TVO. It complements TVO’s management 
system. The procedures have been developed over 
the course of the project, and an acceptable level 
in terms of commissioning has been reached, but 
managing the project’s procedures as a whole re-
quires special competence – the commissioning 
responsibilities and procedures are specified in 
agreements between TVO and the plant supplier, 
the commissioning handbook, the commissioning 
plan and the commissioning concept as well as 
other separate TVO procedures on commissioning. 
STUK required that TVO find out how the proce-
dures of the Olkiluoto 3 project and the procedures 
included in TVO’s management system are to be 
applied after the loading of fuel so that there will 
be no uncertainties as to which procedures apply.
Quality management and 
supplier monitoring
TVO’s independent quality assurance unit moni-
tors the quality of the Olkiluoto 3 project and its 
management by processing any critical non-con-
formances observed in the operations of the plant 
supplier and its subcontractors, product non-con-
formances and audit results, as well as by record-
ing statistics and analysing information pertaining 
to the underlying causes for the non-conformances. 
Another concern in the OL3 project is the large vol-
ume of open items, and their postponement until 
the commissioning and operating license phases.
STUK has previously required that TVO devel-
op its supplier supervision and control procedures. 
Comprehensive supervision of the key subcontrac-
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ing to the safety culture and other issues pertain-
ing to safety has improved as well. Formal meet-
ing practices between the parties have also been 
established to improve communication. According 
to the study, the fact that the plant supplier’s proj-
ect organisation is located at the construction site 
has improved the management’s understanding of 
the conditions under which the project is imple-
mented.
Compliance with rules, regulations and proce-
dures is of utmost importance at the Olkiluoto 3 
construction site. Processing practices at the con-
struction site have been very hierarchical, which 
has sometimes prolonged the processing times. The 
attitude towards human errors made by individual 
employees is either neutral or punitive. People in 
general understand the significance of safety is-
sues at the construction site, but their understand-
ing may be limited to a narrow field.
TVO employs two safety culture coordinators 
who promote and assess the safety culture. The 
plant supplier has also invested in promotion of 
the safety culture by hiring its own safety culture 
coordinator. Since sufficient resources have been 
allocated, the safety culture coordinators are able 
to work daily at the construction site.
The safety culture principles of TVO and the 
plant supplier are divergent. TVO’s principles ap-
plied to the construction site comply with those 
applied to the operating plants. The plant supplier 
applies its own safety culture principles also to 
other projects, which is why they are of a more gen-
eral nature. The divergent safety culture principles 
of TVO and the plant supplier may confuse the 
subcontractors who need to follow these principles. 
The study recommended that TVO and the plant 
suppliers should try to reach a consensus about the 
safety culture and continue supporting the work of 
the safety coordinators. The study also noted that 
financial issues and schedules are major risks of 
the project and the fact that the construction site 
is a multicultural working environment requires 
more investments in communication about the 
safety culture.
4.3.9 Safeguards of Nuclear Materials
STUK performed a safeguards inspection o the 
Olkiluoto 3 design data (technical basic data) with 
IAEA and the European Commission. The inspec-
tion focused on locating the key issues in terms 
of nuclear non-proliferation control, such as fuel 
storage locations and transfer routes. In the same 
occasion, a meeting on practical implementation 
of the systems related to nuclear non-proliferation 
control (such as CCTV cameras) was arranged.
STUK-B 176
71
4.4 New nuclear power plant projects
STUK arranged several meetings with TVO and 
Fennovoima on a variety of issues such as the 
safety culture, safeguards of nuclear materials, civ-
il engineering, planning of licensing, management 
systems, seismology, radiation control, plant tech-
nology and interpretation of the requirements in 
STUK’s draft procedure YVL B.1. STUK’s experts 
participated in supplier assessment of TVO and 
Fennovoima as observers.
In project meetings and the meetings focusing 
on a particular issue, STUK stressed the signifi-
cance of the planning of licensing and monitored 
development of the license applicant’s   manage-
ment and quality control systems, operations of 
the power companies and the preparation of their 
organisations for the new nuclear power plant 
project. In these discussions, STUK aimed at im-
proving the power companies’ competence, as the 
construction licence stage will start soon.
Contrary to expectations, TVO and Fennovoima 
did not submit any significant volume of documen-
tation to STUK for approval in advance. An amend-
ment of section 55 of the Nuclear Energy Act came 
into force in the autumn of 2012. According to the 
amendment, STUK can approve equipment and 
structures prior to the construction licence  deci-
sion and also review in advance plant and system 
level documentation. In the autumn of 2013, STUK 
started assessment of the AES-2006 plant based 
on a request of Fennovoima. Preparation for a 
potential supplement to the Fennovoima decision-
in-principle also in terms of the assessment of 
organisations and plant  siting was simultaneously 
started.
As part of the preparation for new plant proj-
ects, STUK kept in contact with the Ministry of 
Employment and the Economy, the municipality of 
Pyhäjoki and other authorities in the region who 
are involved in the Pyhäjoki cooperation commit-
tee. In June, STUK arranged a national licensing 
seminar. In addition to the license applicants, 
representatives of nuclear power plant suppliers 
were invited to the seminar. The discussion theme 
was the importance of the licensing stage and the 
status of plant design at the construction licence 
stage.
 STUK continued development of its own re-
quirement management procedures. STUK hired 
an expert in requirement management and started 
the expert’s orientation. As the completion of the 
YVL Guides was postponed, the setting of more 
specific goals for the plant and system design to be 
reviewed at the construction licence stage was also 
postponed.
STUK reviewed Fennovoima Oy’s nuclear secu-
rity  procedures and related documentation.
Including the safeguard requirements in the 
design and construction of new plants as early on 
as possible is important both in terms of the opera-
tor’s own supervision activities and the safeguards 
of nuclear materials  arranged by STUK and in-
ternational parties. TVO submitted preliminary 
design data for Olkiluoto 4 in November 2012 
and Fennovoima submitted preliminary design 
data for Hanhikivi 1 in July 2013. The European 
Commission issued Material Balance Area codes 
for the plants and submitted the data to IAEA. 
Thus, international safeguards of nuclear materi-
als  organisations have been able to start the plan-
ning of their regulatory actions and regulation of 
the projects.
4.5 Research reactor
VTT’s FiR 1 research reactor was commissioned in 
1962. The reactor was built for research and educa-
tional purposes and for producing isotopes. The re-
actor underwent considerable modifications in the 
1990s, and in 1999, the use of the reactor for the 
boron neutron capture therapy (BNCT) of cancers 
in the head and neck area began. BNCT treatment 
and the related research became the reactor’s most 
important use in the 2000s. In 2013, FiR 1 mainly 
focused on isotope irradiation and arranging basic 
training in reactor physics.
The operating license for FiR 1 is valid until 
the end of 2023. However, VTT Technical Research 
Centre of Finland has decided to shut down and 
decommission the reactor earlier due to finan-
cial reasons. VTT submitted an up-to-date plan 
on nuclear waste management at FiR 1 to the 
Ministry of Employment and the Economy in June 
2013. The document includes a preliminary reac-
tor decommissioning plan. The plan is to continue 
operating the reactor while the decommissioning 
plans are being specified. VTT started an environ-
mental impact assessment (EIA) procedure for the 
reactor’s decommissioning by submitting an EIA 
programme to the Ministry of Employment and 
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the Economy on 6 November 2013. According to a 
preliminary schedule included in the programme, 
the reactor will be shut down in late 2015 and 
demolished over the course of around two years. 
Based on a request by the Ministry of Employment 
and the Economy, STUK submitted a statement 
on the nuclear waste management plan and pre-
pared a statement on the EIA programme for the 
Ministry. In these statements, STUK paid special 
attention to the safe operation of the reactor, more 
specific planning of the demolition, development of 
physical protection and more specific planning of 
the nuclear waste management during the decom-
missioning stage.
There are safety requirements for decommis-
sioning in the Nuclear Energy Act, acts and decrees 
on the use of radiation and the YVL Guides. A new 
YVL Guide, YVL D.4, deals with the decommission-
ing of nuclear facilities. It entered into force on 1 
December 2013 for new nuclear facilities. The plan 
is to extend the Guide to cover FiR 1 based on a de-
cision by STUK in 2015. The Guide states that the 
licensee must, for example, submit a final decom-
missioning plan to STUK for approval.
STUK completed inspections of FiR 1 in com-
pliance with the regulatory plan. The inspections 
involved operational safety, physical protection, 
emergency preparedness, nuclear non-proliferation 
control, nuclear waste management and radiation 
protection. STUK assessed the updated physical 
protection procedures of the research reactor, tak-
ing into account the decommissioning plans. Over 
the course of the year, STUK performed three re-
views of nuclear material records, one of them in 
cooperation with the European Commission and 
one of them an inventory review together with the 
Commission and IAEA. The plant was studied in 
detail in connection with the inventory review be-
cause IAEA and the Commission have also started 
preparations for the decommissioning of FiR 1.
In 2013, STUK approved the person in charge of 
the nuclear non-proliferation control of FiR 1 and 
deputies in charge of physical protection and emer-
gency preparedness. STUK approved one supervi-
sor and two operators for a period of four years. 
Furthermore, VTT submitted to STUK for ap-
proval proposals on one supervisor, two operators 
and one operator candidate at the end of the year.
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4.6 Encapsulation facility and rEpository for spEnt nuclEar fuEl
4.6 Encapsulation facility and 
repository for spent nuclear fuel
4.6.1 Processing of construction 
licence application
At the end of 2012, Posiva submitted to the 
Government a construction licence application for 
an encapsulation facility and repository for spent 
nuclear fuel and submitted to STUK the construc-
tion licence application documentation laid down 
in the Nuclear Energy Decree and Government 
Decree no. 736/2008. In addition to submitting the 
documents, a representative of Posiva personally 
presented the documents to STUK.
Completeness review(s)
Processing of the construction licence applica-
tion for an encapsulation facility and repository 
for spent nuclear fuel was started at STUK by a 
completeness review that verified sufficiency and 
appropriateness of the submitted documentation. 
STUK decided to start further processing of the 
documents. The completeness review was imple-
mented in two stages because the documentation 
submitted by Posiva at the turn of the year did not 
include safety case documentation pertaining to 
long-term safety.
The first part of the completeness review, i.e. 
the review of the documentation excluding the 
safety case, was completed in April 2013. The 
decision stated that Posiva’s construction licence 
application documentation is mostly comprehen-
sive. However, some of the documents need to 
be supplemented and STUK decided to start the 
processing of these documents once Posiva has 
supplemented them. Such documents included 
Chapters Y2 (Plant description), Y9 (Behaviour of 
the encapsulation facility and repository in case of 
a transient and accident), Y11 (Organisation and 
functions), a classification document proposal, a re-
port on the management of ageing and a licensing 
plan. Furthermore, system descriptions submitted 
in connection with the preliminary safety analysis 
report were not processed because of deficiencies 
in the classification. The completeness review also 
stated that a project plan and its appendices, a 
safety management report, a safety culture report 
and environmental condition classification of the 
encapsulation facility’s rooms were not included 
among the submitted documents.
The safety case pertaining to long-term safety 
was submitted to STUK in several stages during 
2013. The last key documents were submitted to 
STUK in October 2013. The scope of these docu-
ments was reviewed in the same way as the scope 
of the other documents, and a decision on the com-
pleteness was issued in November 2013. Minor de-
ficiencies were observed, but the documents were 
approved for further processing.
Plant design, plant construction 
and safety classification
STUK arranged several meetings focusing on spe-
cific technical issues based on the observations 
made during the completeness review. The safety 
classification and system documentation were dis-
cussed in these meetings. Thus, the licensee has 
been able to take into account the observations 
made so far when updating the application doc-
umentation. A review of the system descriptions 
were not started until the licensee submitted the 
revised documents at the end of the year.
In terms of the underground facilities, the re-
view focused on the division of the underground 
facilities for different systems and their safety 
classification: the systems and the classification 
must unambiguously take into account the long-
term safety viewpoint. Special attention was paid 
to the consistency of the safety case with the safety 
classification.
When processing the descriptions of the reposi-
tory location, final disposal and long-term safety 
in the safety analysis report, STUK paid attention 
particularly to Posiva committing to a sufficient ex-
tent to the requirements posed by the regulations 
with its comments.
Operational safety
Chapters Y7, Radioactive materials, Y8, Radiation 
protection and Y9 Behaviour of the encapsulation 
facility and repository in case of a transient and 
accident, of the preliminary safety analysis report 
deal with operational safety. When reviewing them, 
STUK will verify that the safety of employees and 
the environment have been taken into account in 
the design of the encapsulation facility and reposi-
tory.
STUK submitted a request for supplementary 
information to Posiva on Chapter Y7 in October 
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2013. Chapter Y7 includes the radioactive material 
contents in the spent fuel, but there is no assess-
ment on the volume of radioactive materials that 
will be accumulated in the facility and its systems, 
such as filters. In the request, STUK required that 
Posiva add the missing information in Chapter 
Y7. Review of the other chapters pertaining to op-
erational safety in the safety analysis report was 
started in 2013 and will be continued in 2014.
Posiva submitted, in connection with the con-
struction licence application, a probabilistic risk 
analysis for the design stage. STUK started the re-
view of the risk analysis in 2013 and will continue 
it in 2014. So far, no deficiencies that warrant a 
request for supplementary information have been 
found.
Long-term safety
The actual review of the documents started once 
the coverage review of the safety case was com-
plete. In terms of the repository site and the facil-
ity, STUK has so far processed geological descrip-
tions of the site, the bedrock classification system, 
design bases of the final disposal system, initial 
state of the system, a performance assessment and 
background data on hydrogeology, rock mechan-
ics and hydrogeochemistry. A review of engineered 
barriers was started with their design bases, initial 
state and its feasibility, as well as performance as-
sessment and its justification.
A review related to the safety assessment fo-
cused on, for instance, methodology used to create 
the scenarios describing possible lines of evolution 
of the final disposal system and their coverage, 
compliance of the performance analysis of the bar-
riers with the base scenario, preparation for lines 
of evolution not in line with the expected evolu-
tion of the final disposal system (base scenario) in 
case an variant scenario or disturbance scenario is 
realised, compliance of the safety analysis calcula-
tions with the scenarios and justification of long-
term safety.
STUK is using a group of international experts 
as a supportin the review. STUK has used a lot of 
time in launching its own review procedures as 
well as in planning, launching and managing the 
review work of these experts. This was necessary 
for STUK to benefit as much as possible from the 
review work of the external experts when review-
ing all the documents.
As the review proceeded, STUK submitted to 
Posiva requests for additional information in fol-
lowing areas, site investigations, technical barriers 
and long-term safety analyses. STUK required that 
Posiva submit to STUK the background reports 
STUK deemed the most important for the safety 
case. A total of 52 documents must be submitted 
by 30 April 2014. In addition to compiled requests 
for additional information, STUK submitted more 
detailed requests for additional information to 
Posiva. Based on the review of site investigation 
reports, requests for additional information on the 
brittle deformation structural models modelled by 
Posiva, the model of the facility to be excavated, a 
hydrogeochemical database, missing site related 
reports and uncertainties in the hydrogeological 
discrete fracture network model were submitted 
to Posiva. In terms of the safety analysis, STUK 
submitted a request for additional information in 
October where it required that Posiva 1) specify 
in more detail the safety functions of the barriers 
in compliance with section 2 of the Government 
Decree no. 736/2008 or provide justification as to 
how the safety functions defined by Posiva comply 
with the above-mentioned requirement and 2) fur-
ther define the performance targets specified for 
the safety functions by presenting for each perfor-
mance target a criterion describing the characther-
istics of the barrier that ensures the performance 
of a safety function.
STUK arranged three workshops when review-
ing the safety case. Participants of these work-
shops included the international experts who sup-
port STUK’s review work. The first workshop was 
also the kick-off meeting of the safety case review, 
and it took place in March 2013. In this workshop, 
the consultants participating in the review were 
familiarised with the background of the Finnish 
spent nuclear fuel repository project, the licens-
ing procedures and the planned review process. 
Furthermore, Posiva presented the licence applica-
tion’s safety case documentation.
A second, smaller meeting was arranged in 
June. The focus of this meeting was on possible 
critical issues based on the first reviews of the safe-
ty case. A total of fourteen issues were discussed. 
A couple of them were selected for the next larger 
workshop that took place in September 2013. Four 
to five themes were laid down based on the work-
shop in September to be processed in a separate 
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workshop in addition to the document review.
The first subject-specific workshop was ar-
ranged on 10–13 December 2013. This workshop 
focused on reviewing the rock classification system 
used by Posiva, rock mechanics at Olkiluoto and 
sufficiency of the thermal characterisation of the 
bedrock.
In addition to its own review work, STUK fol-
lowed the progress of a similar licence review 
process in Sweden. STUK agreed with the Swedish 
authority SSM that invitations to representatives 
of STUK/SSM will be sent to all of the workshops 
arranged when processing these licence applica-
tions. In 2013, STUK participated in workshops 
arranged by SSM on seismology and biosphere 
analyses.
Quality management
As part of the repository’s construction licence ap-
plication, Posiva submitted a report on construc-
tion project quality management to STUK for ap-
proval. In this report, Posiva describes the proce-
dures to be used to verify the quality of operations 
and products. The quality assurance procedures 
to be applied to the design and construction of the 
Posiva repository are described in Posiva’s man-
agement system and several of the documents re-
lated to the project. When reviewing the report, 
STUK noted that Posiva’s procedures have been 
developed to such an extent after the drafting of 
the report that some of the descriptions in the 
report are no longer up to date. In its decision on 
the report, STUK required that Posiva update the 
report, taking into account the development of the 
activities and the procedures guiding it. STUK will 
continue processing the report in 2014 once Posiva 
has submitted the updated documents.
Detailed quality management procedures to 
be applied in practice during construction and 
the quality management organisation will be de-
scribed in separate project and quality plans to 
be drafted at a later date. Posiva submitted the 
plans to STUK for review in 2013. The project plan 
describes the construction project’s goals, scope 
and division. The plan also illustrates key poli-
cies to be applied to project management and the 
completion of the project, plans, duties of the units 
that will participate in the project, interfaces with 
other projects and key processes. In the quality 
plan, Posiva describes the project’s goals and the 
procedures to be applied to reach the goals. The 
plan also illustrates the quality management du-
ties laid down in the project plan and determines 
the parties responsible for them. STUK is of the 
opinion that the project and quality plan are key 
documents pertaining to the implementation, con-
trol and quality management of Posiva’s construc-
tion project. Since the plans are important, STUK 
has requested an assessment by an outside expert 
to support its own review. The expert compared 
the plans to STUK’s requirements and interna-
tional proven standards. The assessment reports 
included all non-conformances found in the plans 
and observations that STUK deemed especially 
important. Thus, STUK required that Posiva as-
sess the feedback from the reports and take it into 
account to the extent necessary when updating the 
project plan and quality plan. STUK also required 
that Posiva submit updated versions of the plans to 
STUK in early 2014.
STUK’s regulatory activities and assessments 
also cover the licensee’s suppliers. In 2013, STUK 
participated as an observer in four audits per-
formed by Posiva on its equipment suppliers. The 
purpose with these audits was to verify that the 
supplies are capable of supplying products that 
comply with the requirements. By participating in 
the audits, STUK was able to assess Posiva’s audit-
ing activities and their functionality as well. STUK 
is of the opinion that Posiva’s auditing is advanced 
and complies with the requirements.
According to the Nuclear Energy Act, Posiva 
must arrange for STUK appropriate and sufficient 
opportunities to conduct its regulatory activities 
in Finland and abroad. As part of the construction 
licence application, Posiva submitted to STUK a 
report as laid down in the Nuclear Energy Decree 
on providing the preconditions for the regulatory 
activities. In this report, Posiva describes the pro-
cedures it has planned to use to ensure that STUK 
will have the opportunity to inspect equipment and 
structures, monitor their manufacture, assess the 
design and manufacturing organisations and con-
duct investigations as necessary. STUK required 
that Posiva supplement some parts of the report. 
For instance, STUK wanted Posiva to provide 
STUK with an opportunity to assess and monitor 
type testing and testing of systems, equipment or 
structures that are conducted to find out whether 
the design requirements are met. Furthermore, 
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STUK wanted the objects to be monitored also to 
include demonstration tests at the repository, the 
test programme and testing procedures. STUK also 
required from Posiva a summary describing the 
practical measures to be implemented to ensure 
that STUK can conduct its regulatory activities, 
including training on the procedures to be provided 
to personnel. STUK will verify these practical ar-
rangements in 2014 when processing the construc-
tion licence application.
Emergency preparedness and 
physical protection
Posiva submitted to STUK a preliminary emer-
gency response plan as laid down in section 35 of 
the Nuclear Energy Decree when submitting the 
construction licence application on 31 December 
2012. After having reviewed the document, STUK 
sent a letter to Posiva on 9 October 2013 where 
it requested that Posiva update the preliminary 
emergency response plan and specify the coopera-
tion procedures with the Olkiluoto power plant to 
be applied during the construction stage in terms 
of Posiva’s emergency preparedness and the ac-
cident analyses. The results of the accident analy-
ses will be used when determining the scope of 
protection measures required during a potential 
accident, for example. Posiva submitted its pre-
liminary emergency response plan to STUK on 20 
November 2013.
STUK processed the construction licence ap-
plication documents on physical protection sub-
mitted by Posiva to STUK on 31 December 2012 
and issued a safety classified decision on them, 
stating that the processing of the documents was 
discontinued because of deficiencies found in the 
documents. STUK submitted its decision to Posiva 
and a memorandum clarifying the observations 
made so that Posiva could update the documents 
and submit them to STUK. Most of the updated 
documents were submitted to STUK for approval 
in December 2013.
Safeguards of Nuclear Materials  
Posiva submitted to STUK a description of ar-
rangements required to non-proliferation of nu-
clear weapons as laid down in section 35 of the 
Nuclear Energy Decree when submitting the con-
struction licence application on 31 December 2012. 
STUK performed a coverage review and noted that 
Posiva had identified the duties laid down in the 
Nuclear Energy Act, regulations and international 
treaties, but the plan did not describe how Posiva 
plans to ensure compliance with them. Posiva sub-
mitted to the European Commission and STUK the 
design information laid down in the Commission 
Regulation in 2013. STUK used the design infor-
mation as part of the construction licence applica-
tion review. Since safeguards of nuclear materials 
is international, several technical meetings with 
the European Commission and IAEA have been 
arranged on safeguards of nuclear materials at the 
Posiva plant.
4.6.2 Posiva’s organisational operations 
and quality management
In 2013, Posiva continued the systematic improve-
ment of its management system and policies. The 
improvements involve Posiva’s management sys-
tem as a whole. The management system com-
prises a management handbook, an organisation 
handbook, processes used to control the activities 
and procedures in the form of handbooks. To sup-
port the development, Posiva requested an exter-
nal assessment of its management system. The 
improvements based on the results of the assess-
ment will be continued in 2014. After a review of 
the updated management system and its processes, 
STUK further required that Posiva develop the 
processes, particularly the organisation’s opera-
tions processes, to comply with the requirements 
laid down in STUK’s YVL Guides. Posiva will sub-
mit new process charts and process descriptions on 
safety control and quality management to STUK 
for review in early 2014.
The procedures guiding Posiva’s organisation 
have been compiled into several handbooks cover-
ing a variety of areas, such as the R&D handbook, 
the procurement handbook, the design handbook, 
the manufacturing handbook and the construction 
handbook. Most of these handbooks and the proce-
dures to be included in them are still being drafted. 
Since the handbooks are key documents that will 
control the future construction project, STUK is of 
the opinion that they must be approved and taken 
into use by Posiva before construction of the reposi-
tory starts.
Posiva developed its organisational structure in 
2013 to better correspond to the needs of the prep-
STUK-B 176
77
4.6 Encapsulation facility and rEpository for spEnt nuclEar fuEl
aration and construction stage after delivery of the 
construction licence application. A key organisa-
tional change was a transfer to a line management 
model from the process management model that 
had been in use since 2011. The units and depart-
ments were also revised, and the job descriptions of 
some employees were changed. Posiva merged its 
previous technology unit and R&D unit into a de-
velopment unit and changed its construction unit 
into a project unit. Posiva implemented a safety as-
sessment required by STUK for the organisational 
changes prior to implementing them. According to 
Posiva’s assessment, the changes do not have any 
safety implications. Furthermore, Posiva must as-
sess the implemented change by the end of 2014 to 
verify that the safety goals set for the change were 
met.
The organisation to be used during the con-
struction stage of the repository will, according to 
Posiva’s report, consist of Posiva’s line organisation 
and a project organisation to be established for the 
construction stage. The line organisation will be 
in charge of the development of the final disposal 
concept and supporting functions at the company 
level for the implementation project. According to 
Posiva, the repository project’s resources will be 
allocated from among the employees of Posiva and 
the owners, whenever possible. In late 2013, Posiva 
launched a project on improving its resources by 
hiring several experts in project management, im-
plementation and control. The organisation will be 
complemented as necessary based on the construc-
tion requirements. STUK will continue evaluation 
of the Posiva organisation, personnel resources and 
competence as part of the construction licence ap-
plication process in 2014.
STUK evaluated Posiva’s management system 
and its functionality in 2013 by means of several 
inspections of Posiva’s operations. The purpose of 
these reviews was to assess readiness of the Posiva 
organisation to carry out the construction project. 
STUK stated in its summary of the reviews that 
Posiva must further develop its operations and 
processes before implementing the construction 
stage. STUK stated in the reviews that Posiva’s 
personnel resources are still incomplete and Posiva 
does not, based on the review results, have the re-
quired readiness to supervise and control detailed 
design and implementation of a nuclear facility. 
STUK will continue assessment of the personnel 
resources of Posiva’s plant project in 2014. The 
reviews and their results are described in more 
detail in Appendix 8. The management system and 
the functions described in it do not yet fully comply 
with STUK’s requirements.
4.6.3 Construction of research facility Onkalo
General
The excavation of the Onkalo access tunnel was 
mostly completed in 2012. The combined length of 
the access tunnel and other tunnels is 4,987 me-
tres, and the deepest part is 455 metres in depth 
(Fig. 17). In 2013, Demonstration Tunnels 3 and 4 
as well as Vehicle Access Tunnel 13 were excavated 
at level –420 in Onkalo. The casting of building 
Figure 17. Status of the excavation of Onkalo in January 2014 (Posiva Oy).
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elements and HVAC and electricity system instal-
lations were completed in the access tunnel, at the 
bottoms of the shafts, in connecting tunnels, in 
pump rooms and at the precipitation tank.
Further reinforcing of the first part of the 
Onkalo access tunnel (between piles 60 and 220) 
with bolts was completed. The further reinforce-
ments were necessary because of the excavation 
of a hoisting device building of the repository that 
will be constructed at ground level. When the foun-
dation of the hoisting device building was being ex-
cavated, the top parts of the exhaust air shaft and 
personnel shaft were injection grouted by injecting 
the bedrock around them. Rocks and loose stone 
matter were removed from the Onkalo access tun-
nel and other rock facilities by scaling. Condition of 
the surfaces reinforced with shotcrete was simulta-
neously inspected.
A test hall above ground level was almost com-
pleted. It will be used to test the functionality and 
use of equipment for tests and demonstrations to 
take place in Onkalo. An expansion of the Onkalo 
project office was completed, except for the accep-
tance inspection, by the end of 2013.
Posiva started preparation for the ‘large-scale 
projects’, i.e. construction of the repository and en-
capsulation facility, by starting modification of the 
area. The modification measures include new roads 
and moving the access gate and related access con-
trol system elements.
In 2013, missfired explosives were found in 
several parts of Onkalo when the stone mate-
rial was removed for a geological survey and the 
bedrock was cleaned with a pressure washer. 
Posiva isolated the dangerous areas, notified the 
people working in Onkalo and submitted reports 
on the unexpected conditions to STUK. All of the 
detected missfired explosives were removed from 
Onkalo.
In 2013, Posiva added to its database a total 
of 42 new non-conformances regarding the con-
struction of Onkalo or regarding environmental 
damage caused by foreign materials. These were 
caused by casting during the civil engineering 
construction project, vibration measuring at the 
ventilation and hoisting device building, unau-
thorised materials being taken to Onkalo and 
exceeding of the excavation tolerances for demon-
stration Tunnels 3 and 4.
RSC demonstration
Posiva has excavated in Onkalo four demonstra-
tion tunnels at level –420 m. Between September 
and November 2013, Posiva excavated demonstra-
tion tunnel 4 (20.8 m) and demonstration tunnel 3 
(25.3 m). A geological survey was completed in both 
tunnels. Prior to starting excavation, water pressure 
tests were carried out through probing holes at the 
location of demonstration tunnel 3. A very large 
volume of water, 221 l/min, was poured into one of 
the holes. Some of the water also flowed into an ex-
perimental deposition hole in nearby demonstration 
tunnel 1. Posiva did not inject this point, however. 
The decision was not in line with the procedures, but 
Posiva justified it by stating that a plug test requires 
a volume of rock with as few holes as possible.
The main purpose of the demonstration tun-
nels is to yield information for the development 
of the rock suitability classification (RSC), as well 
as information for the needs of characterisation 
and modelling of the Onkalo bedrock. The full-
scale plug test (Poplu) of Posiva will probably take 
place in demonstration tunnel 4. The plan is to use 
demonstration tunnel 3 to store the equipment 
needed during testing. Various testing of techni-
cal barriers, installation and operation procedures 
and simultaneous application of several technical 
barriers will also be carried out in the other dem-
onstration tunnels. Modifications of the concrete 
slabs of the experimental deposition holes took 
place in demonstration tunnel 1 as a prepara-
tion of the above-mentioned tests. The bottom of 
demonstration tunnel 2 was levelled out by rough-
grinding. The excavation damage zone (EDZ) was 
studied with a ground-penetrating radar prior to 
the rough-grinding and after the grinding.
Posiva drafted the ninth revision of the detailed 
model description of the demonstration area in 
late 2013. Of the seven planned experimental de-
position hole locations in demonstration tunnel 2, 
one has been deemed unsuitable in a preliminary 
estimate and one will not be used because the area 
may be needed for the plug structure. Drilling of 
the holes and an assessment on the rock classifica-
tion method will be completed by the end of 2014. 
Posiva completed the first suitability analysis of 
demonstration tunnel 4 when it was completed in 
October 2013. STUK will closely monitor Posiva’s 
RSC development work.
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Rock falls
In 2013, STUK was informed of several rocks of 
varying sizes having peeled off the vault of dem-
onstration tunnel 2 (at around PL 55). The falling 
rocks had been caught by the tunnel vault reinforc-
ing mesh. Even though the falling rocks did not ac-
tually pose any danger to occupational safety, they 
are an indication of stresses in the bedrock being 
released, which means that they are an indication 
of the properties of the bedrock at Olkiluoto. The 
communication and reporting practices between 
Posiva and STUK were updated to ensure that 
STUK will be notified of such events in real time 
and can assess their safety significance.
Grouting of Onkalo shafts to 
manage seepage water
So far, only the ventilation shaft at Onkalo is open 
from the ground level to the level –437. In 2013, 
Posiva used colloidal silica to seal leaking points 
in the bedrock inside the supply air shaft and the 
personnel shaft at level –290 m.
In October 2013, Posiva announced that it will 
start vertical drilling of the supply air shaft, even 
though the volume of seepage water from the con-
trol hole still exceeded the injection limit value 
determined by Posiva. In early November 2013, 
STUK posed to Posiva during a seepage water and 
injecting inspection a requirement that Posiva 
must submit to STUK for information a report on 
representativeness, reliability and coverage of the 
background data used to reach the decision to start 
the vertical drilling of the supply air shaft prior 
to starting the drilling. STUK will monitor prog-
ress of shaft injecting during its construction site 
inspections, in the Onkalo construction follow-up 
meetings and during its other inspections.
Studies
In 2013, Posiva conducted studies on the long-term 
safety of nuclear waste disposal at Onkalo:
•	 In	 research	 niche	 1	 (PL	 1475),	 the	 properties	
of bentonite under the conditions of the final 
repository was studied. In December 2013, the 
second hole of the test site was emptied and the 
bentonite samples were taken to a laboratory to 
be studied. The test continues in the first hole of 
the research facility.
•	 No	R&D	activities	took	place	in	research	niche	
2 (PL 2440) in 2013.
•	 In	research	niche	3	(PL	3620),	thermal	and	rock	
mechanics properties of the bedrock and the 
direction of tension stress in the bedrock are 
being studied. Heating elements were installed 
in a test hole to increase the temperature for 
a period of three months. After this period of 
time, cooling of the test site was monitored for 
a period of two months. In November, Posiva 
drilled more research holes around the above-
mentioned hole for geological modelling and 
taking rock mechanics samples. A separate 
research area was used to conduct hydrogeo-
logical studies and mise à la masse method 
measurements in between excavation damage 
zones and hydrogeological areas to study their 
interconnection.
•	 In	 research	 niche	 4,	 hydrogeological	 studies	
were conducted in between two holes. These 
studies focused on the interaction between the 
holes, water consumption and links between 
cracks in the bedrock that conduct water.
•	 In	research	niche	5,	tests	on	drift	of	radioactive	
tracers (H-3, Cl-36, Na-22, Sr-85 and Ba-33) 
were continued. These tests aim at obtaining 
more information on how radionuclides are re-
tained by the bedrock of Olkiluoto.
In November 2013, Posiva announced to STUK 
that the sulphide, sulphate and TDS (total dis-
solved solids) content in several of the groundwa-
ter chemistry monitoring tests had exceeded the 
action limits. This may have been caused by the 
impact of the construction of Onkalo on the hydro-
geological and hydrogeochemical properties of the 
bedrock at Olkiluoto. It is also possible that the 
action limits were exceeded because different types 
of groundwater have been mixed up by cracks that 
conduct water in the drilled holes or the multi-plug 
equipment used to isolate structures. Posiva will 
monitor the situation by taking samples more of-
ten than before.
Posiva has continued its survey of the ground-
water’s sulphate/sulphide balance and oxidation-
reduction reactions through groundwater chemis-
try and geo-microbiological sampling and labora-
tory tests.
Surveys of Onkalo also include a survey of 
incoming seepage water and measuring the total 
volume of seepage water. According to results of 
measurements that Posiva has deemed success-
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ful, the total volume of seepage water in Onkalo 
varied from 30.0 to 37.5 l/min in 2013. These total 
volumes include in average around 2.4–4.0 l/min 
of seepage from the exhaust air shaft. In 2013, 
the measured total volumes of seepage water in 
Onkalo remained clearly below the limit value of 
80 l/min set by Posiva.
Seismic measurements were conducted in the 
Onkalo demonstration area and the surroundings 
of the access tunnel to obtain more information for 
demonstrating the bedrock classification method.
Regulatory inspections in Onkalo and 
at the Onkalo construction site
In 2013, STUK performed seven regulatory site in-
spection in Onkalo and at the Onkalo construction 
site above ground level. During these inspections, 
STUK focused on the planning and implementa-
tion of ongoing works and Posiva’s own quality 
assurance and quality control. Discussions with 
Posiva on the results of the inspections were con-
ducted and the observations were also used to bet-
ter target future inspections. During a regulatory 
inspections in October, Posiva received a remark 
about delays in the weekly reporting of foreign 
materials used by an excavation contractor in its 
work; because of the delays, the volume monitor-
ing system of the foreign materials which may be 
used onsite was no longer up to date. Deficiencies 
in Posiva’s system of monitoring the quantities of 
foreign materials were also observed in a foreign 
material inspection in December.
Inspections of the Onkalo construction 
inspection programme
The construction inspection programme for Onkalo 
included four inspections in 2014. Of these, an in-
spection on drilling and modelling was postponed, 
to be arranged in connection with the construction 
licence application inspection programme in 2014. 
The three completed inspections on Onkalo dealt 
with the inspection and monitoring procedures at 
the Onkalo construction site, management of seep-
age water in Onkalo and management of foreign 
materials. STUK set requirements for Posiva and 
paid special attention in the following issues:
•	 In	the	Onkalo	construction	site	inspection	and	
monitoring procedures, Posiva must verify that 
the procedures on storage of products take into 
account the prevention of unintentional misuse. 
For example, products that have not been ap-
proved for use in Onkalo must be physically 
separated from products that have been ap-
proved for use in Onkalo in the warehouse.
•	 In	terms	of	the	control	of	seepage	water	in	Onk-
alo, STUK requested a report on how Posiva has 
verified coverage, representativeness and reli-
ability of the single control hole that had been 
used as the basis of the supply air shaft sealing 
results when reaching a decision to start the 
vertical drilling of the supply air shaft. STUK 
required that Posiva must submit a report on 
this issue before starting the vertical drilling of 
the supply air shaft.
•	 STUK	 found	 clear	deficiencies	 in	 the	manage-
ment of foreign materials at Onkalo. Posiva 
must develop its monitoring of the volume of 
at least the class A materials that have been 
deemed the most harmful in terms of long-term 
safety to ensure that the volume of foreign ma-
terials delivered to the Onkalo construction site 
and used at the construction site does not ex-
ceed the allowed volume. Furthermore, Posiva 
must study the long-term safety significance of 
traces from explosives (nitrogen compounds).
Construction document reviews
In 2013, STUK processed 84 documents regarding 
the construction of Onkalo that were submitted to 
STUK for information or for approval. The most 
significant included changed implementation scope 
of Onkalo (to excavate demonstration tunnels 3 
and 4); a report on construction of the hoisting 
equipment building and an expansion of the venti-
lation building; updates of the Onkalo construction 
design documents and Onkalo’s construction com-
munication plan; a report on loose rocks in dem-
onstration tunnel 2; a report on further reinforce-
ment plans of phase TU1 of the Onkalo project; a 
report on geological values; and a report on drilling 
records.
Inspection of the readiness to 
start construction work
In May 2013, Posiva arranged three internal in-
spections on the readiness to start construction 
of demonstration tunnels 3 and 4. In November, 
Posiva arranged two similar inspections on the 
vertical drilling of the supply air shaft. STUK par-
ticipated in these inspections as an observer and 
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considered the internal readiness for both con-
struction projects comprehensive enough to make 
a decision on not to arrange a separate readiness 
inspections of its own.
In 2013, STUK carried out one inspection on 
the readiness to start construction work by shot-
creting. During the inspections, the rock surfaces 
of the Onkalo area in question were compared with 
the survey documentation; the results of laser scan 
measurements and the structures reaching across 
Onkalo were also considered. The inspection also 
included a visit to the tunnel to verify that the 
documentation and the laser scan measurements 
comply with the actual tunnel. STUK verified that 
the documentation and the laser scan measure-
ments comply with the observations made in the 
tunnel and granted the permit to start shotcreting 
without posing any requirements.
Commissioning inspections
In October 2013, Posiva started an internal inspec-
tion, Commissioning inspection in stages of the un-
derground facilities, on the quality of the documen-
tation of tunnel phases TU1–TU4. STUK will have 
oversight of the work by Posiva and its suppliers 
that will, according to Posiva’s plans, culminate 
in commissioning inspections of the underground 
Onkalo facilities in 2014.
Follow-up meetings on the 
construction of Onkalo
STUK conducted a total of eight follow-up meet-
ings on the construction work at Onkalo in 2013. 
They included reviews of topical issues pertaining 
to the construction of Onkalo, such as reviews of 
the construction status, design, construction site, 
studies, rock classification procedure demonstra-
tion, quality management (supplier approval pro-
cedures and orientation, audits, non-conformanc-
es, environmental damage, etc.), inspection pro-
grammes, monitoring of barriers and correspon-
dence between STUK and Posiva. In 2013, STUK 
started to give a summary of the key observations 
made during the latest regulatory visit in each 
follow-up meeting.
4.6.4 Safeguard of Nuclear Materials
STUK has carried out safeguards of nuclear ma-
terials at the Onkalo that is currently under con-
struction and that will become part of the reposi-
tory. STUK’s regulatory activities have been imple-
mented in line with the national safeguards plan. 
Finland is the first country in the world to imple-
ment safeguards for a final disposal facility, which 
is why STUK holds a key position in the develop-
ment and implementation of international safe-
guards regarding geolocial repositories. In 2013, 
Posiva drafted the first reports of the technical ba-
sic declarations included in the construction licence 
application design documentation to the European 
Commission and IAEA. In December 2013 STUK, 
the Commission and IAEA reviewed technical ba-
sic declaration of the repository at Onkalo to verify 
that Onkalo has been built in compliance with the 
declaration.
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5 Other uses of nuclear energy
5.1 Talvivaara
Talvivaara Mining Company Plc practices mining 
operations at Talvivaara in Sotkamo. The mine’s 
key products are nickel and zinc, and the ore also 
includes smaller concentrations of other elements 
that can be utilised. The metal is separated from 
the ore at the mine by means of bioheapleaching. 
In this process, uranium is dissolved from the ore 
in addition to other heavy metals. The uranium 
concentration of the Talvivaara metals is low (in 
average 17 ppm), but Talvivaara considers the 
recovery of uranium to be profitable because of the 
large volumes. That is why Talvivaara submitted 
an application to the Finnish Government on the 
recovery of uranium in 2010. If not recovered, the 
uranium will end up in the gypsum waste pond 
and part of it will end up in the mine’s nickel 
product. Talvivaara was granted a conditional li-
cence to start recovery by the Government on 1 
March 2012. The licence states that the recovery 
of uranium may be started once STUK has ap-
proved several documents pertaining to the recov-
ery process.
Talvivaara started construction of a uranium 
recovery plant after granting of the licence. STUK 
monitored progress of the construction project 
and prepared to start regulation of the uranium 
recovery process. In 2013, STUK carried out an 
inspection at Talvivaara on the readiness to start 
the utilisation of nuclear energy. The review fo-
cused on nuclear security of the uranium recovery 
plant. The poor financial status of Talvivaara post-
poned the completion of the recovery plant, and 
Talvivaara failed to submit the documents pertain-
ing to the start of the recovery of uranium to STUK 
for official processing. In the autumn of 2013, the 
Supreme Administrative Court returned, with its 
decision 3825/2013, the uranium recovery licence 
of Talvivaara to the Government for new round of 
processing.
In the winter of 2012–2013, several leaks oc-
curred at the Talvivaara mine where water stored 
in the gypsum waste ponds was discharged into the 
safety dams of the mine and further into the envi-
ronment. Uranium and other heavy metals were 
discharged. Based on the Radiation Act, STUK 
participated in environmental impact monitoring 
of the leaks in 2013. Uranium contents in water-
courses close to the mine were monitored with care.
5.2 Others
Uranium is being extracted in the production 
processes of Freeport Cobalt Oy in Kokkola and 
Norilsk Nickel Harjavalta Oy in Harjavalta. STUK 
has reviewed their inventory reports on the pro-
duction of uranium. Other inspected nuclear ma-
terial inventories include those of the Helsinki 
University Laboratory of Radiochemistry, Suomen 
Nukliditekniikka and the Radiation and Nuclear 
Safety Authority. The nuclear non-proliferation 
control system of the Aalto University has been 
reviewed as well. No remarks were made in the 
reviews.
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6 Safety research
The purpose of publicly funded safety research is 
to ascertain that the authorities have adequate 
expertise available, including a concern for unfore-
seeable issues affecting the safety of nuclear fa-
cilities. Since the beginning of the 1990s, Finnish 
safety research has typically taken the form of 
four-year research programmes. Safety research 
is divided into two research programmes, of which 
SAFIR2014 focuses on nuclear power plant safety 
and KYT2014 on the comparison of the practices 
and methods of nuclear waste management. The 
projects under the research programmes are se-
lected annually on the basis of a public call for 
projects. The projects selected for the programmes 
must be of a high scientific standard, and their 
Nuclear safety research in Finland
In general terms, nuclear safety research comprises 
two distinct areas of research: nuclear power plant 
safety and nuclear waste management safety. In 
Finland, nuclear safety research is conducted by re-
search institutions, universities and power companies 
operating nuclear power plants. In addition to the 
above-mentioned parties, research on the safety of 
nuclear waste management is conducted by Posiva Oy. 
Posiva’s research programme is the most extensive of 
all the research programmes.
Research programmes SAFIR2014 and KYT2014 
were launched in 2011. The purpose of these pro-
grammes is not only to provide scientific and techni-
cal results, but also to ensure the maintenance and 
development of Finnish competence. Further informa-
tion on the projects is available on the websites of the 
research programmes at 
http://virtual.vtt.fi/virtual/safir2014/,  
http://www. ydinjatetutkimus.fi and  
http://kyt2014.vtt.fi/.
Pursuant to Finnish legislation, the parties with 
nuclear waste management obligations are unam-
biguously responsible for the design, implementation 
and costs of managing the waste they have produced, 
including the associated research and development 
work. The research and development work regard-
ing final disposal is carried out by Posiva Oy. Posiva 
also conducts research in different sectors linked to 
the final disposal of nuclear fuel in cooperation with 
international parties.
The Finnish actors contribute extensively to inter-
national nuclear safety research within the framework 
of the following programmes and organisations: the 
European Union’s framework research programmes 
(both fission and fusion research), the Nordic NKS 
safety research programme, the Nuclear Energy 
Agency (NEA) of the OECD, and the International 
Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) within the UN family.
results must be available for publication. The re-
sults must have a broader scope of applicability 
than the nuclear facility of a particular licensee. 
Funding will not be granted for any research which 
is directly connected with projects that licensees, or 
parties representing them, carry out for their own 
needs, or for research which is directly provided by 
nuclear energy regulatory oversight.
STUK controls this research by contributing to 
the work of the programmes’ steering and reference 
groups. Every year, the Ministry of Employment 
and the Economy ascertains that the proposed set 
of projects meets the statutory requirements and 
STUK’s nuclear safety research needs. STUK is-
sued statements on the SAFIR2014 and KYT2014 
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programmes in February 2013.
The current four-year safety research pro-
gramme, SAFIR2014, was initiated as a continu-
ation of the previous SAFIR2010 programme. The 
new programme is more extensive than the previ-
ous one due to decisions-in-principle issued in the 
summer 2010 regarding new plant units. Following 
the decisions, funds for the research programme 
were also collected according to the maximum out-
puts defined in the license conditions for the new 
plant units (funding from the National Nuclear 
Waste Management Fund). The annual volume of 
the SAFIR2014 programme was EUR 10.4 mil-
lion in 2013, of which the National Nuclear Waste 
Management Fund covered EUR 5.7 million. The 
project programme initiated at the beginning of 
the year 2013 provided funding for 45 projects. The 
organisation providing the largest amount of fund-
ing was VTT Technical Research Centre of Finland, 
whose share was EUR 2.8 million.
The SAFIR2014 research programme is divided 
into nine competence areas, which mainly cor-
respond to the support group areas of the previ-
ous research programme. The new support group 
introduced at the beginning of 2011 is Support 
Group 9, Infrastructure, since the construction of 
significant arrays of test equipment is funded and 
guided at, for example, VTT and the Lappeenranta 
University of Technology. The areas of research un-
der SAFIR2014 and their shares of the total fund-
ing are illustrated in Figure 17.
In autumn 2012, the call for projects for the 
2013 project programme was updated with the 
additions to the SAFIR2014 framework plan con-
sidered necessary as a result of the Fukushima 
Figure 18. Research areas of SAFIR2014 programme 
and their shares of the total funding in 2013.
Dai-ichi nuclear accident that took place in March 
2011. The call for projects resulted in new accident 
management proposals and expansion of earlier 
projects that dealt with the management of severe 
accidents and the provisions made for external 
threats. The call for projects for the 2014 project 
programme was updated with the additions of topi-
cal research needs on the regulatory oversight of 
nuclear safety, such as analyses used to prove com-
pliance of new regulations with the requirements 
and nuclear power plant quality management in a 
networked operating environment.
The research programme involved extensive 
development of Finnish expertise for defining the 
design basis of nuclear power plants and for pro-
ducing safety analyses, as well as for managing 
expert work and organisations with a high stan-
dard of safety culture. A project on studying the 
coverage of the Finnish nuclear safety regulations 
by applying methods from the field of sociology 
was launched in 2013. An issue that is still topi-
cal is the research on external threats where the 
potential impacts of climate change on the extreme 
weather conditions and seawater levels occurring 
in Finland were studied, along with the seismic 
requirements for nuclear facilities. Another topi-
cal issue is the definition of the source term for 
an accident, and provisions for accidents of a long 
duration.
The four-year KYT2014 programme was also 
launched in 2011, and the programme will be 
implemented between 2011 and 2014. The pro-
gramme framework consists of research targets 
important to national competence. A special fea-
ture of KYT2014 is the aim of implementing 
Organisation and human factors
Automation and control room
Fuel and reactor physics
Thermal hydraulics
Severe accidents
Structural safety of reactor circuit
Construction safety
Probabilistic safety analysis (PRA)
Development of research infrastructure
5%
9 %
12%
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12 %
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Figure 19. Research areas of KYT2014 programme and 
their shares of the total funding in 2013.
extensive coordinated research projects. In 2013, 
such projects included ones on safety cases, the 
performance of buffer and backfilling materials, 
and the long-term durability of final disposal can-
isters.
The KYT steering group gave its funding rec-
ommendations to the Ministry of Employment 
and the Economy, relying on the evaluations of 
support groups. In 2013, the total funding of 
the programme was around EUR 2.8 million, of 
which funding from the National Nuclear Waste 
Management Fund amounted to around EUR 1.8 
million. In 2013, the research programme provided 
funding for 32 research projects representing new 
and alternative technologies for nuclear waste 
management (three projects), safety research on 
nuclear waste management (28 projects of which 
16 were combined into three coordinated projects) 
and social nuclear waste management research 
(one project). The total scope of the research pro-
gramme is 25.2 man-years. Figure 18 illustrates 
the relative shares of these areas of the total fund-
ing.
In 2012, the Ministry of Employment and the 
Economy ordered an international evaluation of 
the KYT-programme. It was completed in 2013. 
According to the evaluation, the programme meets 
its key objectives, the recommendations given in 
the previous international evaluation have been 
well taken into account, the programme is com-
prehensive and new research areas have been 
taken into account to a sufficient extent. In addi-
tion, the organisation of the programme has been 
developed based on information obtained from 
coordinated projects and mentoring, for example. 
The national nuclear waste management course 
that has been arranged four times so far was men-
tioned as an especially good part of the KYT pro-
gramme. According to the evaluation, the results 
are commensurate with the programme funding: 
the programme has clearly influenced training 
and its results can be applied in practice. As its 
recommendations on development areas, the evalu-
ation workgroup mentioned increasing visibility, 
continuing the development of training, working 
in cooperation with the SAFIR programme, estab-
lishing competence centres, funding arrangements, 
monitoring of results, organising support groups 
and giving the management group a more active 
role.
A total of 33 proposals for research projects 
were submitted for the KYT2014 programme for 
2014. These were evaluated using the same criteria 
as in the previous year, such as the project’s signifi-
cance and utilisation value, networking, impact on 
training and profitability. The research programme 
according to the management group’s funding rec-
ommendation includes 28 research projects.
At the end of the year, the Ministry of 
Employment and the Economy started planning 
the future of the research programme. The plan is 
to launch KYT2018 at the beginning of 2015, and 
the programme period will end in 2018. There are 
representatives of Fennovoima, Fortum Power and 
Heat, Posiva, the Ministry of Social Affairs and 
Health, TVO, the Ministry of Employment and the 
Economy, the Ministry of the Environment and 
STUK in the planning workgroup. STUK chairs 
the group.
New and alternative technological solutions
Safety assessment
Performance of buffer and backfilling materials
Long-term durability of the canister
Other safety relevant research
Social science studies related to nuclear waste management
 Administration
7 %
3 %
23 %
19 %
39 %
7 %
2 %
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7 Oversight of nuclear 
facilities in figures
7.1 Processing of documents
A total of 3,135 documents were submitted to STUK 
for processing in 2013. Of these, 767 concerned the 
nuclear power plant unit under construction and 
355 the repository for spent nuclear fuel. The re-
viewing process of a total of 3,442 documents was 
completed, including documents submitted in 2013 
or earlier as well as licenses granted by STUK by 
virtue of the Nuclear Energy Act, which are listed 
in Appendix 4. The average document review time 
Figure 21. Distribution of time spent on preparing deci-
sions on the Loviisa plant.
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Figure 22. Distribution of time spent on preparing deci-
sions on the operating plant units of Olkiluoto.
Figure 23. Distribution of time spent on preparing deci-
sions on Olkiluoto plant unit 3.
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Figure 20. Number of documents received and re-
viewed as well as average document review time.
Figure 24. Distribution of time spent on preparing deci-
sions on Posiva.
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was 123 days. The number of documents and their 
average review times in 2009–2013 are illustrated 
in Figure 20. Figures 21–24 illustrate the review 
time distribution among documents from the vari-
ous plant units and documents from Posiva.
7.2 Inspections at nuclear power plant 
sites and suppliers’ premises
Periodic inspection programmes
A total of 25 inspections at the Loviisa plant and 
23 at the Olkiluoto plant were carried out un-
der the 2013 periodic inspection programme 
(Appendix 5). STUK carried out nine inspections 
within the Olkiluoto 3 construction inspection pro-
gramme (Appendix 6) and three inspections within 
the Onkalo construction inspection programme 
(Appendix 7). The key findings of the inspections 
are presented in the appendices and the chapters 
on regulatory oversight.
Other inspections at plant sites
A total of 1,131 inspections on site or at suppliers’ 
premises were carried out in 2013 (other than in-
spections of the periodic or construction inspection 
programmes, of the safeguards of nuclear materi-
als and of the construction inspection programme 
of the underground research facility at Olkiluoto, 
which are discussed separately). An inspection 
comprises one or more sub-inspections, such as a 
review of results, an inspection of a component or a 
structure, a pressure or leak test, a functional test 
or a commissioning inspection. Of the inspections, 
254 were related to the regulatory oversight of the 
plant under construction and 876 to that of the 
plants in operation.
The number of inspection days on site and at 
component manufacturers’ premises totalled 3,203. 
This number includes not only inspections per-
taining to the safety of nuclear power plants but 
also those associated with nuclear waste manage-
ment, safeguards of nuclear materials, audits and 
inspection of the underground research facility at 
Olkiluoto. Six resident inspectors worked at the 
Olkiluoto power plant and two resident inspectors 
at the Loviisa power plant. The numbers of onsite 
inspection days in 2009−2013 are illustrated in 
Figure 25.
7.3 Finances and resources
The duty area of nuclear safety regulation included 
basic operations subject to a charge, as well as op-
erations not subject to a charge. Basic operations 
subject to a charge mostly consisted of the reg-
ulatory oversight of nuclear facilities, with their 
costs charged to those subject to oversight. Those 
basic operations not subject to a charge included 
international and domestic cooperation, as well as 
emergency response operations and communica-
tions. Basic operations not subject to a charge are 
publicly funded. Overheads from the preparation 
of regulations and support functions (administra-
tion, development projects in support of regulatory 
activities, training, maintenance and development 
of expertise, and reporting, as well as participation 
in nuclear safety research) were carried forward 
into the costs of both types of basic operation and 
of contracted services in relation to the number of 
working hours spent on each function.
Figure 25. Number of inspection days onsite and at 
component manufacturers’ premises.
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Figure 26. Income and costs of nuclear safety regula-
tion.
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In 2013, the costs of the regulatory control of 
nuclear safety subject to a charge were EUR 18.3 
million. The total costs of nuclear safety regulation 
were EUR 19.7 million. Thus, the share of activi-
ties subject to a charge was 92.7%.
The income from nuclear safety regulation in 
2013 was EUR 18.3 million. Of this, EUR 4.0 mil-
lion and EUR 10.1  million came from the in-
spection and review of the Loviisa and Olkiluoto 
nuclear power plants, respectively. In addition to 
the operating plant units, the income from the 
Olkiluoto plant includes that derived from the 
regulatory oversight of the Olkiluoto 3 construc-
tion project. The income from the regulatory over-
sight also includes costs of the safety assessments 
of the new nuclear power plant projects of TVO and 
Fennovoima. The regulation of Posiva Oy’s opera-
tions yielded EUR 3.3 million. Figure 26 shows the 
annual income and costs from nuclear safety regu-
lation in 2009−2013.
The time spent on the inspection and review of 
Loviisa nuclear power plant was 16.0 man-years or 
10.8% of the total working time of the regulatory 
personnel. The time spent on the Olkiluoto nuclear 
power plant’s operating units was 12.9 man-years 
or 8.4% of the total working time. In addition to 
the monitoring of the operation of nuclear power 
plants, the figure includes nuclear material con-
trol. The time spent on the inspection and review 
of Olkiluoto 3 was 26.2 man-years or 17.8% of the 
total working time. Work related to new power 
plant projects amounted to 2.3 man-years or 0.9% 
of the total working time. A total of 11.7 man-years 
or 8.0% of the total working time was spent on 
inspection and review of Posiva’s operations, and 
that spent on the FiR 1 research reactor was 0.3 
man-years. The working time spent on small-scale 
users of nuclear materials was 0.1 man-years. 
Figure 27 shows the division of working hours of 
the personnel engaged in nuclear safety oversight 
(in man-years) by subject of oversight during 
2003–2013.
Where necessary, STUK commissions inde-
pendent safety analyses and research in sup-
port of regulatory decision-making. Figures 28 
and 29 illustrate the costs of such assignments 
in 2009–2013. The costs in 2013 were mainly 
related to comparative analysis, independent as-
sessments and third-party consultants’ inspection 
work concerning the plant unit under construc-
tion, as well as to assessment work concerning the 
safety documentation for final disposal of nuclear 
waste. Appendix 8 lists assignments on the safety 
of nuclear power plants and the final disposal of 
nuclear fuel funded by STUK in 2013. The reviews 
of the safety documentation for the final disposal of 
nuclear energy are discussed in Chapter 4.6.1.
The distribution of the annual working time of 
the nuclear safety regulation personnel to the vari-
ous duty areas is shown in Table 5.
Figure 27. Distribution of working hours (person-years) of the regulatory personnel by subject of oversight  
in 2005–2013. Until 2011 the nuclear waste management includes both the oversight of the operating 
nuclear power plants’ nuclear waste management as well as the oversight of Posiva, since 2012 only the 
oversight of Posiva. The oversight of the operating nuclear power plants’ nuclear waste management is 
combined with the oversight of the power plants.
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Figure 28. The costs of research and commissioned 
work pertaining to the safety of nuclear power plants.
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Figure 29. The costs of research and commissioned 
work pertaining to nuclear waste management and 
nuclear non-proliferation.
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Table 6. Distribution of working hours (person-years) of the regulatory personnel in each duty area.
Duty area 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013
Basic operations subject to a charge 68.0 70.5 70.2 68.9 69.7
Basic operations not subject to a charge 6.6 7.8 8.8 5.6 5.0
Contracted services 1.7 1.9 1.7 2.2 1.6
Rule-making and support functions 33.6 38.2 43.0 46.3 45.3
Holidays and absences 23.5 24.3 24.7 24.7 25.1
Total 133.5 142.9 148.4 147.7 146.7
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8 Development of 
regulatory oversight
8.1 STUK’s own development projects
Changes in practices and the organisation 
updated into the quality manual
A total of 18 guides were updated in the quality 
manual for nuclear safety regulation, and 24 ap-
pendices to the guides were updated. The guides 
were updated following changes in procedures as 
well as changes in the personnel of the nuclear re-
actor regulation department and the nuclear waste 
and materials regulation department.
International assessment of 
STUK’s regulatory oversight
STUK’s regulatory oversight activities were com-
prehensively assessed in the autumn of 2012. 
STUK prepared an action plan based on the as-
sessment report and has started implementation of 
the measures listed in the action plan.
Development of records management system
The records management system that was 
launched in the autumn of 2009 was updated. The 
new version is shared by several governmental 
agencies, and it better supports the processing of 
electronic documents. Development of workflows 
planned to be added into the system was postponed 
to 2014.
Electronic inspection protocols 
expanded to new areas
The electronic inspection protocol system 
(TARKKA) that was launched in 2011 was fur-
ther expanded. At present, TARKKA covers all of 
the records needed in regulatory inspections with 
the exception of inspections of nuclear materials. 
Features and availability of TARKKA were further 
developed based on user feedback.
Progress in development of 
requirement management
As the preparation of the new YVL Guides pro-
ceeds, STUK launched a development project of 
its requirement management procedures. The goal 
is to specify requirement management procedures 
as part of STUK’s current operating processes to 
create clear-cut requirements that can be managed 
throughout the lifecycle of plants.
Lessons learned
Due to changes made in STUK’s personnel struc-
ture, the importance of sharing competence and 
knowledge has increased. As experts who have 
been with STUK for a long time are about to retire, 
there is a risk that the tacit knowledge will be lost. 
STUK has launched a project where the experts 
who will soon retire are interviewed and meth-
ods are developed to share the lessons they have 
learned with experts who are at the beginning of 
their careers.
8.2 Renewing and working capacity
Training on issues such as nuclear power plant 
systems, safety culture, document management 
and regulatory activities was arranged for inspec-
tors. Furthermore, the inspectors received training 
in compliance with a separate training plan on 
STUK’s new YVL Guides.
New STUK inspectors participated in a nation-
al training programme in the field of nuclear safety 
(the YK course), which STUK organises together 
with other actors in the field. The total duration 
of the tenth YK course was 20 days in six periods. 
Three of the periods took place in the spring of 
2013. Eight STUK employees participated in the 
YK10 course. The YK11 course was launched in the 
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autumn of 2013. Ten STUK employees participated 
in the course. There were a total of 77 participants 
in the YK11 course.
STUK was actively involved in the planning 
and execution of national nuclear waste man-
agement training, now organised for the fourth 
time. The course took six days and had nine-
teen participants. Lecturers included experts from 
the Ministry of Employment and the Economy, 
STUK, Posiva, VTT Technical Research Centre 
of Finland, Fortum, Fennovoima, TVO, the Aalto 
University, the University of Helsinki Laboratory 
of Radiochemistry and Saanio & Riekkola. The 
course focused on the main themes of nuclear waste 
management, covering the entire nuclear fuel cycle.
STUK’s inspectors also participated in train-
ing provided by external enterprises, such as lead 
auditor training, project operations training and 
auditing training. Furthermore, STUK’s inspectors 
participated in various Finnish and international 
training events of the sector, both as participants 
and lecturers. In addition, supervisors in the field 
of nuclear safety participated in management and 
leadership skills training programmes.
Based on a recommendation of a peer evalu-
ation of regulatory activities, a project aiming at 
generating standardised nuclear sector approval 
procedures for the STUK inspectors was launched. 
The project will be continued in 2014.
In 2013, three Master’s theses were complet-
ed in the nuclear reactor regulation department: 
Uncertainty Evaluation in Deterministic Safety 
Analyses, Operational Safety during Outage and 
The Link between Qualification and Risk Informed 
In-service Inspection. Furthermore, two Master’s 
theses were being prepared at the nuclear reactor 
regulation department and one Master’s theses 
at the nuclear waste and materials department. 
These theses will be completed in 2014.
On average, 12.2 days per inspector in the field 
of nuclear waste and materials regulation, and 
10.6 days per inspector in the field of nuclear reac-
tor regulation, were spent on developing the exper-
tise of STUK’s nuclear safety experts in 2013.
Five new employees were hired for nuclear 
reactor regulation in 2013. Their positions are in 
the regulatory oversight of nuclear power plant 
I&C, manufacturing technology and operation. 
Two new inspectors were hired for nuclear waste 
management. Their positions are in the regula-
tory oversight of rock engineering design and rock 
construction as well as mining and milling of ore, 
preparation of regulatory guides and assessment 
of nuclear waste management plans. Furthermore, 
one person from another position within the STUK 
was transferred to a development position in the 
nuclear waste and materials regulation depart-
ment.
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9 Emergency preparedness
STUK actively participated in the work of the 
emergency response cooperation groups in both 
Eastern Uusimaa and Satakunta. Both groups in-
clude the most important operators of the early 
stages of an emergency: in addition to STUK, rep-
resentatives from the power companies, the rescue 
services and the police. The Satakunta group also 
includes the Finnish Border Guard; the Eastern 
Uusimaa group also involves the emergency care 
organisation. Meetings of the cooperation teams 
discussed issues such as emergency response train-
ing, experiences gained from drills, the update sta-
tus of external rescue plans, organisations’ devel-
opment projects, and changes to legislation.
STUK arranged in cooperation with the 
Helsinki Police, the Helsinki Rescue Services, the 
Satakunta Police, the Satakunta Rescue Services 
and TVO an emergency preparedness training 
event where cooperation between the authorities 
and operators in case of a threat caused by il-
legal activities involving nuclear power plants or 
radiation was discussed. Employees of the above-
mentioned organisations and other governmental 
organisations participated in the event.
The Helsinki Police, STUK and the Helsinki 
Rescue Services arranged a joint emergency pre-
paredness drill to practice operations in case of a 
threat caused by illegal activities involving radio-
active materials. The drill focused on management 
operations. The management operations were ac-
tually practiced, but the field operations were 
simulated. In case of an emergency, STUK will 
adopt the role of an expert organisation within the 
joint organisation of the authorities, headed by the 
police in situations where illegal operations are 
involved.
STUK’s emergency preparedness (contingency) 
procedures for scenarios involving illegal opera-
tions were updated in connection with the training 
event and drill. STUK will continue the develop-
ment of integrated operations for various situa-
tions together with other authorities, utilising the 
results of the drills.
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10 Communications
STUK’s nuclear safety communications are based 
on active, immediate, open and honest communica-
tion and media services.
In 2013, STUK published fifteen pieces of news 
on nuclear safety. Furthermore, nuclear safety 
experts were interviewed by Finnish and foreign 
media.
In addition to its own website, STUK commu-
nicates with citizens via the social media, such as 
Facebook and Twitter. STUK also answers ques-
tions that the public presents by telephone or e-
mail, participates in public meetings and receives 
guest groups.
At the end of May and the beginning of June, 
STUK’s directors and experts told the public in 
Loviisa and Eurajoki about the results of the over-
sight operations at the nuclear power plants and 
their environment, and about topical issues related 
to nuclear safety. The public events were organised 
in cooperation with the municipalities.
STUK organised, together with the Ministry of 
Employment and the Economy, a briefing on the 
new YVL Guides and the nuclear safety legislation 
reform in November.
STUK provided information as quickly as pos-
sible on all deficiencies observed at the Finnish 
nuclear power plants that require a special report 
from the licensee, or that are otherwise considered 
matters of public interest.
In 2013, STUK gave information on its website 
about observations made in the inspections and 
oversight of the Olkiluoto 3 plant unit, currently 
under construction, on six separate occasions. Even 
though the events did not put the safety of the 
plant or the environment at risk, STUK reported 
them without delay in accordance with its commu-
nications policy.
STUK reports the operation, events and over-
sight of the operating power plant units as well 
as the oversight of Olkiluoto 3 and nuclear waste 
management, on a quarterly basis. In its annual 
report published in April 2013, STUK reported 
the regulatory oversight of nuclear safety and the 
related observations in 2012. The annual report 
included, among other things, the overall safety 
assessments of nuclear power plants, produced 
on the basis of the observations made during 
oversight operations. The reports were published 
in printed form and as electronic versions on the 
STUK website.
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11 International cooperation
International conventions
CNS
The Convention on Nuclear Safety requires the 
submission of a report on how its obligations have 
been met every three years. STUK was respon-
sible for the preparation of Finland’s report, and 
it was submitted to the IAEA, the secretariat of 
the Convention, according to the agreed schedule 
in August 2013. The report describes changes that 
have occurred in the regulation of nuclear power 
plants in Finland in the past three years, such as a 
reform of the nuclear safety regulations, upgrades 
implemented at Loviisa and Olkiluoto due to the 
Fukushima accident, the Finnish IRRS evaluation 
and status of the Olkiluoto 3 construction project. 
The report will be reviewed at a large interna-
tional meeting of the parties to the Convention 
in Vienna in spring 2014. The Convention also 
includes an opportunity to pose questions about 
the reports submitted by other countries. STUK 
preliminarily reviewed the reports of Finland’s 
neighbouring countries and countries with which 
STUK has been involved in the scope of its in-
ternational cooperation. STUK posed around 160 
questions about the contents of the reports of other 
countries.
In 2013, STUK also participated in a commit-
tee on the Convention on Nuclear Safety that 
studied proposed changes to the current practices 
to promote the assessment process. Proposals on 
fourteen issues were made by the committee. Most 
of the proposals involve instructions provided for 
the assessment process, because making amend-
ments to the actual Convention on Nuclear Safety 
would be very cumbersome. The proposed changes 
will be discussed in the sixth review meeting of the 
Convention on Nuclear Safety in spring 2014.
STUK participated in an extraordinary meeting 
of the Nuclear Waste Convention’s review meetings 
in April 2013. The meeting participants discussed 
the themes that were raised in the review meeting 
and prepared new issues for the next competent 
meeting. Most of the prepared themes involved 
development of the country report assessment pro-
cess and related arrangements.
Cooperation within international 
organisations and with other countries
MDEP
The Multinational Design Evaluation Programme 
(MDEP) was established upon the initiative of the 
United States nuclear safety authority (Nuclear 
Regulatory Commission, NRC). It involves thir-
teen countries with the objective of improving co-
operation in the field of the assessment of new 
nuclear power plants and developing convergent 
regulatory practices. In addition to the United 
States of America, the following countries par-
ticipate in the programme: South Africa, India, 
Japan, Canada, China, Korea, France, Finland, 
the United Kingdom, Russia and the United Arab 
Emirates. Sweden joined the programme in 2013. 
Participants in the programme include only those 
countries with new nuclear power plants at some 
stage of assessment by the regulatory authorities. 
The OECD Nuclear Energy Agency functions as 
the secretariat for the programme.
The MDEP’s work is organised in design-specif-
ic and issue-specific working groups. In addition, 
the MDEP has a management group and a steer-
ing group. There are five Design-Specific Working 
Groups: EPR Working Group, AP1000 Working 
Group, APR1400 Working Group, VVER Working 
Group and ABWR Working Group; the two latter 
STUK-B 176
95
were established in 2013. STUK has representa-
tives in all of the above-mentioned working groups, 
except for the AP100 Working Group, because an 
EPR plant is under construction at Olkiluoto (the 
Olkiluoto 3 project), APR1400 and ABWR are con-
sidered as alternatives in the Olkiluoto 4 project 
and Fennovoima is planning the construction of a 
VVER plant.
The EPR Working Group’s work was originally 
a continuation of cooperation between the Finnish 
and French authorities concerning safety assess-
ment of EPR power plants. The other countries in 
the EPR Working Group are France, the United 
States, the United Kingdom, Canada, China, India 
and Sweden. The EPR Working Group is chaired 
by the Finnish representative; the working group 
has four subgroups dealing with plant automation, 
accidents and transients, severe accidents and 
probabilistic risk analyses (PRAs). STUK’s repre-
sentative chairs the PRA subgroup.
The MDEP Working Groups independent of 
plant design dealt with the following three sub-
jects: plant and plant supplier inspections and 
reviews, pressure equipment standards and pro-
grammable I&C. STUK participated in the activi-
ties of all three Issue-Specific Working Groups. The 
objective of the Working Group dealing with plant 
and equipment supplier inspections and reviews 
is to establish the procedures and requirements 
applied to inspections and reviews by the partici-
pating countries and to create the procedures and 
goals for joint inspections and reviews. The objec-
tive of the Working Group dealing with pressure 
equipment is the harmonisation of requirements 
in different standards. The Working Group on pro-
grammable I&C aims to promote the coordinated 
development of the IEC and IEEE standards, 
among others. Some individual issues have also 
been selected, on which common positions have 
been drafted.
Co-operation within the IAEA
The IAEA continued to revise its regulatory guides 
on nuclear safety. STUK had a representative on 
the Commission on Safety Standards (CSS) man-
aging the preparation of the regulatory guides as 
well as in the committees dealing with the con-
tent of the regulatory guides, i.e. the Nuclear 
Safety Standards Committee (NUSSC), the 
Waste Safety Standards Committee (WASSC), the 
Radiation Safety Standards Committee (RASSC) 
and the Transport Safety Standards Committee 
(TRANSSC). STUK issued statements on the IAEA 
regulatory guides under preparation. STUK also 
participated in the composition of regulatory guide 
drafts in small expert groups.
STUK’s representatives participated in expert 
groups summoned by the IAEA; the groups re-
viewed the regulatory authorities’ operations in 
Bulgaria, the United Kingdom, the Czech Republic 
and Belgium.
STUK is the Finnish contact organisation for 
the following nuclear energy information exchange 
systems maintained by the IAEA:
•	 Incident	Reporting	System	(IRS)
•	 Incident	Reporting	System	 for	Research	Reac-
tors (IRSRR)
•	 International	Nuclear	Event	Scale	(INES)
•	 Power	Reactor	Information	System	(PRIS)
•	 Nuclear	 Fuel	 Cycle	 Information	 System	 (NF-
CIS)
•	 Net	 Enabled	 Waste	 Management	 Database	
(NEWMDB)
•	 Directory	for	Radioactively	Contaminated	Sites	
(DRCS)
•	 Illicit	Trafficking	Database	(ITDB)
•	 Database	 on	 Events	 that	 have	 arisen	 during	
Transport of Radioactive Material (EVTRAM)
Cooperation within the EU
WENRA
STUK participated in the nuclear safety, nucle-
ar waste and decommissioning work carried 
out by WENRA (Western European Regulators’ 
Association) and its working groups. The working 
groups have developed common safety reference 
levels on the basis of the IAEA standards, and an 
agreement regarding their implementation in all 
member countries has been concluded between the 
members of WENRA. The Nuclear Safety Working 
Group updated the nuclear safety reference lev-
els, based on lessons learned from the Fukushima 
accident, and published them for stakeholders to 
comment on, on the WENRA website in December 
2013. Furthermore, the Nuclear Safety Working 
Group published specific safety goals for new nu-
clear power plants in spring 2013.
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ENSREG
STUK participated in the activities of the EU 
member states’ nuclear safety regulators’ co-oper-
ation group (ENSREG, European Nuclear Safety 
Regulators Group) and in two of its subgroups (on 
nuclear safety and nuclear waste management). 
The Director General of STUK chaired ENSREG 
until June.
As a result of the Fukushima accident, the EU 
launched stress tests for existing nuclear power 
plants and for those under construction. The pur-
pose of these tests was to establish how the plants 
would cope with exceptional external events and 
other situations associated with the simultane-
ous loss of operability of several safety systems. 
ENSREG organised an evaluation of the national 
plans to be executed on the basis of the stress 
tests in April 2013 in Brussels. STUK was the 
deputy chair of the review meeting and presented 
Finland’s national action plan.
Cooperation within the OECD/NEA
The Nuclear Energy Agency of the OECD (NEA) 
coordinates international cooperation in the field of 
safety research in particular. The organisation also 
provides an opportunity for co-operation between 
regulatory authorities. STUK was represented in 
all main committees of the organisation dealing 
with radiation and nuclear safety issues. The main 
committees’ fields of activity are:
•	 Nuclear	 safety	 regulation	 (CNRA,	 Committee	
on Nuclear Regulatory Activities)
•	 Safety	research	(CSNI,	Committee	on	the	Safe-
ty of Nuclear Installations)
•	 Radiation	safety	(CRPPH,	Committee	on	Radia-
tion Protection and Public Health)
•	 Nuclear	waste	management	 (RWMC,	Radioac-
tive Waste Management Committee).
Other international cooperation
STUK participated in the cooperation between 
the regulatory authorities of countries with VVER 
power plants (such as the Loviisa power plant) 
via the VVER Forum. A representative of STUK 
chaired the Probabilistic Risk Analyses Working 
Group (PRA Working Group) whose final report 
was presented at the VVER Forum’s annual meet-
ing. The Working Group will continue its work, 
chaired by the Armenian representative for the 
next three years.
STUK’s representative was a member of the 
supporting committee to the Swedish nuclear safe-
ty authority, and a reactor safety expert group 
called by the Swiss nuclear safety authority.
STUK participated in the work of the European 
Safeguards Research and Development Association 
(ESARDA). The purpose of ESARDA is to promote 
and harmonise the European research and devel-
opment work on nuclear non-proliferation control.
International operating experience feedback
STUK’s activities
STUK has a working group for reviewing and as-
sessing international operating experience events 
and reports from nuclear power plants. The work-
ing group includes STUK experts from various 
fields of technology. In 2013 in its monthly meet-
ings, the working group assessed a total of approxi-
mately a hundred reports received from the IAEA’s 
operating experience database. Of the 74 assessed 
reports, 58 required no measures at Finnish nu-
clear power plants. With regard to five events, the 
practices and arrangements in place at Finnish 
nuclear power plants were found to be adequate 
to prevent similar events. In the cases of eight 
event reports, it was decided that the situation 
at Finnish nuclear power plants should be sub-
jected to closer assessment in connection with the 
periodic inspection programme or the inspections 
carried out during the annual outage. Three of 
the reports assessed in 2013, one on incorrect mi-
cro fuses detected at plants in Germany in safety 
significant instrumentation and control modules 
assemblies, and one on a loss of power supply dur-
ing the annual outage of Forsmark 3, were deemed 
to give rise to measures at the Finnish plants or 
in future projects. The third event, on control  rod 
problems in Oskarshamn 3 and Forsmark 2 in 
2008, was an event specific to boiling water reac-
tors, which means that it was only studied in terms 
of Olkiluoto 1 and 2, but similar cracking has not 
occurred there due to the different conditions. 
Measures implemented because of the two other 
events a year earlier were reviewed in connection 
with the periodic inspection programme. These 
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Major events
Manufacturing faults in 
reactor pressure vessel
Inspections carried out in Doel 3 in Belgium in July 
2012 revealed indications in the pressure vessel mate-
rial, believed to have been created during manufac-
ture due to deficient hydrogen removal heat treatment. 
Doel 3 is a pressurised water reactor that was first 
commissioned in the early 1980s, with a pressure 
vessel manufactured at a Dutch shipyard. The ship-
yard manufactured pressure vessels during the same 
period also for several plants in Europe and the U.S. 
There are no pressure vessels from this manufac-
turer in Finland. In March 2013, STUK sent clarifica-
tion requests to the operating plants at Loviisa and 
Olkiluoto as well as Olkiluoto 3 regarding verification 
of the integrity of the plant units’ pressure vessels, as 
well as in the case of the pressurised water reactors 
also the pressurizers and the steam generators.
According to a report submitted by TVO, the 
manufacturing technology of the Olkiluoto 1 and 
Olkiluoto 2 reactor pressure vessels is so different 
than that used in the Belgian reactors that the risk 
of deficient hydrogen removal heat treatment can, for 
a justified reason, be considered minor. Furthermore, 
such faults would have been detected in the non-
destructive testing conducted after manufacture. The 
reactor, steam generators and pressurizer in Olkiluoto 
3 were manufactured in 2003 and 2004. At that time, 
the manufacturing requirements for hydrogen content 
were clearly stricter than those used when the reac-
tors of the Belgian plant units were manufactured 
in the 1970s. The same applies to the requirements 
on non-destructive testing. STUK deemed this report 
acceptable. According to a report by Fortum, manu-
facturing methods that limit the hydrogen content 
were used also in the manufacture of Loviisa 1 and 
Loviisa 2, and the non-destructive testing method 
has been assessed as accurate enough to detect any 
hydrogen flaking indications. However, there were 
some defects in the manufacturing documentation, 
which is why STUK demanded that the licensee try 
to obtain supplementary data and assess the integ-
rity of the reactor’s supporting structures and pipe 
nozzles in more detail to detect any hydrogen flak-
ing indications. Fortum also announced that it will 
conduct supplementary non-destructive tests on said 
pressure equipment in connection with their inservice 
inspections. STUK deemed the proposed methods and 
further measures sufficient and will oversee their 
implementation.
Holes to prevent siphon effect
In testing in compliance with recommendations 
made by the World Association of Nuclear Operators 
(WANO) in its report after the Fukushima accident at 
the end of 2011 in Cattenom in France, it was noted 
that there are no holes in the fuel pool cooling/filling 
pipes to prevent the pools from being drained by the 
siphon effect. The French Nuclear Safety Authority 
(ASN) and the French Institute for Radiological 
Protection and Nuclear Safety (IRSN) started to 
conduct inspections of the French plants in 2013 to 
emphasise the significance of this issue.
TVO submitted its reply to WANO in 2012. There 
are no siphon breakers in the fuel pools at the operat-
ing Olkiluoto plant units, but the pipes do not extend 
to such a level that the siphon effect could lead to the 
fuel being exposed. There are siphon breakers in the 
pool cooling system pipes at Olkiluoto 3 and their 
proper installation will be verified prior to issuing an 
operating licence.
Due to this event, the Loviisa operating experience 
team decided to study whether there are siphon break-
ers in the plant’s fuel pool filling pipes. The descrip-
tion in the FSAR states that there are siphon breakers 
in the pipes. A decision was made to conduct a visual 
inspection of them during the inservice inspections 
of the fuel pool steel lining. These inspections do not 
include an inspection of the insides of the siphon 
breaker pipes, however. To detect any blockages, the 
Loviisa organisation decided to inspect the pipes from 
the inside with an endoscope. The inspections were 
conducted in Loviisa 2 during the 2013 maintenance 
outage, and the siphon breakers were found to be fine. 
The inspection in Loviisa 1 was postponed to 2014 
because the 2014 outage is better suited for such an 
inspection.
The status of the storage pools at the spent nuclear 
storage facility of neither of the plant units has been 
studied yet.
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events were indications observed in the pressure 
vessel material in Doel 3 of Belgium during an 
inspection in 2012 and the lack of siphon break-
ers in the fuel pool cooling/filling pipes that was 
observed in Cattenom 2 of France in testing after 
Fukushima in late 2011.
One new report, one addition to an earlier re-
port and one follow-up report of events at Finnish 
nuclear power plants were added to IAEA’s 
International Reporting System for Operating 
Experience (IRS). The new report was about prob-
lems that occurred during the 2012 outage in con-
nection with the implementation of a modernisa-
tion of the primary circuitpressururizing system in 
Loviisa 1. STUK also decided to submit a report to 
IRS on lead blankets that were accidentally left on 
top of the reactor coolant system pipes in the steam 
generator room in Loviisa 1 after the 2012 mainte-
nance outage. The blankets were detected during 
the 2013 maintenance outage. STUK will also draft 
an IRS report on the problems with moving the 
control rods of Loviisa 2 during the startup after 
the 2013 maintenance outage. Of all the events 
that occurred in 2013 at Olkiluoto, STUK decided 
to draft an IRS report on problems with the cracks 
in the stator welds of the emergency diesel genera-
tors’ exciters in Olkiluoto 1. The experts are still 
considering whether to submit an international 
report on the cracks found in the brazed joints of 
rotor winding  that were detected in connection 
with maintenance.
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Summary of the safety performance 
indicators for nuclear power plants
Background and objectives 
of the indicator system
Safety is a primary prerequisite for the operation 
of nuclear power plants. The power companies and 
STUK evaluate and oversee the safety and op-
eration of the plants in many ways. Along with 
inspections and safety reviews, indicators are a 
method of acquiring information on the safety level 
of the plant and on any changes to the safety level. 
The STUK indicator system consists of two main 
groups: 1) plant safety indicators, and 2) indicators 
describing the efficiency of the authorities. This 
summary covers the indicators describing plant 
safety.
The objective of the indicator system is to rec-
ognise changes in plant safety as early as possible. 
If the indicators weaken, the underlying factors 
influencing the development must be determined 
and changes to plant operation and STUK’s over-
sight of the area must be considered. Indicators 
can also be used to monitor the efficiency and ef-
fectiveness of corrective measures. The information 
yielded by the indicators is also used when commu-
nicating nuclear safety.
In the indicator system, nuclear safety is divid-
ed into three sectors: 1) safety and quality culture, 
2) operational events, and 3) structural integrity. 
STUK began the development of its own indicator 
system in 1995. Since 2006, indicator information 
has been managed in STUK’s INDI (INdicator 
DIsplay) information system. Nominated STUK 
representatives are responsible for the mainte-
nance and analysis of the indicators. Individual 
indicators, their maintenance procedures and the 
interpretation of results are presented at the end 
of this summary. A brief summary of the safety 
status of each plant in 2012 is presented below, fol-
lowed by the detailed results by indicator.
Nuclear safety
A.I Safety and quality culture A.II Operational events A.III Structural integrity
1. Failures and their repairs 1. Number of events 1. Fuel integrity
2. Exemptions and deviations from  
 the Operational Limits and  
 Conditions
3. Risk-significance of events
2. Primary and secondary circuits  
 integrity
3. Unavailability of safety systems 4. Accident risk of nuclear facilities
3. Containment integrity
4. Occupational radiation doses
5. Number of fire alarms5. Radioactive releases
6. Investments in facilities
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Results of the safety performance 
indicators for the nuclear 
power plants in 2013
Summary of indicator results for 
the Loviisa power plant
Structural integrity
In 2013, the reactor of Loviisa 1 did not contain 
any leaking fuel assemblies. In December 2012, a 
minor fuel leak was detected in Loviisa 2. A leak-
ing fuel assembly was removed from the reactor 
during the annual outage of 2013.
The indicators on water chemistry illustrate 
that the reactor coolant system integrity of both 
plant units was at an acceptable level in 2013.
The overall as-found leakage of the outer isola-
tion valves in Loviisa 1 increased, but remained 
clearly below the limit set. In Loviisa 2, the overall 
as-found leakage continued to increase, and based 
on the first tests exceeded the limit set for overall 
leakage. Three outer isolation valves with plenty of 
leakage accounted for 84% of the overall as-found 
leakage. Both lines also have inner isolation valves. 
After the repair of the valves, the overall as-found 
leakage fell back to below the set limit.
The indicator describing the overall as-found 
leakage of the personnel airlock, material airlock, 
emergency personnel airlock, reactor pit, inward 
relief valves, cable penetrations and bellows seals 
(RA, RL, TL23), is good at both plant units.
Radiation doses and releases
The radiation doses received by employees and the 
releases into the environment remained small and 
clearly below the limits set in official regulations.
The occupational radiation dose was the lowest 
in the power plant’s operational history because of 
short annual outages for both plant units that only 
included a little work with significance for radia-
tion protection. Furthermore, improvements aimed 
at reducing the employees’ radiation doses have 
also been made at the plant.
Operational events at the plant
No reactor trips occurred at the Loviisa power 
plant in 2013. Significant operational events in-
cluded faults in the control rod drive mechanism 
after the annual outages (two mechanisms in 
Safety and quality culture is assessed on the 
basis of information concerning the radiation pro-
tection and the operation and maintenance of the 
plant. The operation and maintenance of the plant 
is monitored using the failure and maintenance 
data for the components with an effect on the safe 
operation of the plant, as well as by monitoring 
compliance with the operational limits and con-
ditions (OLC). The success of radiation protec-
tion is monitored on the basis of the employees’ 
radiation doses and radioactive releases into the 
environment. When assessing the safety and qual-
ity culture, attention is also paid to investments to 
improve the plant and to the up-to-dateness of the 
plant documentation.
The indicators concerning operational 
events are used to monitor special situations and 
significant disturbances at the plant. Special situ-
ations include events with an effect on the safety 
of the plant, the personnel or the environment. A 
special report is required for any special situa-
tions. Correspondingly, a disturbance report must 
be prepared for any significant disturbances oc-
curring at a plant unit. Such disturbances include 
reactor and turbine trips, and other operational 
transients leading to a forced reduction of more 
than 5% in the reactor power or average gross 
power. Risk indicators are used to monitor the 
safety effect of the equipment’s unavailability pe-
riods and the development of the plant’s risk level. 
The results provide insight into the operational 
activities at the plant and the efficiency of the op-
erating experience feedback system.
Structural integrity is assessed on the basis 
of the leak-tightness of the multiple radioactivity 
confinement barriers – the fuel, primary and sec-
ondary circuits, and the containment. The integri-
ty must meet the set objectives while the indicators 
must show no significant deterioration. Fuel integ-
rity is monitored on the basis of the radioactivity 
of the primary coolant and the number of leaking 
fuel bundles. The water chemistry indicators are 
used to monitor and control primary and second-
ary circuit integrity. The monitoring is done by 
indices depicting water chemistry control and by 
following selected corrosive impurities and corro-
sion products. The integrity of the containment is 
monitored by testing the leak tightness of isolation 
valves, penetrations and air locks.
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Loviisa 2 and one in Loviisa 1) as well as the repair 
outages implemented to repair these faults. The 
repair outages also account for most of the produc-
tion losses caused by faults.
The number of events warranting a special re-
port and the number of events violating the opera-
tional limits and conditions, which are also events 
warranting a special report, have increased in the 
past few years. STUK discussed the issue of the in-
creased number of events with the management of 
Fortum Power and Heat Oy in the autumn of 2012. 
The licensee studied the underlying causes of the 
changed trend and specified corrective measures. 
Fortum Power and Heat Oy submitted to STUK 
for information a related action plan at the end of 
2013.
For the Loviisa power plant, the most signifi-
cant factors affecting the overall accident risk in-
clude internal plant events during outages (such 
as falling heavy loads in the reactor hall or a power 
surge caused by sudden dilution of the boron used 
to control the core reactivity), fires, high sea water 
level during power operation and oil spills during 
a refueling outage. Loviisa power plant’s accident 
risk has continued to decrease over the last ten 
years, and new risk factors, discovered as the scope 
of the risk analysis has been extended, have been 
efficiently eliminated. The annual probability of a 
severe reactor accident calculated for the Loviisa 
plant units has decreased by approximately 23% 
from the previous year. Several minor plant modifi-
cations, improvements of computational modelling 
and verification of reliability data have contributed 
to the reduction of the risk.
The functionality of safety systems is monitored 
on the basis of the unavailability of the high-pres-
sure safety injection system, the emergency feed-
water system and the emergency diesel generators. 
The condition and availability of the former two 
were good. The availability of the emergency diesel 
generators was acceptable.
The indicators describing the condition of equip-
ment falling under the scope of the operational 
limits and conditions (OLC) show that the mainte-
nance of equipment important to safety and the re-
pairing of faults occurring in them are appropriate.
The fire safety of the Loviisa plant units has re-
mained at the same level as in the past few years. 
Four events classified as fires have occurred in the 
Loviisa plant area in the past ten years. The most 
recent of these events occurred in 2013 when a 
plastic protective cover of a fluorescent tube light 
fixture in the ceiling of an instrument room in the 
reactor building caught fire. The fire was minor 
and could be put out with a handheld fire extin-
guisher. There were around the same number of 
faults in the fire detection system as in the previ-
ous years. There were less actual alarms initiated 
by fire detectors than in 2012.
Summary of indicator results for 
the Olkiluoto power plant
Structural integrity
Based on water chemistry indicators, the integrity 
of the reactor coolant circuits of the Olkiluoto plant 
units was good in 2013. Fuel integrity of Olkiluoto 
1 was good during the 2012–2013 fuel cycle, and 
no leaks were detected. One leaking fuel assem-
bly was removed from the reactor of Olkiluoto 2 
during the annual outage. Several fuel leaks have 
occurred in the 2000s in the Olkiluoto plant units, 
particularly in Olkiluoto 2. The main reason for 
the leaks has been small foreign objects entering 
the reactor during maintenance operations. These 
objects can get caught in the fuel assembly struc-
tures. The coolant flow may cause the loose objects 
to vibrate and break the fuel cladding. To prevent 
this, fuel assemblies with new sieve structures 
for foreign objects have been loaded into the reac-
tor of Olkiluoto 2 in 2012. The sieve profiles were 
changed to make the grid denser.
The overall as-found leakage of the outer isola-
tion valves of Olkiluoto 1’s containment decreased 
when compared to the previous year and remained 
clearly below the limit set in the operating limits 
and conditions (OLC). The overall as-found leak-
age of the outer isolation valves of Olkiluoto 2’s 
containment increased when compared to the pre-
vious year, but remained clearly below the limit 
set in the operating limits and conditions (OLC). 
The percentage of isolation valves that passed the 
leak test at first attempt has remained high for 
both plant units. The total as-found leakage rate of 
containment penetrations, in which TVO includes 
leakages in the upper and lower personnel airlocks, 
the maintenance dome and the containment dome, 
has remained small for both plant units.
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Radiation doses and releases
The radiation doses received by employees and 
the releases into the environment remained small 
and clearly below the limits set in official regula-
tions. In 2013, the collective occupational radia-
tion dose of Olkiluoto employees was the lowest 
ever recorded during the operation of the power 
plant because of short annual outages for both 
plant units that only included a little work with 
significance for radiation protection. The radiation 
doses have clearly decreased after the installation 
of new moisture separators in 2005–2007. Due to 
the new moisture separators, the radiation level 
in the turbine building has continued to decrease. 
Furthermore, improvements aiming at reducing 
the employees’ radiation doses have also been 
made at the plant.
The releases of substances with gamma activity 
into the sea from the Olkiluoto power plant have 
been decreasing in recent years. In 2013, the at-
mospheric releases of radioactive substances were 
of the same magnitude as in previous years. The 
releases into the environment were small, well be-
low the set limits.
Operational events at the plant
For the Olkiluoto power plant, the most important 
factors affecting the overall accident risk include 
internal events during power operation (compo-
nent failures and pipe ruptures leading to an op-
erational transient). In 2013, the risk caused by 
operational activities remained at around the same 
level as in the past ten years. The annual probabil-
ity of a severe reactor accident calculated for the 
Olkiluoto power plant (9%) remained at around the 
same level as in 2012.
No reactor trips occurred at the Olkiluoto power 
plant in 2013. The number of events warranting 
a special report (four in total) was around the 
average for the past ten years while the number 
of events warranting a transient report (seven in 
total) was slightly above the average.
Production losses due to faults in 2013 were 
not much different from the production losses in 
the previous years. Most (87%) of the production 
losses of Olkiluoto 2 were caused by a turbine trip 
that occurred in September. It was triggered by 
an earth fault protector in the generator’s stator. 
This led to a maintenance outage to repair the 
generator. Most (78%) of the production losses in 
Olkiluoto 1 were also due to a generator fault. In 
December, a fault in a surge arrester of a generator 
exciter caused a generator breaker to open, which 
caused a turbine trip. As a result of the trip, the 
plant unit was placed into the hot shutdown state 
to locate and repair the fault.
No events classified as fires occurred in the 
Olkiluoto power plant area in 2013. One event clas-
sified as a fire occurred outside the plant area. The 
fire was minor and could be put out with handheld 
fire extinguishers. No fire detection system faults 
were observed at the Olkiluoto power plant in 
2013.
In 2013, five safety-significant common-cause 
failures were identified at the Olkiluoto power 
plant. The number of common-cause failures has 
increased in recent years. In the three previous 
years, there have been a total of fifteen common-
cause failures. Most of these have occurred in the 
emergency diesel generators (six failures) and the 
relief system (three failures). TVO has launched a 
project on replacing the emergency diesel genera-
tors. The new emergency diesel generators will be 
installed in 2016–2020.
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Safety performance indicators
A.I Safety and quality culture
A.I.1 Faults and repairing them
A.I.1a Faults in components subject to 
the operational limits and conditions
Definition
The number of faults causing the unavailability of 
components during load operation defined in the 
operational limits and conditions (OLC) is moni-
tored as an indicator. The faults are divided by 
plant unit into two groups: faults causing an im-
mediate operation restriction, and faults causing 
an operation restriction in connection with repair 
work.
Source of data
The data is obtained from the work order systems 
and the operational documents of the power plants.
Purpose of the indicator
The indicator is used to assess the plant lifecycle 
management and the development of the condition 
of components.
Responsible units/persons
Resident inspectors
Pauli Kopiloff (Loviisa nuclear power plant)
Jukka Kallionpää (Olkiluoto nuclear power plant)
Interpretation of the indicator
Loviisa
The total number of faults causing an operation 
restriction of components subject to the OLC in 
2013 was 178. The average number of faults during 
the four previous years was 180, which means that 
there was no significant change in the number of 
faults in 2013 or in the fault trend.
The number of faults per year has remained 
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plant maintenance operations at Loviisa, and com-
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ures, there have been no faults with a significant 
impact on plant safety, and the management of 
component availability has been successful.
Based on the above, it can be stated that the 
indicator or the underlying fault data do not show 
any significant negative effects associated with the 
ageing of the facilities, which is an indication of 
well-functioning component lifecycle management 
and component maintenance.
Interpretation of the indicator
Olkiluoto
The number of faults occurring during load opera-
tion and causing the unavailability of components 
subject to the OLC has been increasing since 2009. 
In 2011, the number of faults was nearly double 
the number of faults in 2009. In 2012, the number 
of faults decreased back to the level of 2010, and 
the number of faults did not change in 2013. The 
number of faults indicates that maintenance work 
has been successful.
The unavailability times of OLC components 
in OL1 during all four quarters of 2013 were brief.
In OL2, most of the unavailability times of OLC 
components were brief in 2013. The number of 
operation restrictions decreased because of fewer 
cleanings of the cooling system.
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A.I.1b  Maintenance of components subject 
to the operational limits and conditions
Definition
The indicator is used to follow the number of fault 
repairs and preventive maintenance work orders 
for components subject to the operational limits 
and conditions (OLC) by plant unit.
Source of data
The data is obtained from the plant work order 
systems, from which all preventive maintenance 
operations and fault repairs are retrieved.
Purpose of the indicator
The indicator describes the volumes of fault re-
pairs and preventive maintenance, and illustrates 
the condition of the plant and its maintenance 
strategy. The indicator is used to assess the main-
tenance strategy implemented at the plant.
Responsible units/persons
Resident inspectors
Pauli Kopiloff (Loviisa nuclear power plant)
Jukka Kallionpää (Olkiluoto nuclear power plant)
Interpretation of the indicator
Loviisa
When considering the annual variation in the vol-
ume of fault repairs and particularly in the num-
ber of preventive maintenance jobs, the scheduling 
of various annual outages (refueling outage, short 
annual outage, four-year annual outage, eight-
year annual outage) included in the maintenance 
strategy of the Loviisa power plant during a four-
year cycle should be considered, since it can have 
a significant impact on the annual figures. The 
Loviisa plant units had short refueling outages in 
2013.
Based on the data on which the indicator is 
based, the year 2013 showed no major deviation 
from the average numbers of fault repairs and pre-
ventive maintenance volumes of the four previous 
years. In 2013, the number of maintenance tasks 
on components subject to the OLC was 9% lower 
than the average. Similarly, the number of preven-
tive maintenance tasks was 7% and the number of 
fault repairs 23% lower than the average.
The ratio of preventive maintenance and fault 
repairs was 6.2. The ratio is 18% higher than 
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the 5.2 average of the four previous years, which 
means that the share of preventive maintenance of 
all maintenance work has remained high.
The large share of preventive maintenance 
operations reflects the selected maintenance strat-
egy, the purpose of which is to keep the number of 
faults and the effects of faults at a tolerable level.
Interpretation of the indicator
Olkiluoto
The number of maintenance works causing inop-
erability of components, included in the indicator, 
decreased during 2006–2009 due to the lower num-
ber of fault repairs. In 2010, the number of faults 
repaired increased while the number of preventive 
maintenance operations decreased.
In 2013, the number of fault repairs that caused 
inoperability of components remained at same 
level as in 2011 and 2012. The number of preven-
tive maintenance tasks increased slightly, improv-
ing the ratio of preventive maintenance and fault 
repairs from 2011.
Based on the development of the ratio of pre-
ventive maintenance work to fault repairs and an 
assessment of the work on which the figures are 
based, the maintenance strategy can be considered 
successful.
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A.I.1c  Repair times of components subject 
to the operational limits and conditions
Definition
As an indicator, the average repair time of faults 
causing the unavailability of components defined 
in the operational limits and conditions (OLC) is 
monitored. With each repair, the time recorded is 
the time of inoperability. In the case of a fault that 
causes an immediate operation restriction, it is cal-
culated from the detection of the fault to the end of 
the repair work. If the component is operable until 
the beginning of repairs, only the time it takes to 
complete the repairs is taken into account.
Source of data
The data is obtained from the power plant’s work 
order systems and maintenance and operation doc-
umentation.
Purpose of the indicator
The indicator shows how quickly failed components 
subject to the OLC are repaired when compared to 
the repair time allowed in the OLC. The indicator 
is used to assess the strategy, resources and effec-
tiveness of plant maintenance.
Responsible units/persons
Resident inspectors
Pauli Kopiloff (Loviisa nuclear power plant)
Jukka Kallionpää (Olkiluoto nuclear power plant)
Interpretation of the indicator
Loviisa
The OLC define the maximum allowed repair 
times for components based on the components’ 
safety significance. The times vary between four 
hours and 21 days. Faults in OLC components are 
to be repaired within the allotted time without 
undue delay.
Due to the small amount of work requiring op-
eration restrictions and the varying allowed repair 
times, an individual operation may have a significant 
effect on the indicator value, even if it is completed 
within the allotted time. This aspect of the indica-
tor is taken into account in the interpretation of the 
indicator by evaluating the significance of individual 
long-term fault repairs in terms of maintenance 
strategy, resources and efficiency of operations.
The average repair times of faults causing una-
vailability of components have remained stable at 
the Loviisa plant for several years. In 2013, the 
average repair time for the plant units was 21.6 
h, compared to the average of 29.4 h for the four 
previous years. In 2013, the average repair time of 
OLC component faults that had an allowed repair 
time of 72 hours or less was 9.7 hours in Loviisa 1 
and 12.0 hours in Loviisa 2.
Based on the 2013 indicators and the underly-
ing data, the plant’s maintenance operations can 
be considered appropriate. Despite the positive 
development in repair times, attention still needs 
to be paid to the power plant’s maintenance on 
having the necessary resources available for fault 
repairs, and for carrying out the repairs without 
unnecessary delays.
Interpretation of the indicator
Olkiluoto
The repair time allowed in the OLC for the 
Olkiluoto nuclear power plant is usually 30 days 
for faults concerning one train and three days for 
faults concerning two trains. Depending on the sys-
tem and the component, other allowed repair times 
may be defined in the OLC.
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In the long term, the average repair time has 
varied between six to ten hours, with the excep-
tion of the year 2007. In 2007, repair times greatly 
increased for both plant units, to around 1.5 times 
the previous figure in the case of Olkiluoto 1 and 
to more than six times the previous figure in the 
case of Olkiluoto 2. In the case of both plant units, 
the increase was due to a fault in a single device. 
In 2013, the average repair time of faults causing 
inoperability of components in Olkiluoto 1 was 
around 8 h and in Olkiluoto 2 around 8.5 h. In the 
case of both plant units, the average repair time of 
faults causing inoperability of components subject 
to the OLC was at around the same level as in 
2010 and 2011.
On the basis of the 2013 indicators and the un-
derlying data, the plant’s maintenance operations 
were appropriate.
A.I.1d  Common-cause failure
Definition
As the indicator, the number of common-cause fail-
ures of components or systems defined in the op-
erational limits and conditions (OLC) is followed.
Source of data
Data for the indicators is collected from the reports 
by the power companies of works causing an opera-
tion restriction.
Purpose of the indicator
The indicator is used to follow the quality of main-
tenance.
Responsible unit/person
Operational safety (KÄY)
Suvi Ristonmaa (Loviisa)
Niko Mononen (Olkiluoto)
Interpretation of the indicator
Loviisa
When a fault is observed in a safety-critical sys-
tem, component or structure in connection with 
maintenance, inservice testing or other monitoring 
operations, the corrective measures include an in-
vestigation of whether the fault is a single fault, or 
whether there might be other similar faults in the 
system. No common-cause failures were identified 
at the Loviisa power plant in 2013. An increased 
common-cause failure risk of auxiliary relays in 
the emergency diesel generators was observed. The 
Loviisa power plant prepared a special report on 
the event.
Olkiluoto
In 2013, five safety-significant common-cause fail-
ures were identified at the Olkiluoto power plant. 
These included problems with the surface coat-
ing of pistons in the auxiliary feed water system, 
corrosion of galvanised flanges in the condenser’s 
circulating water chambers, alarms pertaining to 
cards in the neutron flux measuring system and 
fluctuation of the measuring results, air leaks from 
the compressed air motors of the emergency diesel 
generators, and corroded flanges in shutdown cool-
ing system.
The number of common-cause failures has in-
creased in recent years. In the three previous 
years, there have been a total of fifteen common-
cause failures. Most of these have occurred in the 
emergency diesel generators (six failures) and the 
relief train (three failures). TVO has launched a 
project to replace the emergency diesel generators. 
The new emergency diesel generators will be in-
stalled in 2016–2020.
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A.I.1g  Production losses due to faults
Definition
As the indicator, the loss of production caused by 
faults in relation to rated power (gross) is moni-
tored.
Source of data
Data for the indicator is obtained from the annual 
and quarterly reports submitted by power compa-
nies.
Purpose of the indicator
The indicator is used to follow the significance of 
faults from the point of view of production.
Responsible unit/person
Operational safety (KÄY)
Suvi Ristonmaa (Loviisa)
Niko Mononen (Olkiluoto)
Interpretation of the indicator
Production losses due to faults have been small at 
both Loviisa and Olkiluoto, which is also indicated 
by the plants’ high load factors.
Loviisa
In 2013, Loviisa  1 experienced a higher number 
of faults resulting in production losses than in the 
previous years. Furthermore, Loviisa 2 experienced 
more production losses due to faults in 2012 and 
2013 than in the previous years.
Most (92%) of the production losses due to 
faults in Loviisa 2 were caused by a repair outage 
in October, and most (81%) of the production losses 
in Loviisa 1 were due to a repair outage at the 
turn of November and December. Both repair out-
ages were implemented to study and repair faults 
observed in control rod mechanisms (one fault in 
Loviisa 1 and two faults in Loviisa 2). The next 
largest share of faults (14%) was caused by a leak 
in a seal in the Loviisa 1 safety injection system 
and its repairs.
Olkiluoto
The production losses due to faults were not clearly 
different from the production losses in the previous 
years.
Most (87%) of the production losses of Olkiluoto 
2 in 2013 were caused by a turbine trip that oc-
curred in September. It was triggered by an earth 
fault protector in the generator’s stator. This led 
to a maintenance outage to repair the generator. 
Other issues that caused production losses in-
cluded repairing a steam leak in an HP reheater 
(an on-power maintenance measure) and inspect-
ing and replacing flexible connection pieces in 
between the generator and an exciter. Reactor 
power was decreased when these faults were being 
repaired.
Most (78%) of the production losses in Olki-
luoto 1 were due to a generator fault. In December, 
a fault in a surge arrester of a generator exciter 
caused a generator breaker to open, which caused 
a turbine trip. As a result of the trip, the plant unit 
was placed into the hot shutdown state to locate 
and repair the fault. Most of the other production 
losses were caused by the identification and repair 
of faults during power operation. Such repair work 
included the repair of an HP turbine control valve 
and the repair of a contactor in a valve of the relief 
train.
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A.I.2 Exemptions from the operational limits 
and conditions and non-conformances
Definition
As indicators, the number of non-conformances 
with the operational limits and conditions (OLC), 
as well as the number of exemptions granted by 
STUK, are monitored.
Source of data
Data for the indicators is collected from applica-
tions for exemption orders and from event reports.
Purpose of the indicator
The indicator is used to follow the power compa-
nies’ activities in accordance with the OLC: compli-
ance with the OLC and identified situations during 
which it is necessary to deviate from them; conclu-
sions as regards to the appropriateness of the OLC 
can also be made based on this data.
Responsible unit/person
Operational safety (KÄY)
Suvi Ristonmaa (Loviisa)
Niko Mononen (Olkiluoto)
Interpretation of the indicator
The main purpose of the OLC exemption procedure 
is to enable alterations and maintenance that will 
improve safety and plant availability.
Non-conformance with the OLC refers to a situ-
ation where the plant or a system or component of 
the plant is not in a safe state as required by the 
operational limits and conditions. The objective is 
to have zero non-conformance events at the plants. 
The licensee always prepares a special report on 
each non-conformance and any corrective meas-
ures, and submits it to STUK for approval.
Loviisa
Exemptions
Based on the last ten years (2003–2012), the 
Loviisa nuclear power plant applies for STUK’s 
approval for exemptions from the OLC eight times 
per year on average. Hence, the number of applica-
tions in 2013 (nine applications) was in line with 
the average. Five of these applications concerned 
modifications, one the repair of a valve and three 
an unclear item in the OLC. As the planned devia-
tions had no significant safety implications, STUK 
accepted the applications. One of the applications 
was not accepted until after further reviews, how-
ever.
Non-conformance with the OLC
In 2013, five events during which the plant did not 
comply with the OLC without an advance safety 
analysis and STUK’s permission were detected at 
the Loviisa power plant. There have been more 
such events in the past few years than in the previ-
ous years. Such events have occurred twice a year 
on average during the past ten years (2003–2012). 
STUK discussed the issue of the increased number 
of events with the management of Fortum Power 
and Heat Oy in the autumn of 2012. The licensee 
studied the underlying causes of the changed trend 
and specified corrective measures. Fortum Power 
and Heat Oy submitted to STUK for information a 
related action plan at the end of 2013.
One of these non-conformances with the OLC 
was caused by a human error made when planning 
the repair of a valve. Some of the OLC require-
ments applied to the repair work were not identi-
fied at the design stage, which means that they 
were not taken into account at the implementation 
stage. In one of the cases, one of the measurements 
included in the monitoring of radioactive releases 
did not operate as planned when treated evapora-
tor concentrate was released into the sea from the 
Loviisa power plant. In the three other cases, the 
non-conformance with the OLC was related to a 
switching of the plant unit’s operating mode during 
a startup after an annual outage or a repair outage; 
the operating mode was changed even though the 
conditions laid down for the new operating mode 
had not been met. In two of these cases, equipment 
whose operation had been prevented for the dura-
tion of the outage were inadvertently not restored 
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back to the operating mode. In one of the cases, 
valve malfunctions were still being studied; pro-
ceeding with the startup of a plant unit with unre-
solved valve malfunctions is not allowed. Fortum 
Power and Heat Oy analysed all five OLC non-con-
formances and determined corrective measures to 
prevent similar events from occurring in the future. 
There were, however, several events linked to the 
switching of operating modes, which is why ensur-
ing that there are no deficiencies in the knowledge 
of the OLC or the procedures to ensure compliance 
with the OLC that would lead to unintentional 
non-conformance is of utmost importance. Fortum 
Power and Heat Oy decided to study the procedures 
pertaining to the switching of operating modes in 
more detail. The results of the study and corrective 
measures will be presented in a root cause analysis 
to be drafted by 30 April 2014.
Olkiluoto
Based on data from the last ten years (2003–2012), 
the Olkiluoto power plant applies for STUK’s ap-
proval for exemptions from the OLC seven times 
per year on average. Hence, the number of appli-
cations in 2013 (four) was slightly lower than the 
average. All of these applications were linked to 
modifications. One of the applications was linked 
to an upgrade of a radiation measuring channel 
in Olkiluoto 2 and three of them were linked to an 
expansion of the spent fuel storage facility. As the 
planned deviations had no significant safety impli-
cations, STUK accepted the applications. In 2004 
and 2005, the number of deviations was increased 
by work and installations related to the moderni-
sation of OL1 and OL2 and the construction of 
OL3. Similarly, major modifications were carried 
out during 2010 and 2011.
Non-conformance with the OLC
In 2013, TVO reported two events during which 
the plant did not comply with the OLC without an 
advance safety analysis and STUK’s permission. 
This is slightly more events than during the past 
ten years on average (three).
All of these non-conformances were uninten-
tional. In one of the cases, the non-conformance 
with the OLC was caused by an administrative 
error in work pertaining to reactor cooling dur-
ing the annual outage. The other case was a non-
conformance with the key handover procedure of a 
cross-connection room below the control room. The 
individual events did not put the plant or its sur-
rounding environment at risk. TVO analysed all 
events and defined corrective measures to prevent 
similar events from reoccurring.
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A.I.3 Unavailability of safety systems
Definition
As the indicators, the unavailability of safety sys-
tems is monitored separately for each plant unit. 
The systems monitored at the Olkiluoto nuclear 
power plant are the containment spray system 
(322), the auxiliary feed water system (327) and 
the emergency diesel generators (651–656). Those 
followed at the Loviisa nuclear power plant are the 
high-pressure safety injection system (TJ), auxil-
iary feed water system (RL92/93, RL94/97) and the 
emergency diesel generators (EY).
Essentially, the ratio of a system’s unavailabil-
ity hours and its required availability hours is used 
as the indicator. Unavailability hours are the com-
bined unavailability of redundant trains divided by 
the number of trains.
Annual plant criticality hours are the avail-
ability requirement for the 322, 327, TJ and RL 
systems. For diesel generators, the requirement is 
continuous, i.e. equal to annual operating hours.
The unavailability hours of a train include 
the time required for the planned maintenance of 
components and unavailability due to faults. The 
latter includes, in addition to the time spent on 
repairs, the estimated unavailability time prior 
to fault detection. If a fault is estimated to have 
occurred in a previous successful test but to have 
escaped detection, the time between inservice tests 
is added to the unavailability time. If a fault has 
occurred between tests but its date of occurrence 
is unknown, half of the time period lapsed between 
tests will be added to the unavailability time. If the 
fault clearly occurred during an operational, main-
tenance, testing or other event, the time between 
the event and the defection of the fault is added to 
the unavailability time.
Source of data
Data for the indicators is collected from the power 
companies. The licensee’s representatives submit 
the necessary data to the relevant person in charge 
at STUK.
Purpose of the indicator
The indicator indicates the unavailability of safe-
ty systems. The indicator is used to track the 
condition of safety systems and any identifiable 
trends.
Responsible units/persons
Resident inspectors
Pauli Kopiloff (Loviisa nuclear power plant)
Jukka Kallionpää (Olkiluoto nuclear power plant)
Interpretation of the indicator
Loviisa
TJ system
Analysis of the unavailability figures of the high 
pressure safety injection systems (TJ) of the plant 
units and their background information shows that 
one fault, the repairs for which caused the sys-
tem to be unavailable for 36.4 hours, occurred in 
Loviisa 1. One fault that caused the system to be 
unavailable for 10.7 hours occurred in Loviisa 2.
The unavailability of the high pressure safety 
injection systems was low in 2013, i.e. their condi-
tion and availability were good.
RL system
In Loviisa 1, the total unavailability time of the 
emergency feedwater systems was 162.1 hours, of 
which a total of four faults were being repaired 
for a total of 57.5 during load operation. The rest 
of the unavailability of Loviisa 1, a total of 104.6 
hours for the RL94 emergency feedwater system, 
was caused by maintenance of an emergency diesel 
generator that is implemented every 16 years. 
In Loviisa 2, the total unavailability time was 
226.1 hours, of which the unavailability caused by 
a single fault during load operation accounted to 
a total of 4.4 hours. The maintenance of an emer-
gency diesel generator that is implemented every 
16 years in the RL94 emergency feedwater system 
accounted for unavailability of 221.8 hours.
The unavailability of the emergency feedwater 
systems was low in 2013, i.e. their condition and 
availability were good.
EY system
In 2013, the total unavailability time for all eight 
emergency diesel generators was 526.2 hours. 
Maintenance of the emergency diesel generator 
11EY02 that is implemented every 17 years ac-
counted for 169.4 hours of the unavailability. The 
maintenance of 11EY02 began as planned before 
the shutdown of Loviisa 1 for the annual outage. At 
that time, 11EY02 was replaced with a connection 
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to the Ahvenkoski hydropower plant for the period 
of time the OLC set an operability requirement for 
11EY02.
In 2013, there were a total of 30 diesel genera-
tor faults causing unavailability of the generators. 
Six of these caused immediate operation restric-
tions while 24 caused operation restrictions from 
the beginning of the repair work. Most of the faults 
were caused by the normal ageing of components 
and did not have any serious implications.
Unavailability of the emergency diesel genera-
tors, 0.93%, was close to the average for the past 
four years, 0.96%. Taking into account the impact 
of the planned periodic maintenance of 11EY02 on 
the unavailability, one can state that the unavail-
ability of the diesel generators remained low, i.e. 
their availability was satisfactory.
Interpretation of the indicator
Olkiluoto
The unavailability times of the containment spray 
system have been decreasing since 2005. In 2007, 
2008, 2010, 2011 and 2013, the unavailability was 
zero for both plant units, and almost zero in 2009 
and 2012.
The unavailability of the auxiliary feed water 
system increased significantly after 2004, when the 
unavailability was practically zero. The increased 
unavailability of Olkiluoto 1 in 2006 was due to 
faults in the recirculation and safety valves in sys-
tem 327. There were no significant faults in 2007, 
2008 or 2009, and the unavailability of the auxil-
iary feed water system decreased to nearly zero in 
2009 at both plant units. In 2010, unavailability 
of Olkiluoto 1 was still zero but the unavailability 
of Olkiluoto 2 slightly increased from the previous 
year, mainly as a result of several new faults dis-
covered during the outage. In 2011, the figure for 
OL1 was multiplied many times over as the result 
of a latent fault in one auxiliary feed water system 
valve that remained inoperable for 504 hours (cf. 
Section A.II.3). In 2013, the unavailability of the 
auxiliary feed water  system was restored to the 
level prior to 2011.
The unavailability of the diesel generators has 
decreased since 2004, and was very low in 2006 
and 2007. In 2008, the value increased by nearly 
95% compared to the previous year. The increase 
was due to latent faults in the compressed air mo-
tors of the diesels in both plant units. In 2009, the 
unavailability of the diesel generators decreased 
considerably from the 2008 figures. In 2010, una-
vailability increased somewhat from the previous 
year as a result of faults occurring in connection 
with inservice testing. At OL1, the stator winding 
of a diesel generator failed in connection with a 
periodic test in August 2010, and the generator 
was replaced with an overhauled unit. In 2011, the 
unavailability of the emergency diesel generators 
was more than four times higher than in 2010, the 
highest figure ever recorded while the parameter 
has been monitored. The reason for the increase 
was the generator fault discussed above, which 
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may have lasted as long as from August 2010 to 
May 2011. In addition, there were faults in exhaust 
manifolds and exhaust pipes. In 2012, unavail-
ability of emergency diesel generators was zero. 
The unavailability of the diesel generators slightly 
increased in 2013 but still remained very low.
Unavailability of containment spray system (322), 
Olkiluoto NPP
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A.I.4 Radiation exposure
Definition
As the indicators, collective radiation exposure of 
nuclear power plant employees by plant site and 
plant unit is monitored, together with the annual 
average of the ten highest occupational doses.
Source of data
The data on the collective dose is received from the 
quarterly and annual reports of the power plants 
as well as the national dose register. The data on 
individual radiation doses is obtained from the na-
tional dose register.
Purpose of the indicator
The indicators are used to control the radiation 
exposure of employees. In addition, compliance 
with the YVL Guide’s calculated threshold for 
one plant unit’s collective dose averaged over 
two successive years is followed. The threshold 
value, 2.5 manSv per one gigawatt of net electri-
cal power, means a radiation dose of 1.24 manSv 
for one Loviisa plant unit and 2.20 manSv for 
one Olkiluoto plant unit. The collective radiation 
doses describe the success of the plant’s ALARA 
programme. The average of the ten highest doses 
indicates how close to the 20  manSv dose limit 
the individual occupational doses at the plants 
remain. It also indicates the effectiveness of the 
plant’s radiation protection unit.
Responsible unit/person
Radiation protection (SÄT)
Antti Tynkkynen
Interpretation of the indicator
Loviisa
Most doses are incurred through work done dur-
ing outages. Thus outage duration and the amount 
of work having significance on radiation protec-
tion affect the annual radiation doses. Both Loviisa 
plant units have more extensive annual outages 
every four and eight years (the four-year annual 
outage and the eight-year annual outage) so that 
both plant units never have a major annual outage 
during the same year. The four-year and eight-year 
outages have been held in even years and nor-
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mal annual outages in odd years. The effect of an-
nual outages on collective doses can be seen in the 
Collective radiation dose, Loviisa graph. In 2013, 
there was a refueling outage in both plant units. 
The time used for annual outages was short, and 
there were few operations of significance for radia-
tion protection, which resulted in the total collec-
tive dose of the Loviisa power plant being the low-
est ever in the history of the Loviisa power plant.
The radiation doses for nuclear power plant 
workers at Loviisa remained below the individual 
dose limits. The average of the ten largest doses 
was the lowest ever recorded during the opera-
tion of the power plant. This was mainly due to 
the short refueling outages of the power plant 
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units. Furthermore, improvements aiming at re-
ducing the employees’ radiation doses have also 
been made at the plant. The Radiation Decree 
(1512/1991) stipulates that the effective dose for 
a worker from radiation work may not exceed the 
20  manSv/year average over any period of five 
years, or 50 manSv in any one year.
The threshold set for the collective occupational 
dose was not exceeded either in 2013. If, at one 
plant unit, the collective occupational radiation 
dose average over two successive years exceeds 
2.5 manSv per one GW of net electrical power, the 
utility is to report the causes of this to STUK, and 
any measures required to improve radiation safety 
(Guide YVL 7.9).
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Interpretation of the indicator
Olkiluoto
Most doses are incurred through work done during 
outages. Thus outage duration and the amount of 
work having significance on radiation protection 
affect the annual radiation doses. The annual out-
ages for the Olkiluoto power plant units are di-
vided into two groups: refueling outages and main-
tenance outages. The refueling outage is shorter 
in duration (approximately 7 days). The length of 
the maintenance outage depends on the amount of 
work (2–3 weeks). Annual outages are scheduled so 
that in the same year, one plant unit has a main-
tenance outage and the other a refueling outage. 
Olkiluoto 1 was subject to a refueling outage and 
Olkiluoto 2 to a maintenance outage in 2013.
Collective dose per 1 GW of net electrical capacity 
averaged over two succesive years,
Olkiluoto NPP
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In 2013, the collective occupational radiation 
dose of Olkiluoto employees was the lowest ever 
recorded during the operation of the power plant. 
The radiation doses have clearly decreased af-
ter the installation of new moisture separators 
in 2005–2007. The radiation level in the turbine 
buildings has continued to decrease after the in-
stallation of the moisture separators, and this had 
also decreased the collective dose. Furthermore, 
improvements aiming at reducing the employees’ 
radiation doses have also been made at the plant.
In 2013, the average of the ten largest doses 
was the lowest ever recorded during the opera-
tion of the power plant. The ten largest doses 
have continued to decrease during the past ten 
years. The prescribed dose limits (Radiation Decree 
1512/1991) were not exceeded.
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A.I.5 Releases
Definition
As the indicators, radioactive releases into the sea 
and the air from the plants are monitored, together 
with the calculated dose due to releases to the most 
exposed individual in the vicinity of the plant.
Source of data
Data for the indicators is collected from the power 
companies’ quarterly and annual reports. From 
this data, the calculated radiation dose for the 
most exposed individual in the vicinity of the plant 
is defined.
Purpose of the indicator
The indicator is used to monitor the amount and 
trend of radioactive releases and assess factors 
having a bearing on any changes in them.
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A.I.5a Releases into the air
Interpretation of the indicator
In 2013, the radioactive releases into the air from 
the Loviisa and Olkiluoto nuclear power plants 
were of the same magnitude as in previous years. 
Releases into the environment were small, well 
below the set limits.
Releases of noble gases and particulate aerosols 
were of the same magnitude as in previous years. 
The releases of particulate aerosols increased al-
most tenfold from the previous years due to the 
rapidly decaying As-76 (arsenic) that was released 
from both plant units during the extra outages at 
the end of the year. The releases of iodine isotopes 
increased because a fuel leak from Loviisa 2 in-
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creased the total amount of iodine releases.
More noble gases than in the previous years 
were released into the air from the Olkiluoto power 
plant. The releases of iodine isotopes increased 
compared to 2011–2012 due to a minor fuel leak 
in Olkiluoto 2. The fuel leak did not influence the 
noble gas releases, however. The releases of par-
ticulate aerosols were around the same magnitude 
as in the previous years.
Gaseous fission products, noble gases and 
iodine isotopes originate from leaking fuel rods, 
from the minute amounts of uranium left on 
the outer surfaces of fuel cladding during fuel 
fabrication, and from reactor surface contamina-
tion from earlier fuel leaks. At both Loviisa and 
Olkiluoto, there have been very few leaking fuel 
rods and the leaks have been small. Leaking fuel 
assemblies were replaced during the annual out-
ages of Loviisa 2 and Olkiluoto 2. The indicator 
A.III.1 describes fuel integrity. The releases of 
radioactive noble gases from Loviisa power plant 
are dominated by argon-41, the activation prod-
uct of argon-40 originating in the air space be-
tween the reactor pressure vessel and the main 
radiation shield. Aerosol nuclides (including ac-
tivated corrosion products) are released during 
maintenance work.
A.I.5b Releases into the sea
Interpretation of the indicator
Releases of radioactive substances emitting 
gamma radiation into the environment from the 
Loviisa and Olkiluoto nuclear power plants re-
mained clearly below the set limits. In 2004, 2009 
and 2013, the Loviisa power plant released low-ac-
tivity evaporation bottom into the sea as planned. 
Consequently, the releases of substances with gam-
ma activity were larger than the average in those 
years. The releases of substances with gamma ac-
tivity into the sea from Olkiluoto have decreased in 
recent years.
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A.I.5c Population exposure
Interpretation of the indicator
The doses of the most exposed individual in the 
vicinity, calculated on the basis of releases from the 
plant, remained below the set limit in Loviisa and 
Olkiluoto. The calculated dose of the most exposed 
individual in the vicinity of the Loviisa power plant 
was higher than usual in 2013 because the power 
plant discharged low-activity evaporation waste 
into the sea as planned. Larger radiation doses in 
2004 and 2009 were also caused by the discharge 
of evaporationwaste into the sea. The calculated 
dose of the most exposed individual in the vicinity 
of the Olkiluoto power plant was slightly higher 
than normal.
For both plants, the radiation doses were less 
than 0.3% of the 100-microsievert limit established 
in the  Government Decree (717/2013).
A.I.6 Investments in facilities
Definition
Investments in plant maintenance and modifica-
tions in the current value of money adjusted by the 
building cost index.
Source of data
The licensee submits the necessary data directly to 
the person responsible for the indicator.
The indicator demonstrates the relative fluc-
tuation of investments. The amounts given in 
euro are the confidential information of the pow-
er companies involved, and not to be published 
here. Furthermore, the scales of the Loviisa and 
Olkiluoto power plants’ investment and moderni-
sation diagrams are not mutually comparable.
Purpose of the indicator
The indicator is used to follow the amount of in-
vestments in plant maintenance and their fluctua-
tions.
Responsible unit/person
Operational safety (KÄY)
Suvi Ristonmaa (Loviisa)
Niko Mononen (Olkiluoto)
Interpretation of the indicator
The variation in the indicator distinctly shows the 
investments related to the power upgrades and 
modernisation projects of the plants. Both plants 
have paid great attention to lifecycle management, 
which also shows as continuous long-term invest-
ment plans. The renewal of the operating license 
of the Loviisa plant in 2007 and the periodic safety 
review carried out at Olkiluoto in 2008 have also 
had an effect on the investment plans.
Loviisa
Many modification projects and other projects span 
over many years, which means that their total 
costs are also divided between several years. For 
example, investments in the Loviisa I&C upgrade 
started in 2007. Other major investments in 2013 
included an upgrade of the 110 kV and 20 kV 
switchgear, a reheater upgrade, a turbine moderni-
sation project, an upgrade of a maintenance data 
system, construction of new buildings in the ac-
commodation area and renovation of a guest house.
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Olkiluoto
Fewer investments took place in 2013 than in the 
previous years.
TVO has at times carried out extensive modifi-
cations, which becomes evident in the trends. For 
example, major modifications mainly implemented 
during the 2010 annual outage of Olkiluoto 1 and 
the 2011 annual outage of Olkiluoto 2 show in 
the investment figures for 2010 and 2011. These 
modifications included the replacement of inner 
isolating valves of the main steam lines, the re-
placement of LP turbines and the replacement of 
main sea water pumps. Some of the work included 
in the project continued in 2013 and showed in the 
investment figures for the year. These included, for 
example, an upgrade of the low voltage switchgear. 
Other major investments in 2013 included a new 
upgrade project on the emergency diesel genera-
tors, a continued project on the diversification of 
the reactor surface level measuring system and a 
new project on the calibration system of the neu-
tron flux measuring system.
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A.II Operational events
A.II.1 Number of events
Definition
As the indicators, the numbers of events reported 
in accordance with Guide YVL 1.5 are monitored; 
these include events warranting a special report, 
reactor trips and reports on operational events.
Source of data
Data for the indicators is obtained from STUK’s 
document administration system (SAHA).
Purpose of the indicator
The indicator is used to follow the number of safe-
ty-significant events.
Responsible unit/person
Operational safety (KÄY)
Suvi Ristonmaa (Loviisa)
Niko Mononen (Olkiluoto)
Interpretation of the indicator
Loviisa
No reactor trips occurred at the Loviisa power 
plant in 2013.
Based on data from the last ten years (2003–
2012), the average number of annual events war-
ranting a special report is three to four per year, 
while the average number of events warranting 
a transient report is five per year. The number of 
events warranting a special report was higher than 
average in 2013 (seven in total) and the number of 
events warranting a transient report (four in total) 
was slightly below the average. STUK discussed 
the issue of the increased number of events war-
ranting a special report with the management of 
Fortum Power and Heat Oy in the autumn of 2012. 
The licensee studied the underlying causes of the 
changed trend and specified corrective measures. 
Fortum Power and Heat Oy submitted to STUK 
for information a related action plan at the end of 
2013.
Five of the events warranting a special report 
in 2013 were connected to non-conformances with 
the operational limits and conditions (OLC). One 
special report was drafted on the jamming of two 
control rods in Loviisa 2 and another on malfunc-
Number of Special Reports, 
Loviisa NPP
 LO1
 LO2
0
1
2
3
4
5
6
 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 
 0 1 1 1 2 3 1 1 5 4
 3 0 4 1 1 3 0 1 5 3
Number of reactor scrams, Loviisa NPP
 LO1
 LO2
0
1
2
 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013
 1 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 1 0
 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0
Number of operational transient reports, Loviisa NPP
 LO1
 LO2
0
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013
 6 6 2 3 3 1 3 1 3 2
 3 3 3 5 3 0 0 0 4 2
STUK-B 176
123
APPENDIX 1 STUK’S SafeTy performance indicaTorS for nppS in 2013
tions in auxiliary relays of the diesel generators. 
For more detailed descriptions of all the events 
warranting a special report, please see Appendix 3.
Four events were classified as operational tran-
sients. A control rod dropped to its lower position 
twice in Loviisa 1. In Loviisa 2, one of the turbine 
lines had to be stopped because of human errors 
made in the operation of the main condensate pu-
rification system. Furthermore, an isolating valve 
in the steam line of a steam generator was closed 
because of a card malfunction in the plant protec-
tion system.
When considering the indicators concerning 
special and transient reports, it must be noted that 
the number of reports does not give a correct idea 
of the division of events by plant unit since, for 
technical reasons, the reports that concern both 
plant units have been entered for Loviisa 1. In 
2013, one event warranting a special report con-
cerned both plant units.
Olkiluoto
No reactor trips occurred at the Olkiluoto power 
plant in 2013. Based on data from the last ten 
years (2003–2012), the average annual number of 
events warranting a special report or a transient 
report is five. In 2013, the number of events war-
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ranting a special report (four in total) was nearly 
at the average, while the number of events war-
ranting a transient report (seven in total) was 
slightly above the average. Events warranting a 
special report included defects in the maintenance 
of a reactor coolant pump and the management of 
work linked to the cooling of the reactor, material 
faults detected when maintaining an emergency 
diesel generator, and a non-conformance with the 
key handover procedure of a cross-connectionroom 
below the control room. For more detailed descrip-
tions of all the events, please see Appendix 3. Most 
of the transient reports (four in total) were caused 
when one of the reactor coolant pumps slowed 
down as planned due to a disturbance in the exter-
nal power supply.  Two of the transient reports in-
volved generator malfunctions at both plant units. 
One of the transient reports involved a malfunction 
of an HP turbine control valve.
When considering the indicators concerning 
special and transient reports, it must be noted that 
the number of reports does not give the correct 
idea of the division of events by plant unit since, 
for technical reasons, the reports that concern both 
plant units have been entered for Olkiluoto 1. In 
2013, one event warranting a special report con-
cerned both plant units.
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A.II.3 Risk-significance of events
Definition
As the indicator, the risk-significance of events 
caused by component unavailability is monitored. 
An increase in the conditional core damage prob-
ability (CCDP) associated with each event is used 
as the measure of a risk. CCDP takes the dura-
tion of each event into consideration. Events are 
divided into three categories: 1)  unavailability 
due to component faults, 2)  planned unavailabil-
ity, and 3)  initiating events. In addition, events 
are grouped into three categories according to 
their risk-significance (CCDP): the most risk-
significant events (CCDP>1E-7), other signifi-
cant events (1E-8≤CCDP<1E-7) and other events 
(CCDP<1E-8). The indicator is the number of 
events in each category.
Unavailability caused by work for which STUK 
has granted an exemption are included in category 
2. Any non-conformances with the OLC are in-
cluded in category 1 if they can be applied for this 
indicator. Non-conformances with the OLC are also 
dealt with under indicator A.I.2.
Calculations concerning the Olkiluoto plant 
were made with FinPSA software and those con-
cerning the Loviisa plant with RiskSpectrum soft-
ware. For the Loviisa power plant, calculations of 
a simultaneous fault in several components are 
solely based on the load operation model, mean-
ing that the results are not as exact as for single 
faults which have been calculated for all operating 
modes. The modelling of simultaneous faults across 
all operating modes (17 of them) would be possible, 
but the calculation time would be too long when 
compared to the benefits gained. This year, no si-
multaneous faults of several components with the 
highest risk-significance occurred.
Source of data
Data for the calculation of the indicators is col-
lected from the power companies’ reports and ap-
plications for exemptions.
Purpose of the indicator
The indicator is used to follow the risk-significance 
of component unavailability and to assess risk-sig-
nificant initiating events and planned unavailabil-
ity. Special attention is paid to recurring events, 
common cause faults, simultaneously occurring 
faults and human errors. Another objective of the 
event analysis is to systematically search for any 
signs of a deteriorating organisational and safety 
culture.
Responsible unit/person
Risk assessment (RIS), Jorma Rantakivi  (PRA 
computation)
Operational safety (KÄY) (fault data)
Interpretation of the indicator
Loviisa
A brief description of the most significant events 
regarding risks is provided below.
Loviisa 1:
1. Maintenance of the auxiliary emergency feed-
water system at LO2 took a long time. This 
influenced the risk for LO1 because the LO2 
emergency feedwater system can be used to 
replace the LO1 emergency feedwater system 
RL94. Unavailable for 222 hours. CCDP: 2.8E-
07.
Loviisa 2:
1. There was a hidden fault in the power control 
potentiometer of diesel generator EY02. A fault 
in the generator exciter. Unavailable for 123.3 
hours. CCDP: 1.11E-07.
2. Diesel generator tried to race when switching 
to individual operation. It was a hidden relay 
fault. Defective relays from the same manu-
facturing batch may have been installed at 
several positions in various diesel generators, 
which means that this may be a common-cause 
failure. Fortum and STUK are still processing 
STUK-B 176
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Most risk-significant events
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the event. If the significance is deemed high, a 
report may also be issued in connection with the 
results for next year. Unavailable for 274 hours. 
CCDP: 2.6E-07.
3. Heavy hoisting of reactor components during 
the outage caused the highest single risk com-
ponent for the Loviisa plants. It was noted du-
ring an inspection performed during the outage 
of LO2 that the hoisting was not being perfor-
med in compliance with the procedure assumed 
in the PRA risk assessment. The hoisting routes 
and the hoisting heights were not the same as 
those assumed in the PRA. The event is still 
being processed, and Fortum will reassess risks 
posed by hoisting. It is difficult to calculate the 
specific CCDP, but the event has been rated in 
the highest category due to the high risk signifi-
cance of hoisting.
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Most risk-significant events
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Olkiluoto
A brief description of the significant events is given 
below.
Olkiluoto 1:
1. Preventive maintenance of a diesel generator in 
the D train took 110 h. CCDP: 1.11E-07.
2. A thyristor fault caused the tripping of a gene-
rator breaker. Turbine bypass started as plan-
ned. The plant was brought to a shutdown in 
order to repair the thyristor fault. The planned 
shutdown and startup caused an added risk of 
CCDP = 1.0E-6.
Olkiluoto 2:
1. There had been a hidden fault in valve 323V207 
in redundancy 2 of the core spray system for 
324 hours. There had also been a partly over-
lapping fault in pump 323P004 in redundancy 
4. There had simultaneously been faults in the 
second and fourth redundancy for 77 hours. The 
fault in the second redundancy persisted for 
324 hours and the calculated CCDP was 7.2E-7.
2. There had been a hidden fault in pump 323P004 
in redundancy 4 of the core spray system for 
359 hours. A total of 77 hours of this fault were 
already calculated in fault no. 1 above (there 
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Risk contribution of the safety system unavailability at Loviisa NPP
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had been simultaneous faults in the second 
and fourth redundancy for 77 hours), which 
means that the fault in the pump of the fourth 
redundancy alone persisted for 282 hours. The 
fault persisted for 282 hours and the calculated 
CCDP was 1.6E-7.
3. The washing of a seawater heat exchanger in 
redundancy 3 of intermediate circuit 721 took 
a long time. The isolation lasted for 36 hours. 
CCDP: 1.4E-7.
4. Preventive maintenance of a diesel generator in 
the D train took 103 h. CCDP: 1.0E-07.
The combined total CCDP of all three categories di-
vided by the probability of a severe accident gives 
an overview of the risk-significance of operational 
events. To facilitate analysis, risk calculation is 
based on conservative assumptions and simplifica-
tions, which materially weakens the applicability 
of the results for trend monitoring. If the risk-sig-
nificance remains at the same average level year 
after year, the annual fluctuation does not warrant 
particular attention.
In 2013, the risk arising from operational activ-
ities decreased slightly at the Loviisa power plant 
when compared to previous years. At Olkiluoto, 
the risk remained at around the same level as nor-
mally during the past ten years.
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A.II.4 Accident risk at nuclear facilities
Definition
As the indicator, the annual probability of an acci-
dent leading to severe damage to nuclear fuel (core 
damage frequency) is followed. The accident risk is 
presented per nuclear power plant unit.
Source of data
The data is obtained as the result of probabilistic 
risk analyses (PRA) of the nuclear power plants. 
The risk analysis is based on detailed calculation 
models, continuously developed and complement-
ed. A total of 200 man-years have been used at 
Finnish nuclear power plants to develop the mod-
els. The basic data of the risk analyses includes the 
globally collected reliability information of compo-
nents and operator activities, as well as operating 
experience from Finnish power plants.
Purpose of the indicator
The indicator is used to follow the development of 
the nuclear power plant’s accident risk. The objec-
tive is to operate and maintain the nuclear power 
plant so that the accident risk decreases or re-
mains stable. Risk analyses can help in detecting 
a need to make modifications to the plant or revise 
operating methods.
Responsible unit/person
Risk assessment (RIS), Jorma Rantakivi  (PRA 
computation)
Operational safety (KÄY) (fault data)
Interpretation of the indicator
When assessing the indicator, one must keep in mind 
that it is affected by both the development of the 
power plant and the development of the calculation 
model. Plant modifications and changes in methods, 
carried out to remove risk factors, will decrease the 
indicator value. An increase of the indicator value 
may be due to the model being extended to new 
event groups, or the identification of new risk fac-
tors. Furthermore, developing more detailed models 
or obtaining more detailed basic data may change 
the risk estimates in either direction. For example, 
an increase in the Loviisa indicator in 2003 was due 
to the analysis being extended to cover exception-
ally harsh weather conditions and oil accidents at 
sea during a refueling outage. In the following year, 
the indicator value decreased, partly as a result of a 
more detailed analysis of these factors.
Loviisa power plant’s accident risk has contin-
ued to decrease over the last ten years, and new 
risk factors, discovered as the scope of the risk 
analysis has been extended, have been efficiently 
removed. The indicator decreased in 2007 due to 
the new sea  water line completed during the peri-
od. The new line allows for the alternative intake of 
seawater from the outlet channel to cool the plant 
when it is at a shutdown. The change decreases 
the risks in situations where algae, frazil ice or an 
oil spill endanger the availability of seawater via 
the conventional route. The decrease of the indica-
tor in 2008 and in the following years result from 
more detailed analyses performed in conjunction 
with the renewal of the operating license, as well 
as changes at the plant planned to be carried out 
earlier or in connection with the license renewal. 
Such changes include: the I&C upgrade LARA; the 
decrease in the probability of a criticality accident 
using, for example, boron analysers; modernisa-
tion of the refueling machine and a decrease in the 
probability of an external leak.
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For the Loviisa power plant, the most important 
factors affecting the overall accident risk include 
internal plant events during outages (such as the 
falling of heavy loads or a power surge caused by 
the sudden dilution of the boron used to adjust 
reactor operation), fire, a high level of seawater 
during load operation and oil releases during a 
refueling outage.
The annual probability of a severe reactor ac-
cident calculated for the Loviisa plant units is 
low (approximately 2.3 x 10–-5 in 2012). The value 
decreased around 23% year-on-year. The decrease 
of the risk was a result of several small plant 
changes, changes in the model and the revision of 
reliability data.
The indicator for the Olkiluoto plant decreased 
approximately 30% in 2008 compared to previ-
ous years’ relatively stable value. The decrease 
was mainly due to the more detailed modelling 
of earthquake events and changes carried out at 
the plant to improve seismic qualification. The 
increase in 2009 was due to the fact that a heat 
exchanger in the screening system cannot be used 
for residual heat removal after all, contrary to ear-
lier assessments. The decrease of the risk in 2010 
was due to changes in the modelling of DC systems 
672 and 679 (inclusion of battery diversity), while 
the increase in 2011 resulted from reassessment 
of fire frequencies. For the Olkiluoto power plant, 
internal events during load operation (component 
faults and pipe ruptures leading to an operational 
transient) are the most important factors affecting 
the overall accident risk.
The annual probability of a severe reactor ac-
cident calculated for the Olkiluoto nuclear power 
plant was approximately 1.22 × 10-5 in 2013. The 
value slightly decreased year-on-year (by 9%).
A.II.5 Number of fire alarms
Definition
As indicators, the number of fire alarms and actual 
fires are followed.
Source of data
Data for the indicators is collected from the power 
companies. The licensees submit the data needed 
for the indicator to the person responsible for the 
indicator at STUK.
Purpose of the indicator
The indicator is used to follow the effectiveness of 
fire protection at the nuclear power plants.
Responsible unit/person
Civil engineering and fire protection (RAK)
Pekka Välikangas
Interpretation of the indicator
At the Loviisa power plant, one event classified as 
a fire occurred in 2013: a plastic protective cover 
of a fluorescent tube light fixture in the ceiling of 
an instrument room on level +5.80 of the reactor 
building caught fire on 29 August 2013. The plant’s 
fire brigade was alerted and came to extinguish the 
fire. The fire was minor and could be put out with 
a handheld fire extinguisher. There were no events 
classified as fires outside the plant area in 2013. 
In 2013, the number of faults in the Loviisa power 
plant’s fire detection system remained at the same 
level as in the previous years. There were less ac-
tual alarms initiated by fire detectors than in 2012.
No events classified as fires occurred in the 
Olkiluoto power plant area in 2013. One event 
classified as a fire occurred outside the plant area: 
Number of fire alarms, Loviisa NPP
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sparks from an angle grinder used inside the 
containment at the Olkiluoto 3 construction site 
caused a fire in a welding gas extractor. The fire 
in the extractor caused smoke to build up inside 
the building. Employees were evacuated and the 
plant fire brigade ventilated the premises. The fire 
was minor and could be put out with handheld fire 
extinguishers. No fire detection system faults were 
observed at the Olkiluoto power plant in 2013; no 
faults occurred during the four years preceding 
2013, either. There were slightly fewer correct fire 
detection system alarms in 2013 than in 2012.
The fire safety at the Loviisa and Olkiluoto power 
plants remained at around the same level as before. 
There have been four events classified as fires in the 
Loviisa power plant area in the past ten years. The 
trend is slightly decreasing at the Olkiluoto power 
plant: the last event classified as a fire occurred three 
years ago. Alarms from fire detection systems have 
also been at a relatively low level. Most of the alarms 
were caused by dust, smoke or humidity. Fire detec-
tion systems are not always disconnected in a area 
wide enough for maintenance work. The number of 
alarms from the fire detection system is also affected 
by the amount of maintenance and repair work per-
formed at the plants.
A.III Structural integrity
A.III.1 Fuel integrity
Definition
As indicators, the plant unit-specific maximum level 
and the highest maximum activity value of the io-
dine-131 activity concentration (I-131 activity con-
centration) in the primary coolant in steady-state 
operation (startup operation or load operation for 
Loviisa and load operation for Olkiluoto) are fol-
lowed. The change in activity concentration of I-131 
in primary coolant due to depressurisation in con-
junction with shutdowns or reactor trips, as well 
as the number of leaking fuel assemblies removed 
from the reactor, are also followed as indicators.
Source of data
The licensees submit the indicator values directly 
to the person in charge of the indicator at STUK. 
The maximum activity levels are also available 
in the quarterly reports submitted by the power 
companies.
Purpose of the indicator
The indicators describe fuel integrity and the fuel 
leakage volume during the fuel cycle. The indica-
tors for the shutdown situations also describe the 
success of the shutdown concerning radiation pro-
tection.
Responsible unit/person
Reactor and Safety Systems (REA),
Kari Mäkelä
A.III.1a Reactor coolant system activity
Interpretation of indicators (Loviisa)
There were no leaking fuel assemblies in the reac-
tor of Loviisa 1 in 2013. A fuel assembly that had 
been observed to be leaking before was removed 
from the Loviisa 1 reactor in 2010. Once this was 
done, the maximum activity (I-131) of the primary 
coolant has remained low. After removal of the 
leaking fuel assemblies, the maximum activity val-
ues associated with shutdowns returned to the lev-
el before the leaks. Increased iodine concentration 
in the primary coolant of Loviisa  2 was detected 
in a routine laboratory test. Noble gas measure-
ments of the primary coolant confirmed that there 
was a fuel leak. The leak was, however, minor and 
the fuel assembly was removed during the annual 
outage. The number of minor fuel leaks has in-
creased at the Loviisa power plant in recent years, 
particularly in Loviisa 2. The actual reason for this 
is unknown, as examination of the damaged fuel 
assemblies has not been possible due to problems 
with the pool inspection equipment. Fortum’s cur-
rent goal is to repair the inspection equipment by 
the end of 2014. When the inspection equipment 
is available, the damage mechanism can be iden-
tified. All in all, the fuel integrity at both Loviisa 
plant units was good in 2013.
Interpretation of indicators (Olkiluoto)
There were no leaking fuel assemblies in the re-
actor of Olkiluoto 1 in 2013. Thus, the primary 
coolant activity caused by iodine-131 in Olkiluoto 
1 has continued to decrease since 2010. There was 
a fuel leak in the Olkiluoto 2 reactor. It started 
in May 2013, right at the end of the fuel cycle. 
The leaking bundle was removed from the reac-
tor in the 2013 annual outage. The impact of the 
leak showed in the maximum activity (I-131) of 
STUK-B 176
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Olkiluoto 2 primary coolant associated with shut-
down. No primary damage was observed in the re-
moved assembly when it was inspected during the 
annual outage. On the basis of other inspections 
carried out during the annual outage, the fuel 
types at both plant units have mostly behaved 
normally. Several fuel leaks have occurred in the 
2000s in Olkiluoto 2. The main reason for the 
leaks has been small loose objects entering the re-
actor during maintenance operations. The coolant 
flow may cause the loose objects to vibrate and 
break the fuel cladding. To minimise the problem, 
new foreign object sieves were adopted for the 
fuel in Olkiluoto 2 in 2012. The sieve profiles were 
changed to make the grid denser. The leaking as-
sembly in 2013 was not of this type.
Fuel integrity: 
Iodine (I-131) maximum activity concentration level of primary 
coolant (kBq/m³) in power operation, Loviisa NPP
 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013
 5.01E+02 3.89E+02 3.91E+02 1.90E+02 2.00E+02 2.60E+02 3.80+02 3.90E+02 3.70E+02 4.00E+02
3.39E+02 2.91E+02 2.72E+02 2.10E+02 4.90E+04 2.40E+04 1.20+03 8.50E+02 4.71E+03 5.40E+03
LO1
LO2
1.00E+06
1.00E+05
1.00E+04
1.00E+03
1.00E+02
1.00E+01
1.00E+00
Fuel integrity: 
Iodine (I-131) maximum activity concentration of primary 
coolant (kBq/m³) related to shutdowns, Loviisa NPP
 LO1
LO2
 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013
 4.80E+02 5.60E+04 6.70E+02 7.06E+02 6.30E+02
 6.40E+06 4.10E+02 1.40E+03 4.10E+03 3.41E+05 
1.00E+03
1.00E+07
1.00E+06
1.00E+05
1.00E+04
1.00E+02
1.00E+01
1.00E+00
Fuel integrity: 
Iodine (I-131) maximum activity concentration of primary 
coolant (kBq/m³) in power operation, Loviisa NPP
 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013
 2.10E+03 2.20E+03 1.90E+03 8.10E+02 1.20E+03 1.54E+03 4.97E+04 1.49E+03 2.80E+03 8.50E+02
5.80E+02 5.90E+02 5.20E+02 5.00E+02 1.30E+05 3.85E+06 3.20E+03 6.64E+03 1.27E+04 3.41E+05 
LO1
LO2
1.00E+07
1.00E+06
1.00E+05
1.00E+04
1.00E+03
1.00E+02
1.00E+01
1.00E+00
OLC limit 7E+05 kBq/m3
Fuel integrity: 
Iodine (I-131) maximum activity concentration of primary 
coolant (kBq/m³), Olkiluoto NPP
 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013
 1.90E+02 5.90E+01 6.90E+02 3.50E+01 3.70E+01 3.60E+01 3.12E+04 1.40E+02 6.76E+01 5.90E+01
 3.12E+03 6.52E+03 7.03E+03 9.99E+02 2.30E+02 1.00E+02 2.01+04 4.84E+03 9.45E+02 9.51E+01
OL1
OL2
1.00E+07
1.00E+06
1.00E+05
1.00E+04
1.00E+03
1.00E+02
1.00E+01
1.00E+00
Tech Spec limit 2.2 MBq/l
Fuel integrity: 
Iodine (I-131) maximum activity concentration of primary 
coolant (kBq/m³) related to shutdowns, Olkiluoto NPP
 OL1
OL2
 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013
 0.00E+00 1.03E+04 0.00E+00 0.00E+00 0.00E+00
 0.00E+00 1.61E+05 3.93E+03 6.19E+04 1.00E+06
1.00E+06
1.00E+05
1.00E+04
1.00E+03
1.00E+02
1.00E+01
1.00E+00
Fuel integrity: 
Iodine (I-131) maximum activity concentration level of primary 
coolant (kBq/m³) in power operation, Olkiluoto NPP
 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013
8.20E+01 5.80E+01 2.00E+02 2.70E+01 3.00E+01 3.50E+01 2.45E+03 5.50E+01 5.58E+01 3.92E+01
1.49E+03 4.00E+03 4.00E+03 2.30E+02 2.10E+02 9.10E+01 1.87E+03 1.46E+03 3.03E+02 3.43E+01 
OL1
OL2
1.00E+04
1.00E+03
1.00E+02
1.00E+01
1.00E+00
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A.III.1b Number of leaking fuel assemblies
Interpretation of indicators (Loviisa)
There were no leaking fuel assemblies in the 
Loviisa 1 reactor during the period under review. 
A minor fuel leak was observed in Loviisa 2 in 
December 2012. The leaking fuel assembly was 
removed during the 2013 annual outage. A meth-
od that has been found functional at Olkiluoto 
was used to identify a leaking fuel assembly for 
the first time in Loviisa. A subcontractor handled 
the actual equipment and provided the operators, 
but the plant’s own radiochemistry laboratory an-
alysed the water samples from the reactor. The 
leaking fuel assembly was identified based on the 
analysis results.
Interpretation of indicators (Olkiluoto)
The Olkiluoto 1 reactor did not have any leaking 
fuel assemblies in 2013. A fuel assembly that had 
been leaking since May 2013 was removed from 
the Olkiluoto 2 reactor during the annual outage.
Number of leaking fuel bundles removed from the reactor, 
Loviisa NPP
 LO1
 LO2
0
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 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0
2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013
 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 1
0
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Number of leaking fuel bundles removed from the reactor, 
Olkiluoto NPP
 OL1
 OL2
 0 0 1 0 0 0 1 0 0 0
2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013
 0 1 1 1 0 0 1 1 1 1
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A.III.2 Reactor coolant system integrity
A.III.2a Water chemistry conditions
Definition
As indicators, the water chemistry conditions for 
each plant unit are followed.
The water chemistry indicators are:
•	 Chemistry	 performance	 indices	 used	 by	 the	
licensees, depicting the effectiveness of water 
chemistry control in the secondary circuits of 
PWRs and in the reactor circuits of BWRs. The 
chemical conditions in the secondary circuit of 
a pressurized water reactor affect the integrity 
of the interface between the reactor coolant sys-
tem and the secondary circuit. The indicator for 
Loviisa is a new index developed at the plant to 
be used together with the international index. 
The new index describes the water chemistry 
conditions in the secondary circuit at Loviisa 
with a higher degree of sensitivity than the 
corresponding international index for VVER 
plants. The indicator for Olkiluoto is the inter-
national index used by the plant. This index ob-
serves corrosive factors and the concentrations 
of corrosion products in the steam generator 
blowdown and the feedwater. For steam gene-
rator blowdown, the calculation includes the 
chloride, sulphate and sodium concentrations 
and acid conductivity. For feedwater, it includes 
the iron, copper and oxygen concentrations. The 
chemistry index of the Olkiluoto plant consists 
of the chloride and sulphate concentrations of 
the reactor water and the iron concentration in 
the feedwater. The indices for both plants only 
cover the aforementioned parameter values du-
ring load operation.
•	 The	 maximum	 chloride	 concentration	 of	 the	
steam generator blowdown at the Loviisa plant 
units and the reactor water at the Olkiluoto 
plant units during operation compared with 
the OLC limit in the monitoring period. At the 
Olkiluoto plant, the maximum sulphate content 
of reactor water during steady-state operation 
is also followed.
•	 Corrosion	 products	 released	 from	 the	 surfaces	
of the reactor coolant system and the secondary 
circuit into the coolant. For the Loviisa plant, 
the iron concentration of the reactor coolant 
and the secondary circuit feedwater (maximum 
values for the monitoring period) are followed. 
For the Olkiluoto plant, the iron concentration 
of feedwater (maximum value for the monito-
ring period) is followed. In addition, the maxi-
mum Co-60 activity concentration in the reactor 
coolant while bringing the plant to a cold shut-
down or after a reactor trip is followed for both 
plants.
Source of data
The licensees submit indicators describing water 
chemistry control to the respective responsible per-
son at STUK. The approximate concentration lev-
els of corrosive substances and corrosion products 
can also be obtained from quarterly reports sub-
mitted by the licensees.
Purpose of the indicator
The water chemistry indicators are used to moni-
tor and control the integrity of the reactor coolant 
system and the secondary circuit. The monitoring 
is done by indices depicting water chemistry con-
trol and by following selected corrosive impurities 
and corrosion products. The water chemistry indi-
ces combine a number of water chemistry param-
eters and thus give a good overview of the water 
chemistry conditions. STUK’s indicators are also 
used to monitor the fluctuation of certain parame-
ters in more detail. The corrosive substances moni-
tored include chloride and sulphate. The corrosive 
products followed are iron and radioactive Co-60. 
The activity concentration of Co-60 isotope while 
bringing the plant to cold shutdown is used to 
describe the access of cobalt-containing structural 
materials into the reactor circuit and the success of 
the water chemistry control and the shutdown pro-
cedures. In addition to the parameters described 
here, the licensees use several other parameters 
to monitor the plant units’ water chemistry condi-
tions.
Responsible units/persons
Reactor and safety systems (REA),  
Kari Mäkelä
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some resin to enter the secondary circuit. This was 
a brief transient and thus it does not have a major 
impact on the corrosion behaviour of the steam 
generator pipes or the integrity of the reactor cool-
ant system. The maximum Co-60 activity levels 
associated with shutdowns were measured during 
shutdowns for annual outages. In 2013, the con-
centrations were around the same as in the previ-
ous years, which indicates successful compliance 
with the ALARA principle. The indicator shows 
that the integrity of the reactor coolant systems of 
the Loviisa plant units was good in 2013.
Interpretation of indicators (Loviisa)
In 2013, the impurity and corrosion product lev-
els in the reactor coolant system and the second-
ary circuit, followed in STUK’s indicator scheme, 
were in keeping with the OLC limits. In the past 
few years, the chemistry index has remained at a 
good level in the Loviisa plant units. The Loviisa 
1 index for 2013 was lower than in 2012 because 
of improved startup procedures introduced during 
the 2013 annual outage and more specific adher-
ence to related procedures that aim to optimise 
the chemical parameters. The blowdown water 
chloride content and iron content of the secondary 
circuit feedwater were normal in 2013. No clear 
changes have occurred in the past few years in the 
iron content of the primary coolant, either. All of 
the water chemistry parameters for the secondary 
side of Loviisa 2 have slightly increased. The fig-
ures show that the most clearly discernible change 
from the previous years is the high iron concentra-
tion in the secondary side feedwater. This high con-
centration was caused by failed surface coating of 
filters used to treat the concentrate, which allowed 
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Integrity of the secondary circuit: 
Chemistry index, Loviisa NPP
 LO1
 LO2
 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013
 1.11 1.08 1.03 1.06 1.03 1.05 1.02 1.13 1.03
 1.05 1.18 1.11 1.07 1.01 1.02 1.00 1.02 1.08
Integrity of primary circuit: Corrosive impurities; 
Maximum chloride concentration of a steam generator blow-down 
(µg/kg) in power operation, Loviisa NPP
 LO1
LO2
 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013
 2.90E+01 7.80E+00 1.93E+01 1.98E+01 1.36E+01
 1.14E+01 9.10E+00 1.10E+01 3.19E+01 4.30E+01
1.00E+03
1.00E+02
1.00E+01
1.00E+00
OLC limit ≤ 100 µg/kg
OLC limit after the annual maintenance outages 2008 100 µg/kg; 
before them 500 µg/kg.
Integrity of primary circuit: Corrosion products; 
Maximum iron concentration in the feed water (µg/l) 
(RL30 / RL70) in power operation, Loviisa NPP
 LO1
LO2
 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013
 15.1 17.0 8.1 8.4 7.4
 8.7 8.7 8.4 7.7 596.0
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Integrity of primary circuit: Corrosion products; 
Maximum iron concentration in primary coolant (Fe-tot µg/l) 
in power operation, Loviisa NPP
 LO1
LO2
 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013
 19.4 6.5 9.1 13.8 14.1
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Integrity of primary circuit: 
Maximum cobalt-60 activity concentration (kBq/m³) in 
primary coolant related to shutdowns, Loviisa NPP
 LO1
LO2
 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013
 1.03E+04 8.21E+03 5.26E+03 7.48E+03 8.10E+03
 1.71E+04 8.60E+03 9.88E+03 7.90E+03 1.40E+04
1.00E+05
1.00E+04
1.00E+03
1.00E+02
1.00E+01
1.00E+00
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Interpretation of indicators (Olkiluoto)
The impurity and corrosion product levels in re-
actor water and feedwater, followed in STUK’s 
indicator scheme, remained below the OLC limits 
at both plant units. The chemistry index of both 
plant units was the best possible, 1, in 2013. Iron, 
sulphate and chloride concentrations of the reac-
tor coolant did not deviate from their regular val-
ues, which is also shown by the achieved chemis-
try index value. The monitoring and optimisation 
of Olkiluoto 2 water chemistry was successful in 
2013. All the results for 2013 are at a normal good 
level. The iron concentration in feedwater has con-
tinued to increase steadily since 2010, but it still 
remains below all the action limits. At both plant 
units, the shutdown-related maximum value of 
Co-60 activity content occurred during shut-
downs for annual outages. There were no essen-
tial changes in the Co-60 activity content com-
pared to previous years, which indicates success-
ful compliance with the ALARA principle. The 
indicator shows that reactor coolant system in-
tegrity has been good at the Olkiluoto plant units 
in 2013.
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Integrity of primary circuit: Chemistry index, 
Olkiluoto NPP
 OL1
 OL2
 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013
 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00
 1.06 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.05 1.00 1.00
Integrity of primary circuit: Corrosion products; 
Maximum sulphate concentration in primary coolant (µg/l) 
in power operation, Olkiluoto NPP
 OL1
OL2
 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013
 3.2 7.0 4.9 1.9 2.8 
 5.6 4.6 4.8 1.8 1.9
0
10
20
OLC limit 20 µg/kg (since II/2011)
Integrity of primary circuit: Corrosion products; 
Maximum iron concentration in reactor feed water (µg/l) 
in power operation, Olkiluoto NPP
 OL1
OL2
 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013
 0.68 1.15 1.10 0.60 0.50 
 0.67 0.49 0.70 0.80 1.15
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Integrity of primary circuit: Corrosion products; 
Maximum cobalt-60 activity concentration (kBq/m³) in 
primary coolant related to shutdowns, Olkiluoto NPP
 OL1
OL2
 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013
 7.83E+04 8.59E+04 1.10E+05 1.19E+05 8.65E+04
 7.54E+04 1.01E+05 2.66E+05 9.05E+04 1.19E+05
1.00E+06
1.00E+05
1.00E+04
1.00E+03
1.00E+02
1.00E+01
1.00E+00
Integrity of primary circuit: Corrosive impurities; 
Maximum chloride concentration in primary coolant (µg/kg) 
in power operation. Olkiluoto NPP
 OL1
OL2
 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013
 2.1 3.0 0.7 0.5 1.1
 2.0 2.1 7.8 0.6 1.0
0.0
0.1
1.0
10.0
100.0
below detection limit
OLC limit 20 µg/kg (since II/2011)
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A.III.2b Reactor coolant system 
leakages (Olkiluoto)
Definition
The indicators below are used to follow identified 
and unidentified reactor coolant system leakages 
at the Olkiluoto plant units:
•	 Total	 volume	 (m3)	 of	 identified	 (from	 contain-
ment to collection tank 352 T1 of the controlled 
leakage drain system) and unidentified (total 
volume of leakages into the sump of the control-
led floor drainage system, 345 T33) internal lea-
kages in the containment during the fuel cycle.
•	 Highest	 daily	 internal	 leakage	 volume	 in	 the	
containment during the fuel cycle in relation to 
the leakage volume allowed in the OLC (outflow 
water volume of water condensing in the air 
coolers of the containment cooling system 725/
OLC limit).
Source of data
The licensee submits data on reactor coolant sys-
tem leakages at the Olkiluoto power plant to the 
person responsible at STUK.
Purpose of the indicator
The indicators describing reactor coolant system 
leakages are used to follow and monitor the leak 
rate of the reactor coolant system within the con-
tainment.
Responsible units/persons
Projects (PRO), Jukka Kallionpää
Interpretation of the indicator, 
fuel cycle 2012–2013
One of the purposes of controlled leakage is to col-
lect leakages from valves, pumps and other such 
components. The drains from the seal boxes of 
the valves within the containment are equipped 
with temperature sensors to locate any leaks. 
Temperature sensors installed in the drains above 
the main lines will detect any leakage in the line. 
Other methods must then be used to locate the 
actual leaking object. Identified leakages in the 
reactor coolant system increased to some extent 
in Olkiluoto 1 during the fuel cycles of 2009, 2010 
and 2011. They decreased in 2012 and continued to 
decrease in 2013. Identified leakages in Olkiluoto 
2 have remained almost constant. The leakage vol-
umes do not include the drainage of process sys-
tems during annual outages and other outages. 
The identified leakages include sampling flows 
of approximately 100–1,500  m³ from the reactor 
building.
At the lowest point of the containment drywell, 
there is the drain water pit T33, which collects 
the drain water from the containment drywell 
floor drains and any leakage from the control rod 
actuator seals. The volumes of unidentified reac-
tor coolant system leakages during the fuel cycle 
2010–2011 decreased in both plant units. In 2012, 
they went slightly up from the 2011 level at both 
plant units, only to fall back to the previous level 
in 2013.
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Identified leakages of primary circuit (352T1, m³), 
Olkiluoto NPP
 OL1
 OL2
 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013
 3300 3004 4058 3805 4697 6448 7496 4664 2773
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Unidentified leakages of primary circuit (345T33, m³), 
Olkiluoto NPP
 OL1
 OL2
 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013
 1.14 2.52 1.56 2.16 15.48 32.28 4.74 25.3 7.9
 53.00 3.84 1.26 2.04 16.5 43.08 5.10 15.2 7.7 
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The maximum unidentified leakage in ratio to the OLC limit, 
Olkiluoto NPP
 OL1
 OL2
 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013
 0.18 0.23 0.21 0.21 1.27 2.20 0.35 1.38 0.17
 0.35 0.35 0.09 0.16 1.97 2.08 0.35 0.69 0.40 
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One of the purposes of containment gas cooling 
system 725 is to remove moisture from the contain-
ment atmosphere. Moisture may originate from 
steam leaking from the reactor coolant system. 
During the fuel cycle of 2012–2013, the contain-
ment’s largest internal daily leak volume’s ratio to 
the maximum allowable volume, as specified in the 
operational limits and conditions, was low for both 
plant units.
The reactor coolant system was relatively leak-
proof during the 2012–2013 fuel cycle.
A.III.3 Containment integrity
Definition
As indicators, the parameters below are followed:
•	 Total	as-found	leakage	of	outer	isolation	valves	
following the first integrity tests compared with 
the highest allowed total leakage from the outer 
isolation valves.
•	Percentage of isolation valves tested during the 
year in question at each plant unit that passed the 
leak test at the first attempt (i.e. as-found leakage 
smaller than the acceptance criteria of the valve 
and no consecutive exceeding of the so-called at-
tention criteria of a valve without repair).
•	 Combined	as-found	leakage	rate	of	containment	
penetrations and airlocks in relation to their 
highest allowed total leakage. The combined 
leakage rate at Olkiluoto includes leakages 
from personnel airlocks, the maintenance dome 
and the containment dome. At Loviisa, the com-
bined leakage rate is comprised of the leak test 
results from personnel airlocks, the material 
airlock, the cable penetrations of inspection 
equipment, the containment maintenance ven-
tilation systems (TL23), the main steam piping 
(RA) and the feedwater system (RL) penetra-
tions; the seals of blind-flanged penetrations of 
ice-filling pipes are also included.
Source of data
Data is obtained from the power companies’ leak-
tightness test reports submitted by the licensees to 
STUK for information within three months from 
the completion of an annual outage. STUK calcu-
lates the total as-found leakages, since the reports 
give total leakages as they are at the end of the 
annual outage (i.e. after the completion of repairs 
and re-testing).
Purpose of the indicator
This indicator is used to follow the integrity of 
the containment isolation valves, penetrations and 
airlocks.
Responsible unit/person
Reactor and safety systems (REA)
Päivi Salo
0.0
0.5
1.0
1.5
2.0
2.5
The overall as-found leakage of outer isolation valves compared 
with the highest allowed overall leakage of outer isolation valves, 
Loviisa NPP
 LO1
 LO2
 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013
 1.10 0.38 0.40 0.41 0.54 0.47 1.37 0.76 0.56 0.72
 0.54 0.36 0.11 0.20 0.45 0.74 0.87 0.71 1.26 1.97
92%
94%
96%
98%
100%
Isolation valves passing the leakage test at the first attempt, 
Olkiluoto NPP
 LO1
 LO2
 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013
 95.0 97.0 96.0 99.0 95.5 99.5 97.0 98.1 99.2 96.4
 97.0 99.5 98.6 99.5 98.6 97.7 95.4 98.5 94.4 94.9
Combined leak rate of containment penetrations and air locks 
compared to the leak limit, Loviisa NPP
 LO1
 LO2
0.00
0.05
0.10
0.15
0.20
0.25
0.30
 0.07 0.03 0.11 0.03 0.02 0.02 0.02 0.03 0.02 0.01 0.01 0.03 0.03
 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013
 0.04 0.07 0.17 0.28 0.03 0.02 0.03 0.03 0.06 0.02 0.02 0.04 0.05
138
STUK-B 176 STUK’S SafeTy performance indicaTorS for nppS in 2013 APPENDIX 1
Interpretation of the indicator
Loviisa
The overall as-found leakage of the outer isola-
tion valves in Loviisa 1 increased, but remained 
clearly below the limit set. In Loviisa 2, the overall 
as-found leakage continued to increase, and based 
on the first tests exceeded the limit set for overall 
leakage. Three outer isolation valves with plenty 
of leakage accounted for 84% of the overall as-
found leakage. They will be tested together with 
the inner isolation valves of the line. The leak test 
results of a valve pair in the cable room extin-
guishing system was also high in 2012. The leak 
test results of valve pairs in the fuel pool cooling 
system and the reactor coolant system purification 
system, which have had plenty of leakages in the 
past, were acceptable in 2012. After the repair of 
the valves, the overall as-found leakage fell back to 
below the set limit. Since 2010, the leak test result 
of at least one outer valve has been high each year 
(around 55% of the limit set for as-found leakages). 
The increase of as-found leakages is caused by 
these single major leakages.
The percentage of isolation valves that passed 
the leak test at the first attempt has remained high.
The overall as-found leakage of containment 
penetrations, which at Loviisa includes the leak 
test results for the personnel airlock, the emer-
gency personnel airlock, the material airlock, the 
reactor pit, inward relief valves, cable penetrations 
and bellow seals (RA, RL, TL23), was low at both 
plant units.
Olkiluoto
The overall as-found leakage of the outer isolation 
valves in Olkiluoto 1 decreased when compared to 
the previous year and remained clearly below the 
limit set in the OLC.
The overall as-found leakage of the outer iso-
lation valves of Olkiluoto 2 increased when com-
pared to the previous year, but remained clearly 
below the limit set in the OLC.
The percentage of isolation valves that passed 
the leak test at first attempt has remained high for 
both plant units.
The total as-found leakage rate of containment 
penetrations, in which TVO includes leakages in 
the upper and lower personnel airlocks, the main-
tenance dome and the containment dome, has re-
mained small for both plant units.
The overall as-found leakage of outer isolation valves compared 
with the highest allowed overall leakage of outer isolation valves, 
Olkiluoto NPP  
 OL1
 OL2
0.0
0.2
0.4
0.6
0.8
1.0
1.2
1.4
 0.80 0.47 0.38 0.41 1.02 1.29 0.10 0.14 0.77 0.15
 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013
 1.26 0.45 1.27 1.10 0.45 1.12 0.55 0.53 0.36 0.68
0.00
0.01
0.01
0.02
0.02
0.03
0.03
0.04
Combined leak rate of containment penetrations and air locks 
compared to the leak limit, Olkiluoto NPP
 OL1
 OL2
 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013
 0.01 0.01 0.02 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01
 0.03 0.01 0.02 0.02 0.01 0.02 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01
Isolation valves passing the leakage test at the first attempt, 
Olkiluoto NPP
 OL1
 OL2
92%
93%
94%
95%
96%
97%
98%
99%
100%
 95.0 96.1 98.6 97.5 98.0 99.4 99.5 97.6 97.5 98.0
 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013
 97.0 97.0 97.4 97.7 98.3 95.8 97.6 98.5 98.8 96.9
APPENDIX 2 Occupational radiation dose distribution 
at Loviisa and Olkiluoto nuclear power plants in 2013
According to the Radiation Decree, the annual ef­
fective dose from radiation work for a worker must 
not exceed 50 mSv while the average over any pe­
riod of five years must remain below 20 mSv.
The highest individual dose incurred at Finnish 
nuclear power plants was 8,6 mSv. This dose 
was accumulated from work at the Loviisa nu­
clear power plant. The highest individual dose 
for a Finnish nuclear power plant worker in the 
five­year period from 2009 to 2013 was 43,4 mSv. 
The dose was accumulated at the Loviisa nuclear 
power plant.
dose range 
(mSv)
number of persons by dose
Loviisa Olkiluoto total*
< 0,1 816 1695 2429
0,1–0,49 191 454 642
0,5–0,99 102 175 256
1,00–1,99 91 124 204
2,00–2,99 45 36 92
3,00–3,99 23 14 39
4,00–4,99 13 10 28
5,00–5,99 6 4 12
6,00–6,99 2 1 5
7,00–7,99 0 3 4
8,00–8,99 1 1 2
9,00–9,99 0 0 0
10,00–10,99 0 0 0
11,00–11,99 0 0 0
12,00–12,99 0 0 0
13,00–13,99 0 0 0
14,00–14,99 0 0 0
15,00–20 0 0 0
> 20 0 0 0
*  The data in this column include Finnish workers who have received 
doses also at Swedish nuclear power plants. The same person may 
have worked at both Finnish nuclear power plants and in Sweden.
 Source: STUK’s dose register
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events at nuclear power plants in 2013
Loviisa nuclear power plant
Faulty connections in Loviisa 1 I&C system
During the inservice testing of the I&C system at 
Loviisa 1 on 10 January 2013, it was noted that 
two of the boron feed pumps would not have op­
erated properly in the event of an accident. The 
pumps would not have started automatically if the 
reactor had cooled down too quickly.
Automatic starting of the pumps had been pre­
vented when the plant unit was shut down for 
repairs on 25 September 2012. At that time, repre­
sentatives of the power plant noted that preventing 
automatic starting of the pumps was not necessary 
during the repair outage in question. They failed 
to remove this task from the plant’s shutdown in­
struction, however, which means that automatic 
starting of the pumps was prevented by bypassing 
them. Such bypassing is usually recorded in the 
plant’s work management system so that all tem­
porary connections can be reliably removed prior 
to the subsequent startup of the plant unit. Using 
forms that are manually filled out is also allowed in 
some cases. The form filled out in connection with 
this bypassing incident could not be traced when 
investigating the event. It is likely that the form 
was not properly archived in a folder in the control 
room. Thus, no information about the bypassing 
was available during the startup of the plant unit 
and the bypass connection was not removed.
The reactor of a nuclear power plant is shut 
down with the help of the control rods in the event 
of an accident. The detected fault would not have 
prevented the shutting down of the reactor. Boron 
is supplied to the reactor under specific accident 
conditions to verify that the reactor has shut down. 
The detected fault would have prevented automat­
ic starting of the pumps, but they could still have 
been started manually. Furthermore, the plant has 
other safety systems that can used to supply boron 
to the reactor. Thus, the event did not pose any risk 
to the plant, people or the environment.
The representatives of the power plant elimi­
nated the fault immediately after its detection. 
They also inspected other similar connections at 
both plant units and found no other non­conform­
ances. The power plant will specify its procedures 
to prevent reoccurrence of the event. In the future, 
all such entries will be made in a new work man­
agement system that will be commissioned in a 
couple of years.
There was a similar event at Loviisa 2 in 2008: 
at that time, I&C system connections had not been 
restored, either. An extensive and thorough inves­
tigation of the event and its underlying causes was 
conducted. It was observed that the simulation 
practices have not been properly specified and are 
not consistent. The power plant implemented cor­
rective measures after the event to prevent its re­
occurrence. The underlying causes of the new event 
are not the same, and thus it cannot be deemed to 
have been caused by improper corrective measures 
of the previous event.
On the INES scale, the event is rated at Level 1.
Some of the requirements of the 
operational limits and conditions were 
not taken into account during the startup 
stage of the Loviisa 1 annual outage
During testing implemented at the startup stage 
after the annual outage of Loviisa 1 on 5 September 
2013, it was noted that two of the valves influenc­
ing pressure control of the reactor coolant system 
did not fully open. The valves were moved, which 
made them operate normally. The fault did not re­
appear in further tests conducted, and the licensee 
deemed the valves operable. The underlying cause 
of the fault remained unclear.
According to the operational limits and condi­
tions (OLC), the startup of a plant unit may not 
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be started once a valve fault has been detected. 
However, the startup of Loviisa 1 – or, in practice, 
the adjustment of the boron acid concentration in 
the reactor coolant system – was continued even 
though the fault had not been fully processed.
The event was caused by a human error. At the 
time, the personnel of the plant were adjusting 
the boron acid concentration of the reactor coolant 
system, which is a task requiring high precision, 
and they were also studying the unexpected valve 
faults. This is why they failed to notice that the 
valve faults occurred at a stage when the OLC re­
quire discontinuation of the startup until the fault 
has been eliminated. At the time of the event, the 
employees believed that the plant unit had already 
reached a stage where the OLC no longer pose this 
limitation.
The valve fault did not compromise plant safety, 
because other equipment was also available for 
pressure control of the reactor coolant system. The 
event did have safety significance, however. The 
licensee must make sure that the plant unit is al­
ways operated in compliance with the operational 
limits and conditions. If any non­conformances oc­
cur, the licensee must carefully investigate them 
and prevent their reoccurrence by implementing 
corrective measures. Based on the investigation of 
this event, the licensee will clarify the operational 
limits and conditions and provide additional train­
ing for the employees on the significance of the 
operational limits and conditions.
On the International Nuclear Event Scale 
(INES), the event was rated as Level 0.
Some of the requirements of the operational 
limits and conditions were not taken into 
account during the repair of a valve in 
the fuel pool cooling system of Loviisa 1
On 18 September 2013, the operators at Loviisa 
power plant noted that a valve included in the 
Loviisa 1 fuel pool cooling system did not provide 
a signal for whether it was open or closed. The 
signal was obtained after someone went onsite and 
touched the limit switch. The licensee decided to 
inspect the limit switch and drafted a work order 
to that effect.
The valve is located in a pipeline going through 
the containment. According to the operational lim­
its and conditions (OLC), repairs can be imple­
mented during the plant unit’s power operation, 
but the valve paired with the valve to be repaired 
in the same pipeline must be closed if the work 
will make the valve unavailable, or if the work will 
take more than 24 hours. A starting permit for the 
work was issued and the work took more than 24 
hours. The requirement on closing the valve pair 
was not taken into account when processing the 
work permit. Due to this human error, the valve 
paired with the valve being repaired was not closed 
until 3 October 2013, i.e. there was a delay of more 
than 24 hours.
The fuel pool cooling system is used to remove 
residual heat from the spent fuel stored in the 
spent fuel pools. It consists of two separate cooling 
circuits. Normally, one of the circuits is in opera­
tion and the other acts as a backup circuit. The re­
pairs of the valve and the delay in closing the sec­
ond valve did not compromise cooling because the 
devices remained operable throughout the event. 
On the International Nuclear Event Scale (INES), 
the event was rated as Level 0.
Control rod drive mechanism failure 
and repair outage at Loviisa 2
Two control rods at Loviisa 2 jammed during test­
ing prior to plant startup after the annual outage 
in September. The control rods were made opera­
tional, however, and they moved normally during 
retests. The licensee issued a permit to go ahead 
with the plant unit startup. The underlying cause 
of the jamming remained unclear.
STUK required that the licensee study the un­
derlying causes of the jamming and supervise the 
system’s operability more carefully than normal 
until the next annual outage. The licensee decided 
to perform additional tests on the control rods dur­
ing the plant unit’s fuel cycle 2013–2014. The first 
test took place on 14 October 2013. At that time, 
one of the control rods jammed again. It was the 
same control rod that jammed during the testing 
at the startup stage. The licensee decided to imple­
ment a repair outage to study and eliminate the 
cause of this control rod movement failure..
During the Loviisa 2 repair outage (from 15 to 
20 October 2013), the mechanisms of two of the 
control rod drives were replaced and the detached 
mechanisms were inspected. The cause of the 
control rod drive mechanism failure was found to 
be a faulty bearing in the motor. The underlying 
cause of the bearing fault could not be determined, 
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and studies are still ongoing. The licensee stated, 
however, that the fault was eliminated when the 
mechanism was replaced.
The second control rod that had jammed during 
the startup stage after the annual outage oper­
ated normally during testing in October and its 
mechanism was deemed fine when inspected after 
detaching. The cause of the jamming in September 
could not be ascertained. One possibility is that 
there was a minor control rod misalignment that 
was eliminated in September when the assembly 
was moved downwards.
STUK supervised the study and repair of the 
fault onsite. Furthermore, STUK reviewed a report 
on the fault and repairs before issuing a permit to 
start the plant unit after the repair outage.
All of the control rods operated normally during 
testing at the startup stage after the repair outage. 
STUK required that operability of the system be 
monitored more carefully than normal until the 
next annual outage.
On the International Nuclear Event Scale 
(INES), the event was rated as Level 0.
Control rod fault and repair outage at 
Loviisa 2 (see the event description above)
It was observed in tests implemented in connection 
with the startup of Loviisa 2 after the annual out­
age that two control rods of the reactor jammed. 
When the control rods were retested, one of them 
still jammed. This malfunction would have pre­
vented the planned gravitational operation of the 
control rod. The other control rods were deemed 
operable in the retests. The malfunctioning control 
rod was replaced with a spare part and inspected 
by means of dismantling during a repair outage 
implemented on 15–20 October 2013. It was noted 
during the inspection that a cylinder roller bearing 
at the top end of the control rod mechanism’s mo­
tor occasionally got jammed when it was manually 
rotated. The radial clearance in between the bear­
ing’s inner and outer race was too small, and the 
bearing rollers did not freely rotate between the 
races. Fortum was initially of the opinion that the 
problem was caused by a factory defect, but it sub­
sequently turned out that the bearing’s customised 
inner and outer race had been accidentally mixed 
up with the races of a similar bearing in another 
assembly. As a corrective measure, Fortum added a 
note to the maintenance procedures for the control 
rods, instructing employees that the identification 
numbers of a bearing’s inner and outer race must 
be checked prior to assembly.
Lead blankets accidentally left 
on top of reactor coolant system 
pipes in steam generator room
At the beginning of the annual outage, employees 
of Fortum noticed that plastic­covered lead blan­
kets used for radiation protection had been acci­
dentally left on top of pipes inside the reactor pres­
sure vessel’s thermal barrier during the previous 
annual outage. Such blankets were found on top of 
reactor coolant and safety injection system pipes 
and on the floor of the room. The blankets on the 
floor had apparently been placed on top of some 
pipes but had dropped onto the floor when the tem­
perature increased.
Such lead blankets are used as radiation protec­
tion to lower the radiation dose of the maintenance 
and inspection personnel. The radiation protection 
blankets should be removed from all rooms that 
will be closed when the plant is in operation prior 
to startup, but not all of the blankets had been re­
moved after the annual outage of 2012.
When the blankets were found, the outer sur­
faces of the affected pipes were cleaned and in­
spected using a variety of methods. No indication 
suggesting that the integrity of the pipes had been 
compromised by the lead blankets was found in 
these studies. In addition to the studies imple­
mented by Fortum, an external expert assessed the 
potential risks caused by the lead to the surface 
coating, because a comprehensive assessment of 
the consequences of this unexpected event was 
deemed necessary. STUK accepted these stud­
ies and their justification prior to issuing a plant 
startup permit after the annual outage.
Programmable technology in auxiliary 
voltage relays installed into safety 
classified ventilation system switchgears
Fortum observed that there were auxiliary volt­
age relays including programmable technology 
in the ventilation system switchgears of the new 
I&C building of the Loviisa power plant. The volt­
age relays were replaced with non­programmable 
types during the 2013 annual outage, because the 
programmable relays had not been approved for 
the task. The programmable technology was not 
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detected or suspected when the relays were be­
ing acquired. Due to the programmable technology, 
there was a theoretical chance of a more extensive 
common­cause failure of the relays. That is why 
a decision to replace them was made. Around 200 
relays were replaced. The relays were located in a 
safety class 2 switchgears. The relays were there 
to issue an alarm on undervoltage of the control 
circuit and, in the case of circulating water pumps, 
initiate switching to the backup pumps, which 
means that they had safety significance, but that 
their safety significance was not major in terms of 
overall safety.
Relay faults in emergency diesel 
generators at Loviisa power plant
Two of the emergency diesel generators of Loviisa 
2 did not operate as planned during testing in 
December 2013. The generators started operating 
normally during retesting, however. The underly­
ing cause of both of the events was a temporary 
malfunction of a relay (electromechanical switch). 
The relays in all diesel generators at the Loviisa 
power plant were replaced.
Both Loviisa plant units have four diesel gen­
erators that start when necessary to supply power 
to the plant’s safety systems. Operability of the 
diesel generators is verified by testing them every 
four weeks. The relay malfunction was such that 
it would have delayed the automatic emergency 
startup of the diesel generator and, if escalated, 
could have prevented automatic emergency start­
up of the diesel generator when needed. In addi­
tion to the diesel generators, the plant includes 
other electricity supply systems that can be used 
to maintain the safety functions if normal power 
supply is lost.
The event was rated as INES Level 1.
Problem with sample flow of an activity 
monitor during a planned release
Around 180 cubic metres of low­activity evaporator 
bottom waste water was released from the Loviisa 
power plant into the sea as planned between 19 
and 21 December 2013. When around two thirds of 
the planned volume had been released, it was ob­
served that the sample flow going to a monitor that 
was monitoring the radioactivity in the discharge 
line was too low. Thus, the monitor that was moni­
toring the activity of the releases failed to correctly 
measure the releases on 19 December 2013. The 
release remained clearly below the annual release 
limit based on samples taken from the letdown 
tanks, however.
A decision was made to limit the flow of the 
planned release to around half of the normal flow 
rate. The flow rate was decreased by throttling 
specific valves in the plant’s systems. This action 
excessively decreased the pressure of the letdown 
line, however, which decreased the sample flow to 
the activity monitor too much for the monitor to 
operate correctly. Operating requirements for the 
activity monitor are included in the plant’s opera­
tional limits and conditions (OLC). The OLC state 
that no radioactive materials may be released from 
the plant if the activity measuring in the discharge 
line is inoperable. When the problem was detected 
on 20 December 2013, the operation of the activity 
monitor was corrected by changing the throttling 
of a valve so that the desired discharge line pres­
sure could be reached to ensure proper sample flow 
to the activity monitor.
The monitor monitoring the radioactivity of the 
liquid release discharge line makes sure that no 
abnormal releases end up in the sea. The monitor 
will close the discharge line if the radioactivity 
level exceeds a specific level.
During the planned release, it was verified that 
radioactive materials cannot enter the discharge 
line from anywhere else than the tanks being 
drained. The activity monitor is not used to specify 
the releases. Instead, the releases of radioactive 
materials are always specified by taking samples 
from the discharge tank prior to releasing the 
material into the sea. During the planned release, 
around 1 GBq of evaporator bottom waste water 
was released. This amounts to around 0.1% of the 
annual discharge limit.
The event was classified at INES Level 0.
Olkiluoto nuclear power plant
Defects in maintenance of a reactor 
coolant pump in Olkiluoto 2
Reactor coolant pumps were maintained during the 
annual outage of Olkiluoto 2 on 30 May. An impel­
ler was accidentally replaced with a sealing plug of 
the wrong type in one of the reactor coolant pumps. 
The wrong plug type was detected when more wa­
ter than normally started to leak from the reac­
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tor pressure vessel into the reactor coolant leak­
age drain system. The reactor coolant purification 
system was being simultaneously maintained, and 
due to process connections made for maintenance 
purposes, radioactive coolant entered a room in the 
reactor building. When the fault was observed, the 
sealing plug was replaced with a plug of the correct 
type and the room was decontaminated.
The reactor coolant pumps at Olkiluoto 1 and 
2 are located at the bottom of the reactor pres­
sure vessel. Special attention must be paid to the 
maintenance of these pumps because a leak at the 
bottom of the reactor pressure vessel is always a 
major risk in plants of this type. In this case, the 
wrong plug type only slightly increased the risk of 
a bottom leak because the bottom was being sealed 
by the plug and a flange that was used instead of 
the pump’s motor. Furthermore, if there had been a 
bottom leak, the coolant that was drained from the 
reactor could have been replaced with water from 
the safety injection systems.
The power company identified several human 
errors as the underlying causes of this event. These 
human errors are linked to the plant’s work proce­
dures and communication. Because of this event, 
the power company will start storing sealing plugs 
of different types at different locations and make 
the necessary changes in the procedures.
The event caused no risk to the plant, people 
or the environment. On the International Nuclear 
Event Scale (INES), the event was rated as Level 0.
Non-compliance in management of work 
pertaining to reactor cooling at Olkiluoto 2
During the annual outage of Olkiluoto 2, TVO ob­
served that one of the heat exchangers used to cool 
spent nuclear fuel was dirty. Dirt will deteriorate 
the performance of a heat exchanger, which is why 
TVO decommissioned the heat exchanger for clean­
ing on 9 June 2013. TVO inadvertently started 
this maintenance action at the wrong time. Other 
annual outage works on the cooling system were 
being simultaneously carried out, and thus some of 
the requirements on operability of the systems and 
equipment in the operational limits and conditions 
(OLC) were no longer met.
The reactor pressure vessel cover is opened dur­
ing each annual outage in order to replace nuclear 
fuel and conduct other work inside the pressure 
vessel. The reactor pressure vessel is located at the 
bottom of the reactor refueling cavity, which means 
that the reactor pressure vessel and the refueling 
cavity will become a single space once the cover 
is open. The spent nuclear fuel in the reactor core 
still generates heat, which means that its cooling 
must also be ensured during an annual outage. The 
coolant in the reactor pressure vessel and the refu­
eling cavity as well as the systems and equipment 
cooling the coolant take care of this. The event took 
place towards the end of the annual outage. The 
work on the inside of the reactor core was already 
complete and TVO started to decrease the surface 
level in the reactor refueling cavity in order to re­
place the reactor pressure vessel cover. Only one of 
the cooling circuits required by the OLC was avail­
able for cooling the coolant because the other heat 
exchanger was being cleaned.
The event inadvertently violated the OLC be­
cause the OLC requirements in a case where the 
reactor pressure vessel cover is open and a heat 
exchanger has been disconnected to wash it had 
not been studied. TVO identified human errors 
as the underlying cause of the event. Due to this 
event, TVO will study the procedures used when 
washing heat exchangers. Furthermore, TVO will 
assess whether the OLC are sufficiently clear and 
whether some changes are necessary.
The event caused no risk to the plant, people 
or the environment. On the International Nuclear 
Event Scale (INES), the event was rated as Level 0.
Material faults detected during maintenance 
of emergency diesel generator at Olkiluoto 2
TVO is upgrading the diesel generators in 
Olkiluoto 1 and Olkiluoto 2. It was observed dur­
ing repairs in the autumn that the wound core of a 
rotor manufactured from flat bar copper had been 
extended with silver solder at some points. In a 
visual inspection, the subcontractor repairing the 
generator detected two major indications in one of 
the solder joints. Furthermore, small indications 
were detected in two solder joints.
TVO ordered a damage study which proved that 
there were already cracks in the solder joints when 
they were made in the 1970s. It was verified by 
means of electron microscopy that ageing phenom­
ena during operation (such as sparking or fatigue) 
had not occurred. Most of the cross­section of the 
joint with the major fault had not been joined. The 
windings that were cut in order to perform the 
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damage study will be repaired with a qualified sol­
dering method and the quality of the repairs will 
be verified by means of inspections.
In addition to the indications found in the sol­
der joints, two of the eight stator weld joints in the 
generator exciter were cracked. Because of this 
fault, the weld joints of all of the plant’s exciters 
were studied with an endoscope. Another similarly 
cracked joint was found.
Based on a special report submitted to STUK by 
the power company, a crack in one or two welds or 
a deformation of the stator shell does not influence 
the machine’s performance, which means that the 
machines are operable.
The detected material faults have not rendered 
the emergency diesel generators of the nuclear 
power plants inoperable. There are four diesel 
generators at both of Olkiluoto’s operating plants. 
Their operability is tested monthly.
Non-conformance with administrative 
procedures when working in a cross-
connection room in Olkiluoto 1
The fire extinguishing system in the cable rooms 
below the relay rooms will be replaced with a new 
system. Employees were preparing this upgrade at 
Olkiluoto 1, i.e. fixing housings, hauling tools and 
other goods, and installing cables. In connection 
with these preparations, the employees needed to 
enter a cross­connection room to install a cable. 
Working in a cross­connection room was not men­
tioned in the work order given for the preparation 
work. The employees were allowed to enter the 
control room’s cross­connectionroom alone without 
any supervising operating personnel. The event did 
not comply with a requirement included in the op­
erational limits and conditions (OLC) which states 
that the door of a cross­connection room must al­
ways be opened by permanent operating personnel.
The power company identified the underlying 
causes of the event as defective procedures, lack 
of communication and defective procedures on 
entering the cross­connection room. The fact that 
the work would extend to the cross­connection 
room was not observed in the planning or kickoff 
meetings for the work. Due to this event, the power 
company has determined corrective measures to 
prevent reoccurrence of the event and to develop 
operations.
The event caused no risk to the plant, people or 
the environment. The event was classified at INES 
Level 0.
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APPENDIX 4 Licences in accordance with 
the Nuclear Energy Act by STUK in 2013
Teollisuuden Voima Oy
•	 21/C42214/2012,	 8	 January	 2013,	 import	 from	
Sweden and possession of nuclear information 
with safeguards obligation that is required for 
OL1, OL2 and the spent fuel storage. Last date 
of validity 31 December 2030.
•	 1/C42214/2013,	22	February	2013,	import	of	cont­
rol rods from Sweden and the United States of 
America. Last date of validity 31 December 2023.
•	 7/C42214/2013,	10	July	2013,	import	of	radioa­
ctive waste generated when scrapping decom­
missioned turbines and heat exchangers from 
Sweden. Last date of validity 31 December 
2014.
•	 9/C42214/2013,	 29	 October	 2013,	 import	 of	
nuclear fuel with Euratom obligation code “S” 
from Sweden (OL2 E34). Last date of validity 31 
December 2014.
•	 10/C42214/2012,	 31	 October	 2013,	 import	 of	
nuclear fuel with Euratom obligation code “P” 
from Sweden (OL2 E34; part of a batch). Last 
date of validity 31 December 2014.
•	 11/C42214/2013,	 29	 October	 2013,	 import	 of	
nuclear fuel with Euratom obligation code “S” 
from Sweden (Optima3 test). Last date of vali­
dity 31 December 2014.
•	 12/C42214/2013,	 4	 November	 2013,	 import	 of	
nuclear fuel with Euratom obligation code “S” 
from Germany (OL1 E36). Last date of validity 
31 December 2014.
•	 13/C42214/2013,	 4	 November	 2013,	 import	 of	
nuclear fuel with Euratom obligation code “S” 
from Germany (Atrium 11 test). Last date of 
validity 31 December 2014.
•	 14/C42214/2013,	 17	 December	 2013,	 OL1/2	
– import of nuclear information concerning 
HGNE reactor coolant pumps and an amend­
ment	 of	 licence	 19/C42214/2012	 on	 holding	
data. Last date of validity 31 December 2020.
•	 1/G42214/2013,	 22	 February	 2013,	 OL3	 –	 im­
port of a control rod drive mechanism and two 
rod guide tubes from France. Last date of validi­
ty 31 December 2015.
•	 4/G42214/2013,	25	September	2013,	OL3	–	ex­
tending the validity period of import licences 
5/G42214/2010	and	5/G42214/2011	so	 that	 the	
last date of validity will be 31 December 2016.
•	 13/M42214/2012,	8	January	2013,	OL4	–	import	
and possession of nuclear information concer­
ning an APR 1400 plant from South Korea. Last 
date of validity 31 December 2030.
•	 4/M42214/2014,	8	January	2013,	OL4	–transfer	
of nuclear information concerning an APR 1400 
plant to Fortum Power and Heat Oy. Last date 
of validity 31 December 2030.
•	 10/M42214/2013,	 7	 May	 2013,	 OL4	 –transfer	
of nuclear information concerning APWR, EU­
ABWR and APR­1400 plants to Descal Enginee­
ring Oy. Last date of validity 31 December 2030.
•	 13/M42214/2013,	26	August	2013,	OL4	–trans­
fer of of nuclear information concerning an 
ABWR plant to the Finnish subsidiary of To­
shiba International (Europe) Ltd. Last date of 
validity 31 December 2030.
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Fortum Power and Heat Oy
•	 1/A42214/2013,	31	January	2013,	OL4	–posses­
sion and transfer of nuclear information concer­
ning an APR­1400 plant to Teollisuuden Voima 
Oy . Last date of validity 31 December 2030.
•	 19/A43774/2012,	5	February	2013,	an	operating	
licence for the sorting and intermediate storage 
of low­level operational waste in operational 
waste room no. 3. Last date of validity 31 De­
cember 2055.
•	 7/A42214/2013,	7	May	2013,	import	of	neutron	
flux sensors from Russia. Last date of validity 
31 December 2013.
•	 8/A42214/2013,	 27	 June	 2013,	 import	 of	 wide	
range neutron flux sensors from France. Last 
date of validity 31 December 2017.
•	 9/A42214/2013,	 5	 September	 2013,	 import	 of	
neutron flux sensors from Russia. An amend­
ment	 of	 licence	 7/A42214/2013,	 7	 May	 2013.	
Last date of validity 31 December 2013.
Fennovoima Oy
•	 3/J42214/2013,	 22	 August	 2013,	 import	 and	
possession of nuclear information from Russia. 
Last date of validity 31 December 2023.
•	 4/J42214/2013,	 17	 December	 2013,	 transfer	 of	
nuclear information. Last date of validity 31 
December 2023.
Others
•	 2/Y42214/2011,	15	April	2013,	Celer	Oy;	import,	
possession and transfer of nuclear information 
concerning design of sampling autoclaves; an 
amendment	 of	 licence	 2/Y42214/2011,	 24	May	
2011. Last date of validity 31 December 2021.
•	 7/Y42214/2013,	8	May	2013,	Descal	Engineering	
Oy; OL4 –possession and transfer of nuclear in­
formation concerning APWR, EU­ABWR and 
APR­1400 plants to TVO. Last date of validity 
31 December 2030.
•	 10/Y42214/2013,	 16	September	2013,	Elomatic	
Oy, possession and transfer of nuclear informa­
tion on design of sampling autoclaves. Last date 
of validity 31 December 2023.
•	 11/Y42214/2013,	 16	 September	 2013,	 Platom	
Oy, transfer of nuclear information on design 
of sampling autoclaves. Last date of validity 31 
December 2021.
•	 12/Y42214/2013,	 23	 October	 2013,	 Ab	 Solving	
Oy, possession of nuclear information on design 
of sampling autoclaves. Last date of validity 31 
December 2021.
STUK-B 176
147
APPENDIX 5 Periodic inspection 
programme of NPPs in 2013
Inspections included in the periodic inspection programme focus on safety 
management, operational main processes and procedures, as well as the tech-
nical acceptability of systems. The inspections verify that safety assessments, 
operation, maintenance and protection activities (radiation protection, fire 
protection and security) of the facility comply with the requirements of nuclear 
safety regulations.
Periodic inspection 
programme 2013, Loviisa
Management, management 
system and personnel
A1 Management and safety 
culture, 23–24 January 2014
The inspection of Loviisa nuclear power plant’s 
management and safety culture focused particu­
larly on liability of the management on manage­
ment system assessments and improvements, the 
process­based management system, and the man­
ner in which the management processes projects 
and non­conformances. Nine people were inter­
viewed during the inspection. An independent as­
sessment of the coverage and functionality of the 
management	 system	 as	 laid	 down	 in	Guide	YVL	
1.4 has been implemented at the Loviisa power 
plant. Recommendations included in the assess­
ment report were reviewed by the management of 
the power plant. Development of the process­based 
management system is still in progress, and the 
management of the power plant is currently reas­
sessing the power plant’s key processes. Based on 
the inspection, an investment and project portfolio 
management team established by the power plant 
has worked in line with the power plant procedures 
and its working methods have been functional. The 
power plant management is of the opinion that the 
current non­conformance management system is 
functional. Development needs mentioned in the 
interviews included the need to improve the man­
ner in which corrective measures are specified to 
ensure proper allocation of measures and resourc­
es. STUK required that the management of the 
Loviisa power plant must improve the monitoring 
of development measures and the assessment of 
their impact. Furthermore, the power plant must 
implement a classification procedure for measures 
in compliance with the plant procedures.
A2 Personnel resources and 
competence, 13–14 May 2013
The inspection of personnel resources and com­
petence focuses on planning and allocation of the 
power company’s personnel resources, mainte­
nance and development of the personnel’s com­
petence, and supervisory work. The inspection in 
2013 focused particularly on the functionality of 
procedures pertaining to the development of com­
petence. Functionality of the procedures was veri­
fied by interviewing personnel of the maintenance 
unit. Furthermore, the training team organisation, 
its goals, its indicators, its resources and its non­
conformance management system were studied. 
The Loviisa competence development procedures 
include general procedures complying with the 
YVL	Guides.	Based	on	the	 interviews	 included	in	
the inspection it seems, however, that there are dif­
ferences in how the procedures are applied. STUK 
required that the training team of the Loviisa 
power plant study the competence management 
methods and tools used at the power plant and 
use the results of the study to develop the power 
plant’s procedures and methods as well as their 
application. Furthermore, the power plant must 
verify that all persons working in positions impor­
tant to safety complete their refresher training in 
compliance with the power plant’s requirements. 
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The Loviisa power plant must also supplement its 
personnel planning methods to ensure that it can 
manage	both	resources	needed	in	development/pro­
jects and resources needed in regular work. Based 
on the incpection non­conformances observed in 
internal audits are properly processed by the train­
ing team.
A3 Functionality of management system 
and quality management, 16–17 April 2013
The status of the requirements made in the previ­
ous inspection was verified and the management 
of non­conformances was discussed in the inspec­
tion of the functionality of the management sys­
tem and quality assurance. STUK interviewed 
four supplier­auditors of the Loviisa power plant 
to verify their auditing competence and the quali­
fication procedure. Furthermore, action plans and 
resources of the quality management team were 
studied. Three of the five requirements made in 
the previous audits were deemed complete. These 
requirements concerned procurements, supplier 
audits and the management of non­conformances. 
Two of the requirements were further specified: 
the Loviisa power plant must verify that all proce­
dures important to safety are up to date, and the 
power plant must submit to STUK for information 
updated plans of the maintenance and operating 
units, results of the measures included in the plans 
and information on any measures that were not 
updated as planned. Furthermore, the power plant 
must submit to STUK a plan of action including 
measures that will be applied to improve the qual­
ity of documents to be submitted to STUK. STUK 
noted that the resources of the quality manage­
ment team are meagre when taking into account 
the team’s workload.
Plant safety and its improvement
B1 Assessing and improving safety, 26 
November and 3 December 2013
The inspection on assessing and improving safety 
mainly focused on modification processes at the 
Loviisa power plant and measures implemented 
to develop the modification process, particularly 
identifying areas requiring safety significant modi­
fications and their progress in the modification 
process. Furthermore, STUK assessed the periodic 
safety review functions at the Loviisa power plant. 
STUK noted that the actions and methods used 
at the Loviisa power plant are sufficient to verify 
that all modification needs significant to safety 
are identified. STUK observed in the inspection 
that the power plant is planning a large number of 
modifications in the next few years compared to its 
available resources. The power plant aims at im­
proving its modification processes by making more 
comprehensive modification plans before starting 
any installation work at the plant. To collect the 
data needed to develop the modification process, 
STUK required that separate indicators for the 
process must be drafted. Fortum must submit the 
periodic safety review of the Loviisa power plant 
to STUK by the end of the year 2015. According to 
STUK’s inspection results, drafting of the review 
and compilation of the necessary documentation 
seem to have gotten off to a good start.
B2 Plant safety functions, 6–7 June 2013
The inspection of plant safety functions focused 
on the management of reactivity. Here, the term 
‘management of reactivity’ refers to procedures 
and systems used to verify that the reactor is shut 
down and the reactor and the fuel pools remain 
subcritical. STUK noted based on the inspection 
results that the procedures applied to management 
of reactivity at the Loviisa power plant and in the 
technical support unit of the Loviisa power plant 
are appropriate and the organisation’s resources, 
competence and orientation procedures are suf­
ficient. Communication between the Loviisa power 
plant and the technical support unit, located at 
Keilaniemi in Espoo, is functional but there is still 
some room for improvement in meeting practices 
and other issues. Defects observed in the updat­
ing of procedures are already being monitored by 
Fortum itself. The processing of non­conformances 
and procedures used to verify learning from oper­
ating experience were proper in all inspected areas.
B2 Plant safety functions, 30 October 2013
The inspection of plant safety functions focused on 
procurement and the monitoring of nuclear fuel. 
STUK inspected the power company’s nuclear fuel 
procurement and monitoring processes, as well as 
the procedures and resources. STUK stated that 
Fortum’s fuel procurement and monitoring prac­
tices are functional and comply with the require­
ments. Operations are systematic and are based 
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on appropriate procedures, and the responsibilities 
have been clearly defined. Behaviour of the fuel 
is systematically monitored at the Loviisa pow­
er plant. The monitoring operations also provide 
excellent operating experience data. Operating 
experience feedback from other countries is com­
prehensively utilised in the operations as well. 
Problems with the system used to inspect fuel have 
delayed studies. STUK observed in its inspection 
the following issues that require further atten­
tion: resources in fuel delivery control, monitoring 
the operations of third­party inspectors at the fuel 
manufacturing plants and the more visible role of 
the management in the procurement of fuel.
B3 PRA and management of safety
A inspection on using the probabilistic risk analy­
sis (PRA) in the management of safety focused on, 
for example, the current status of PRA updates, 
procedures, training, PRA modelling principles in 
issues concerning residual heat removal, process­
ing of non­conformances linked to PRA and com­
munications. Fortum has developed the planning 
process of its annual outages by taking into ac­
count the risk­informed data provided by the PRA 
in more detail. STUK stated after the inspection 
that more communication and training about an­
nual outage risks observed in the PRA must be 
provided to ensure that the employees participat­
ing in the annual outages are better aware of the 
key risks and how they can mitigate the risks.
B4 Operating experience feedback, 
21 October and 5 November 2013
In its inspection of the operating experience feed­
back, STUK assessed the power plant’s operating 
experience feedback processes, their organisation, 
related procedures and related methods. The in­
spection included verification, with the help of ex­
ample cases, how observations and non­conform­
ances detected in audits and operating experience 
from other plants are processed at the Loviisa pow­
er plant. The Loviisa power plant still has room 
for improvement when it comes to implementing 
corrective measures determined based on operat­
ing experience and monitoring the success of these 
measures. Furthermore, the power plant must sub­
mit an assessment of the implementation and im­
pact of these measures to STUK in connection with 
its annual report.
Operational safety
C1 Operational activities, 
26–27 February 2013
The inspection of operational activities focused on 
the operating unit’s responsibilities and duties dur­
ing modifications. This is a topical issue because of 
events that took place in 2012, the I&C system 
upgrade and a periodic safety review that will take 
place in 2015. Various organisations and organisa­
tional units participate in implementing modifica­
tions, and challenges involved management and 
communications. In the inspection, methods used 
in operational activities were studied by verifying 
the power plant’s procedures, interviewing power 
plant personnel, verifying modification documenta­
tion and conducting an inspection round onsite. No 
significant new development needs were observed 
in the inspection. The power plant has submitted 
reports on non­conformances pertaining to modifi­
cations in connection with its event reports. Based 
on the inspection STUK required changes of the 
coverage of procedures used during the commis­
sioning stage of modifications and completion of a 
modification started during the 2012 annual out­
age (disassembling decommissioned equipment, 
onsite markings).
C2 Plant maintenance, 27–28 November 2013
STUK assesses the condition monitoring of plant 
components important to safety which the licen­
see performs during operation, shutdowns and 
startups of the plants. Condition monitoring may 
be continuous or be based on periodical measure­
ments or observations. The purpose of the inspec­
tion was to verify that the scope and implementa­
tion method of the condition monitoring of different 
plant components is sufficient when taking into 
account their impact on safety. Other inspected 
issues included the detection of leaks, vibration 
monitoring, monitoring of loose objects and load 
monitoring of Loviisa 1. Long­term monitoring of 
the inservice testing of safety systems has a key 
role in the condition monitoring of components. 
After the inspection, STUK required that Fortum 
study the opportunities to develop the long­term 
condition monitoring of safety systems and equip­
ment. Furthermore, Fortum must study the oppor­
tunity to determine a total heat transfer coefficient 
for heat exchangers in connection with the inser­
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vice testing of the residual heat removal chain to 
monitor performance of the heat exchangers and 
receive advance information about changes in their 
performance.
C3 Electrical and I&C systems, 
12–13 November 2013
The electrical engineering part of STUK’s inspec­
tion focused on the procedures used when process­
ing non­conformances, the monitoring of the age­
ing of electrical equipment, the quality control of 
spare parts, relay protection and the maintenance 
of emergency diesel generators. In the I&C part of 
the inspection, STUK assessed the development of 
the I&C design and implementation process, the 
structure of technical instructions on the installa­
tion process, the management of ageing and quali­
fication, inservice testing instructions, construction 
inspection requirements for I&C equipment, the 
condition of installations, the installation imple­
mentation method used in specific parts of the 
containment and the management of non­conform­
ances. Based on the electrical engineering inspec­
tion, STUK required a report on the processing 
method of non­conformances and improvements 
in the condition monitoring of diesel generators. 
Furthermore, STUK required that the power com­
pany issue a report on the thermal relays and fuses 
used to protect electrical motors. Based on the I&C 
inspection, the power company must update the 
electricity and I&C installation planning proce­
dure, study the construction planning methods of 
load­bearing I&C equipment and supplement the 
operational limits and conditions in terms of the 
inservice inspections of the preventive protection 
system.
C4 Mechanical engineering, 1 November 2013
In the mechanical engineering inspection, STUK 
assessed the operation and maintenance of safety­
classified hoisting device units and particularly 
how the power plant has verified the safety of 
hoisting accessories. A particular focus area in the 
inspection of the organisation was the processing 
of non­conformances. STUK observed that there 
is need to update the hoisting device and hoisting 
accessory classification, the currently valid design 
documentation and maintenance programmes, 
and submit clarifying summaries to STUK. STUK 
also required from the power company reports on 
strength calculations and the adequacy of visual 
inspections.
C5 Structures and buildings, 24–25 April 2013
In the inspection of structures and buildings at the 
Loviisa power plant, the maintenance procedures 
of structures, buildings as well as seawater chan­
nels and tunnels were assessed. In addition, the 
results of inspections carried out by the power com­
pany and the modifications made were discussed. 
The scope of the inspection included the organisa­
tion of the power company, inspection procedures 
issued by the power company, inservice inspections 
by the power company, repairs and modifications, 
supplementary construction works onsite and 
other inspections within the area of responsibil­
ity. Four requirements were presented during the 
inspection on quality management, performance 
of structural engineering inspections, measures 
taken based on the inspection results and main­
tenance of procedures pertaining to the area of 
responsibility.
C6 Information security, 4–5 November 2013
STUK’s inspection of information security and data 
management involved the technical and admin­
istrative information security at the Loviisa pow­
er plant. During the inspection, STUK assessed 
responsibilities and duties of the information se­
curity organisation as well as their cooperation 
with other units. Other issues included risk as­
sessments, processing design basis threats (DBT) 
at the Loviisa power plant and taking into account 
information security in supplier assessments.
C7 Chemistry, 13–14 May 2013
Key areas in the inspection of chemistry included 
implemented organisational changes, quality man­
agement at the chemical laboratory, functionality 
of the maintenance process for continuously oper­
ating analyzers and the processing of non­conform­
ances. The chemical laboratory has introduced a 
new procedure that specifies not only the qualifi­
cations required from the personnel but also how 
these qualifications must be verified. In the inspec­
tion, STUK noted that training of the personnel 
of the Loviisa power plant chemical laboratory is 
being systematically managed. This is important, 
because the organisation has lost some key compe­
tence in the past few years. The laboratory’s quality 
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management was assessed in terms of the valida­
tion of chemical measurements. The operations are 
systematic, reports are comprehensive and based 
on results from intercalibration projects and the 
results are highly reliable. In terms of the liability 
for the maintenance of the continuously operating 
chemical analyzers, STUK required that it be clari­
fied and standardised in the various procedures. 
The laboratory handles the daily monitoring and 
management of chemistry well, but STUK found 
some room for improvement in the preparation of 
the system lay­ups systems during future longer 
annual outages. In terms of the processing of non­
conformances, STUK noted that the laboratory had 
not exceeded any of the required deadlines and all 
corrective measures had been performed.
C8 Annual outage, 18 August 
– 23 September 2013
STUK completed an inspection during the annual 
outage of Loviisa 1 and Loviisa 2. In this inspection, 
STUK studied more than twenty sectors and jobs. 
The inspection objects included shoe boundaries 
and markings pertaining to radiation protection, 
heavy lifting in the reactor building, the handling 
of nuclear fuel, three separate modifications, four 
separate jobs on mechanical equipment, physical 
protection and the management of non­conform­
ances. During this inspection, STUK monitored the 
work done at the plant, conducted onsite inspection 
rounds and interviewed employees. Based on the 
inspection, STUK gave eight requirements involv­
ing the development of operations and documenta­
tion. These requirements related to heavy lifting 
in the reactor building, I&C procedures and work 
on mechanical equipment. Nothing out of the ordi­
nary was observed at most of the inspection sites. 
Furthermore, STUK observed some excellent op­
erating practices and signs of continuous improve­
ment of the operations of the plant.
Personal and plant protection
D1 Radiation protection, 23–24 October 2013
The radiation protection inspection covered the nu­
clear power plant’s radiation protection, radiation 
measurements, emissions monitoring and environ­
mental monitoring. A special focus area in 2013 
was operative radiation protection. In this inspec­
tion, STUK assessed radiation protection proce­
dures, the role of radiation protection in the work 
permit processing procedure, communications and 
the processing of non­conformances in the organi­
sation. STUK found some room for improvement in 
keeping some procedures up to date and keeping 
the procedures used in case of exceptional situa­
tions clear. Furthermore, STUK required that more 
detailed descriptions of the processes that have 
been found functional – such as radiation protec­
tion training and the reducing of radiation doses 
– be added to the plant’s procedures. In addition, 
the power company must study applicability of the 
method used when determining neutron doses to 
the transfer of spent nuclear fuel.
D2 Fire protection, 20–21 March 2013
The fire protection inspection included assessing 
the effectiveness of the Loviisa power plant’s fire 
protection arrangements and the operations of the 
power plant, as well as inspecting the implemen­
tation of plans on modifying the fire protection 
arrangements. Focus areas of the inspection in­
cluded non­conformances, the processing of non­
conformances and the implementation of modifica­
tions. The inspection focused on the processing of 
non­conformances in particular, i.e. how the power 
plant had processed requirements and observa­
tions made during inspections by STUK, the power 
company and other organisations, and what kind 
of corrective measures had been implemented. The 
inspection also included studying changes made 
in the protection unit organisation and deputy ar­
rangements as well as a review of fire extinguish­
ing and fire detection system inspections and the 
processing of non­conformances observed in these 
inspections. STUK required after the inspection 
that the maintenance instructions be updated, 
non­conformances observed in the saving of testing 
records be corrected, a fire water system condition 
evaluation by an inspection organisation be im­
plemented as part of the intermediate assessment 
of the operating license, and a form used to man­
age service lives be supplemented with informa­
tion pertaining to systems included in the scope of 
system liability, such as the fire detection system. 
The power plant had not updated the maintenance 
procedures or corrected the non­conformances in 
the saving of maintenance records, as required 
by STUK in the previous inspection, which is a 
deficiency in the processing of non­conformances. 
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A positive observation made during the inspec­
tion concerned modifications the power company 
plans to implement to improve fire safety (such as 
replacing the generator transformers, upgrading 
the fire detection system and upgrading the fire 
extinguishing system in the reactor coolant pump 
room).
D3 Emergency preparedness, 
5 November 2013
The STUK inspection on emergency preparedness 
covered the nuclear power plant’s emergency pre­
paredness arrangements, procedures and training. 
Experiences on emergency preparedness from the 
past six years, as well as experience and feed­
back from emergency preparedness drills, were in­
spected. All the equipment and tools pertaining to 
emergency preparedness, such as the automatic 
environmental radiation measuring system, mete­
orological measurements, communications devices 
and emergency preparedness facilities, were in­
spected. Special attention was paid to personnel 
planning and quality management. STUK required 
that the power company draft a report on repairs 
and modifications that have been implemented on 
the renewed data transfer system that will pro­
cess the plant’s process measuring data during an 
emergency. Furthermore, the power company must 
create systematic practices to monitor the imple­
mentation of emergency response training plans 
and verify that the people included in the emer­
gency preparedness organisation regularly par­
ticipate in drills. STUK noted that the emergency 
preparedness arrangements of the Loviisa power 
plant are in order and the organisation has re­
ceived the required training in compliance with the 
emergency response plan. The Loviisa power plant 
emergency response plan and the related proce­
dures are up to date. The power plant quickly re­
acts to any observed non­conformances and usually 
speedily launches corrective measures. The duties 
of some of the people included in the organisation 
should be developed to ensure that the power plant 
complies with the requirements of the amended 
nuclear safety regulations.
D4 Physical protection, 28 May 2013
In the inspection of physical protection, STUK as­
sessed Fortum’s physical protection arrangements 
in different physical protection zones of the Loviisa 
power plant. The inspection focused mainly on 
the resources needed to maintain and plan the 
physical protection, training and drills, previous 
inspections, development measures and their cur­
rent status, a new alarm centre and status with 
an upgrade of the surveillance system. STUK also 
studied the management of non­conformances. 
STUK noted during the inspection that more re­
sources have been added to the physical protec­
tion organisation and the training programme for 
Fortum’s protection organisation has been imple­
mented as planned. STUK also noted that expe­
riences gained from drills should be consistently 
studied to make sure that lessons are learned from 
them. The transfer of the alarm centre to the new 
safety surveillance system (TUVA) will take place 
in stages. STUK conducted a separate inspection of 
the upgrade in June. A modification of the plant’s 
fence was deemed to comply with the plans in the 
inspection. The power plant borders in terms of 
authority and the practices used to submit safety 
classified information were also discussed during 
the inspection.
Nuclear waste and its storage
E1 Operating waste, 11–12 June 2013
STUK regulates and inspects the processing and fi­
nal disposal of radioactive operational waste at the 
Loviisa power plant. Low­ and intermediate­level 
operational waste is generated during mainte­
nance and repairs as well as during the treatment 
of circulating water. An inspection of operating 
waste focused on remarks made during the last in­
spection, development since the last inspection and 
any important issues that have occurred. Issues 
studied during the inspection included the process­
ing of non­conformances, procedures for exemption 
from radiation control and personnel issues. The 
condition of facilities in which waste is processed 
and stored, radiation levels in these facilities, their 
classification and their markings were studied dur­
ing the site visit. No significant non­conformances 
or development needs were detected in the inspec­
tion. STUK posed a demand relating to the waste 
accounting of dry silos in the reactor buildings and 
at the spent nuclear fuel storage facility of the 
Loviisa power plant. The licensee must pay more 
attention to the documentation of waste during 
waste accounting, in order to verify that the mate­
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rial accounts always include a note of the related 
component as well.
E2 Repository for operating 
waste, 30 –31 October 2013
STUK inspected the final disposal of radioactive 
operating waste at the Loviisa power plant by as­
sessing procedures relating to the repository, the 
maintenance of the repository and the repository’s 
organisation. Other issues studied included imple­
mented repairs and modifications and results of 
inspections by the power company, such as ground­
water chemistry measuring results for the reposi­
tory cave, as well as hydrological and rock mechan­
ics monitoring measurements. No non­conformanc­
es were detected in the inspection. STUK found 
some room for improvement in the content of the 
reports on the repository cave’s monitoring meas­
urements, however.
Special issues
F1 LARA, 6 November 2013
The  inspection of the Loviisa power plant I&C up­
grade (the LARA project) included review of  issues 
that were not resolved in previous inspections. 
Inspected issues included configuration manage­
ment procedures, methods and responsibilities for 
the management of non­conformances, competence 
and operations of the auditing team and instal­
lation control procedures. STUK stated after the 
inspection that the procedures used in the manage­
ment of non­conformances and the operations of 
the auditing team comply with the requirements. 
STUK will continue monitoring compliance with 
the configuration management requirements, since 
the configuration management is still being devel­
oped as a subproject of the Loviisa power plant’s 
periodic safety review.
F2 Compliance with procedures 
influencing startup chemistry in 
Loviisa 1, 1–2 September 2013
In an inspection carried out by STUK without ad­
vance notification, STUK assessed the power com­
pany’s procedures applied to the maintenance and 
supervision of the chemical conditions in systems 
important to safety. The inspection particularly 
focused on practical procedures used to verify in­
tegrity of the reactor coolant system by minimis­
ing the generation, migration and deposition of 
corrosive substances on the surfaces of pipes in 
the steam generators. When the Loviisa power 
plants are started after an annual outage, special 
attention must be paid to the purity of the water 
circulating in the systems, because any impuri­
ties left on the surfaces after maintenance will 
dissolve in the water. In the past few years, the 
operational limits and conditions (OLC) for chem­
istry have been exceeded during the startup of the 
plant units because of inadequate water flow. If 
there are too many impurities in the water, a defect 
in the heat transfer tubes of the steam generators 
is much more likely. The chemical laboratory is 
in charge of measuring these impurities and an­
nouncing the results to the control room operators, 
so that the operators can take the necessary action 
to decrease the level of impurities. The inspection 
started when the plant was being started up, and 
its primary goal was to monitor purity of the water 
in the steam generators. Based on several results 
of the water circulation chemistry analysed by the 
power plant, the operational limits and conditions 
were met. Replacement of the water in the steam 
generators also complied with the plans. The con­
trol room operators implemented a new procedure 
when starting up the plant: the new procedure 
better takes into account the purity of the water 
circulating in the circuits. Due to technical reasons 
pertaining to the process, the water could not be re­
placed fast enough at a latter stage of the startup 
process, which caused the level of impurities to in­
crease. The problem was corrected based on meas­
uring data submitted by the chemical laboratory to 
the control room, however.
Periodic inspection 
programme 2013, Olkiluoto
Management, management 
system and personnel
A1 Management and safety 
culture, 21–22 August 2013
The inspection of the management and safety cul­
ture focused on assessing functionality and cover­
age of the management system, current status and 
development of the management system processes, 
and non­conformances observed in management re­
views and their monitoring. Individual employees 
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were interviewed prior to the inspection. According 
to TVO, the management systems of the operat­
ing Olkiluoto plant units and Olkiluoto 3 will be 
gradually merged, and the combined plant will op­
erate under the same principle as the currently op­
erating plants. This statement and the related risk 
assessment could not be verified during the inspec­
tion, however. TVO must make sure that its risk 
assessments will take into account the changes in 
the organisational structure and operating proce­
dures that will take place when preparing for the 
commissioning of Olkiluoto 3. Furthermore, STUK 
required that the processing and documentation 
of management reviews must be verifiable in the 
next inspection of the TVO management system 
by STUK. The power plant’s operative team has 
studied a report on an assessment of the function­
ality and coverage of the management system and 
named people in charge of all the recommended 
measures. The operating processes have been pre­
sented as graphs in a standardised manner based 
on the operating handbook, but they have not been 
presented to the process owners yet.
A1 Management (physical protection), 
26–27 November 2013
STUK conducted an extra inspection at the 
Olkiluoto plants, titled ‘Physical protection as part 
of the management system’. STUK assessed how 
the processes related to physical protection are 
described in the ERP system, how physical protec­
tion is taken into account in the risk management 
process, and how the management can verify the 
functionality of physical protection. Furthermore, 
discussions on how physical protection has been 
taken into account when assessing and developing 
the organisation’s (safety) culture were conducted. 
Nuclear safety must be a balanced entity where 
the importance of each sector (safety, physical pro­
tection, nuclear non­proliferation control) under 
different circumstances is studied to achieve the 
best overall level of safety. STUK required after 
the inspection that the descriptions included in 
the ERP system must be updated to comply with 
the activities in practice. TVO had updated the in­
formation security requirements for procurement. 
STUK considers the implementation of these re­
quirements successful and important, and asked 
that the requirements be submitted to STUK for 
information purposes.
A2 Personnel resources and 
competence, 25–26 September 2013
The inspection on personnel resources and compe­
tence focused on the implementation and assess­
ment of TVO’s trainee programme, a resource man­
agement development project, as well as duties, 
resources and development of the personnel devel­
opment unit. Individual interviews of participants 
in the trainee programme were conducted prior to 
the inspection. Two of the latest HR auditing re­
ports and minutes of office meetings from 2012 and 
2013 were verified. TVO has launched a resource 
management development project (REHA). STUK 
will monitor the development of procedures and 
methods pertaining to HR planning and the alloca­
tion of resources in connection with this project. 
TVO must submit the REHA project plan and a 
project status report to STUK by March 2014. The 
fact that the personnel development unit failed 
to complete a self­assessment has been noted as 
a minor non­conformance in two consecutive au­
dits. TVO stated that an agreement on completing 
the self­assessment in 2013 has been made. STUK 
required that TVO submit to STUK a report on 
the self­assessment implementation method and 
conclusions.
A3 Functionality of the management system 
and quality management, 7–8 November 2013
The inspection of the functionality of the manage­
ment system focused on a modification develop­
ment project, TVO’s assessments and development 
of supplier approval, duties, responsibilities and 
resources of the quality and environmental unit, 
an external quality management system assess­
ment and the processing of non­conformances. The 
inspection included a verification of the supplier 
assessment process based on information obtained 
from TVO’s data systems. TVO develops its sup­
plier assessment and approval practices, but has 
failed to determine requirements on the compe­
tence of people performing supplier audits and the 
maintenance of their competence as required by 
STUK. TVO has not created procedures and docu­
mentation on the basis on which the competence of 
auditors is verified.
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Plant safety and its improvement
B1 Assessment and improvement 
of safety, 6–7 November 2013
The inspection on assessing and improving safety 
mainly focused on TVO’s modification process and 
measures implemented to develop the modifica­
tion process, such as identifying areas requiring 
modifications to improve safety and monitoring 
the progress of such modifications. Furthermore, 
STUK inspected TVO’s operations pertaining to 
the renewing of the operating license for Olkiluoto 
1 and Olkiluoto 2. Based on the inspection results, 
TVO’s operations and procedures to identify areas 
requiring modifications to improve safety are suf­
ficient. TVO has clarified its modification process 
so that they guide people more clearly. TVO’s goal 
is to start testing the new process after the 2014 
annual outages. STUK will actively monitor the 
progress of the process and required that TVO sub­
mit a status report to STUK prior to the 2014 an­
nual outages. The operating license for Olkiluoto 1 
and Olkiluoto 2 is valid until the end of 2018. TVO 
has drafted a plan for creating the documentation 
needed when renewing the operating license and 
named people in charge of the documentation.
B2 Plant safety functions, 10–11 October 2013
The inspection of plant safety functions focused 
on the management of reactivity. Here, the term 
‘management of reactivity’ refers to procedures 
and systems used to verify that the reactor is shut 
down and the reactor and the fuel pools remain 
subcritical. STUK noted that TVO’s procedures for 
the management of reactivity are adequate. The or­
ganisation’s resources, competence and orientation 
are also sufficient. STUK noted that TVO is moni­
toring the delays in the updating of procedures 
itself. TVO’s non­conformance monitoring system 
is functional, and all issues pertaining to the pro­
cessing of non­conformances and learning from op­
erating experience are fine. According to STUK’s 
assessment, criticality safety and related compe­
tence have been well taken into account at the 
plant and are continuously developed. Procedures 
are supplied to the employees doing related work 
onsite, and they have been provided the necessary 
training. Of the training offered to external par­
ties, the training of loading supervisors has clearly 
been developed. Based on the inspection, TVO is 
properly managing all systems linked to the man­
agement of reactivity and their operability is being 
monitored and developed both in the short term 
and long term.
B3 PRA in management of 
safety, 10 September 2013
STUK inspected TVO’s use of probabilistic risk 
analyses (PRA) in the management of safety by 
assessing the status of PRA updates and the most 
important reactor coolant system leak events in 
terms of the PRA during the annual outage. STUK 
also assessed communications and the manner in 
which non­conformances from the PRA are pro­
cessed. The PRA updating schedule proposed by 
TVO has been revised, but all of the PRA sections 
will be updated prior to the renewal of the operat­
ing license for Olkiluoto 1 and Olkiluoto 2. After 
the inspection, STUK stated that TVO uses PRA 
as a versatile tool to support the management of 
safety and no non­conformances were observed in 
the inspection.
B4 Operating experience feedback, 
11–12 November 2013
In its inspection of the operating experience feed­
back, STUK assessed the power plant’s operating 
experience feedback processes, their organisation, 
related procedures and related methods. The in­
spection included studying, with the help of ex­
ample cases, how observations and non­conform­
ances detected in audits and operating experience 
from other plants are processed at the Olkiluoto 
power plant. STUK noted that TVO’s operating 
experience feedback process is well­organised, and 
the procedures and resources are sufficient, even 
though the person in charge of many of the duties 
has been replaced. TVO is developing procedures 
to ensure that operating experience feedback from 
the construction and commissioning of Olkiluoto 3 
can also be utilised.
Operational safety
C1 Operational activities, 21–22 March 2013
The inspection of operational activities focused 
on the operating unit’s responsibilities and duties 
during modifications. Various organisations and 
organisational units participate in implementing 
modifications, and challenges involve management 
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and communications. In the inspection, methods 
used in operational activities were studied by veri­
fying the power plant’s procedures, interviewing 
power plant personnel, verifying modification doc­
umentation and conducting an inspection round 
onsite. No significant new development needs were 
observed in the inspection. Similar issues and de­
velopment areas as in the licensee’s own internal 
reviews were voiced during the interviews. There 
is room for improvement in, for example, testing, 
scheduling (schedules are often too tight) and co­
operation between different technological sectors. 
Based on the inspection, STUK required that the 
power company update its modification procedures 
and assess whether the device position and room 
markings of the repository cave for low and inter­
mediate­level waste comply with the procedures.
C2 Plant maintenance, 20–21 November 2013
STUK inspected maintenance of the plant by as­
sessing the condition monitoring of plant compo­
nents important to safety which the licensee per­
forms during operation, shutdowns and startups 
of the plants. Condition monitoring may be con­
tinuous or be based on periodical measurements 
or observations. The purpose of the inspection was 
to verify that the scope and implementation meth­
od of the condition monitoring of different plant 
components is sufficient when taking into account 
their impact on safety. The inspection focused on 
TVO’s condition monitoring methods and the key 
role of the persons responsible for equipment in 
monitoring the operability of the equipment. TVO’s 
condition monitoring during operations is exten­
sive, and units from both the operational organisa­
tion and the maintenance organisation participate 
in the condition monitoring processes. Based on 
the inspection, STUK required that TVO submit 
to STUK a summary of all the methods (sensory 
observations,	 continuous/periodic	 measurements,	
etc.) that it uses to monitor the operability of safe­
ty­classified systems, structures and equipment as 
well as the operating environment during opera­
tion of the plant.
C3 Electrical and I&C systems, 
13–14 March 2013
The electrical engineering inspection focused on 
relay protection, monitoring the ageing of electri­
cal equipment, processing of non­conformances, 
spare part maintenance, utilisation of operating 
experience feedback and condition monitoring of 
condensers. No significant non­conformances were 
detected in the inspection. STUK required that 
TVO submit to STUK reports on, for instance, the 
testing of thermal relays, the implementation of 
preparations during operation, the methods used 
to ensure monitoring of statutory electrical engi­
neering requirements, the management of minor 
additional modifications and the utilisation of elec­
trical engineering operating experience.
The I&C inspection focused on the maintenance 
of measuring accuracy, the I&C design and imple­
mentation process, the management of ageing and 
qualifications, the management of non­conform­
ances, configuration management, communications 
and products that do not comply with their speci­
fications, such as micro cartridge fuses. Room for 
improvement was observed in the management of 
measuring accuracy: areas requiring improvement 
include the traceability of accuracy requirements, 
the process used to ensure that all issues influ­
encing measurements are taken into account and 
specific calibration procedures. TVO will continue 
developing the I&C design and implementation 
process to comply with the standards. TVO must 
draft a report on the instrumentation required 
when managing accidents to indicate how the in­
strumentation will be qualified for accidents. Room 
for improvement in the verification of modification 
documentation and configuration management 
were observed during the inspection. Identified 
development needs include improving communi­
cations during projects. Furthermore, the power 
company must submit a report on identification of 
products that do not comply with their markings.
C4 Mechanical engineering, 
14–15 October 2013
The mechanical engineering inspection focused on 
actions of the operation and maintenance organisa­
tion that verify the reliability of pumps, compres­
sors and fans important to safety, as well as their 
motors. A special focus area was the processing 
of non­conformances. Other focus areas included 
leaks in the reactor’s service water system’s pres­
sure measuring nozzles and a test of a reactor cool­
ant pump during the annual outage to study the 
impact of a planned modification on the pump’s vi­
bration. STUK noted that availability of competent 
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personnel onsite has been verified to a sufficient 
extent even though several people in charge of the 
operation and maintenance of pumps, compressors 
and fans have been replaced. Furthermore, STUK 
noted that the non­conformance processing system 
in the licensee’s operating and maintenance organ­
isation is fine. STUK required from the power com­
pany a report on loose screws in rotating parts that 
have led to harmful vibration at the plant. STUK 
found room for improvement in the maintenance 
intervals of safety­classified valves and the inspec­
tions and tests used to verify operability of valves.
C5 Structures and buildings, 
9–10 October 2013
In the structural engineering inspection at the 
Olkiluoto power plant, STUK assessed the main­
tenance procedures of structures, buildings as well 
as seawater channels and tunnels. The scope of the 
inspection included the organisation of the pow­
er company, inspection procedures issued by the 
power company, inservice inspections by the power 
company, repairs and modifications, supplementa­
ry construction works onsite and other inspections 
within the area of responsibility. Furthermore, 
STUK verified the execution and results of the 
power company’s own inspections. Issues that re­
quire further monitoring observed by STUK in­
clude the recording of requirements, the number­
ing of procedures and the need to update modifica­
tion work procedures.
C6 Information security, 1–2 October 2013
STUK’s information security inspection focused on 
the technical and administrative information se­
curity of Olkiluoto 1 and Olkiluoto 2, as well as 
the preparations made by TVO for future commis­
sioning of Olkiluoto 3. Focus areas of the inspec­
tion included the information security organisation 
and its operations, assessment and management of 
risks, the management of targets to be secured, in­
formation security of technical tools used to moni­
tor safety, as well as the information security train­
ing programme and its implementation.
C7 Chemistry, 14–15 November 2013
In the inspection of chemistry, STUK assessed the 
power company’s procedures applied to the main­
tenance and supervision of the chemical condi­
tions in systems important to safety, as well as the 
monitoring of the radionuclide content of the reac­
tor coolant system. Focus areas in 2013 included 
release measuring at Olkiluoto 1 and Olkiluoto 
2, quality management in the laboratory, chemi­
cal conditions, migration of activity and the labo­
ratory’s emergency preparedness actions. STUK 
found room for improvement in the power plant’s 
procedures on sampling in the measuring system 
of releases into the sea. The action limits have 
not been exceeded in any measurements important 
to safety. The laboratory of the operating plant 
units has systematically practiced its emergency 
preparedness actions. All of the laboratory person­
nel working in the controlled area participated in 
training	 on	 sampling.	 The	 following	 training/de­
velopment needs were identified in the laboratory: 
increasing the amount of training on radiometers, 
improving awareness of the access routes in case 
of an accident and minimising contamination at 
the laboratory during sampling. An issue requiring 
special attention detected by STUK is the planning 
of sample pickup routes in case of an emergency.
C8 Annual outage, 12 May – 13 June 2013
During the annual outages of Olkiluoto 1 and 
Olkiluoto 2 from 12 May to 14 June 2013, STUK 
performed an inspection of the power plant’s opera­
tions used to maintain safety, as well as the opera­
tions used to manage and control operations during 
an annual outage. STUK studied TVO’s procedures 
in a total of thirteen sectors. The inspection scope 
included, for example, hot work sites, shoe bounda­
ries, refueling, physical protection, maintenance 
procedures and employee training. STUK made 
observations varying in importance during this in­
spection. Based on the inspection results, STUK 
required from TVO reports on coverage of the in­
service testing procedures for the I&C system and 
process measurements that are not included in the 
scope of regular calibration. Furthermore, STUK 
posed demands on updating the rod cluster control 
assembly condition monitoring programme and im­
proving the spark protection at one permanent hot 
work site.
Personal and plant protection
D1 Radiation protection, 18–19 April 2013
Special focus areas in the radiation protection in­
spection included operative radiation protection, 
158
STUK-B 176 Periodic insPection Programme of nPPs in 2013 APPENDIX 5
radiation protection procedures and the role of ra­
diation protection when processing work permits. 
Other issues studied included communications, the 
processing of non­conformances and the planning 
process of the most important work in terms of 
radiation safety to be completed during the 2013 
annual outage. TVO submitted to STUK a report 
on implementing dosimetry under various excep­
tional conditions where the dosimeters are una­
vailable. STUK required that the power company 
draft a technical procedure on the dosimetry ar­
rangements under exceptional conditions by the 
end of 2013. TVO must submit to STUK a sum­
mary of updates of the computer­based orientation 
training. Furthermore, the power company must 
submit to STUK a plan on studying neutron ra­
diation exposure of employees participating in the 
transport of spent nuclear fuel based on the most 
recent data. Olkiluoto power plant has an ALARA 
team consisting of experts in various fields of tech­
nology. The team regularly meets to discuss radia­
tion protection issues.  STUK noted based on the 
inspection that the ALARA programme has been 
developed and greatly expanded in the past few 
years, and other radiation protection procedures 
have also been developed.
D2 Fire protection, 17–18 September 2013
In a fire protection inspection carried out by STUK 
at Olkiluoto, the processing of previous issues was 
continued, TVO’s plans pertaining to the condition 
of the fire extinguishing and fire water system 
were assessed and functionality of TVO’s fire pro­
tection organisation was assessed. Based on the 
inspection results, STUK required that TVO verify 
the sufficiency of the fire brigade personnel by also 
taking into account the additional personnel re­
quired by Olkiluoto 3 and the Posiva repository. 
TVO will submit a report regarding the issue to 
STUK.
D3 Emergency preparedness, 3–4 June 2013
The inspection of emergency preparedness at the 
Olkiluoto power plant included all of the fields 
included in emergency preparedness. The inspec­
tion also included verifying the current status 
of emergency preparedness measures implement­
ed, based on requirements posed by STUK in its 
previous decisions. In the review of 2012, STUK 
required that the power company obtain more 
resources for drafting the emergency response 
plan. TVO responded to the demand by STUK 
by, for instance, revising its emergency prepared­
ness training organisation. However, the expected 
number of new resources was not gained. TVO has 
introduced satellite phones to be used as a back­
up communications connection with the authori­
ties. The system is regularly tested by opening a 
test connection to STUK. STUK requested from 
TVO further reports on the updated emergency 
response plan that the power company submitted 
to STUK for approval.
D4 Physical protection
The inspection of physical protection included 
TVO’s safety organisation at operating plants and 
plants under construction. Focus areas included 
training and drills on maintaining physical pro­
tection, status with the requirements posed in 
previous inspections, development measures and 
their status as well as the status of the physi­
cal protection at Olkiluoto 3 during construction. 
Discussions on events pertaining to physical pro­
tection and policies, practices and modifications 
pertaining to physical protection were conducted 
during the inspection. It was noted that training 
for the TVO safety organisation was realised as 
planned in 2013. No requirements were issued by 
STUK after the inspection.
Nuclear waste and its storage
E1 Operating waste, 30 
September – 1 October 2013
STUK inspected the processing and final dispos­
al of radioactive operating waste at the Olkiluoto 
power plant. Low­ and intermediate­level waste is 
generated during maintenance and repairs as well 
as during the treatment of circulating water. STUK 
assessed development since the last inspection and 
any important issues that have occurred since the 
last inspection. Focus areas included non­conform­
ances, HR planning, radioactive waste stored in the 
reactor building and the transport of waste. During 
the plant rounds, STUK studied the condition of 
facilities in which waste is processed and stored, 
radiation levels in these facilities, their classifica­
tion and their markings. No significant non­con­
formances or development needs were detected in 
the inspection.
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Special issues
F1 Expansion of spent nuclear fuel 
storage facility, 28–29 November 2013
In the inspection of the spent nuclear fuel storage 
facility (KPA storage facility) at Olkiluoto, STUK 
assessed the licensee’s procedures in commission­
ing of the expanded storage facility. The inspection 
aimed at assessing the commissioning organisa­
tion, its resources and its readiness for commis­
sioning. The inspection scope also included quality 
management procedures and documentation, and a 
visit to the spent nuclear fuel storage facility.
TVO has created a separate organisation for 
the commissioning of the expansion of the spent 
nuclear fuel storage facility. Based on an assess­
ment made after the inspection, STUK noted that 
TVO has sufficient personnel resources to com­
mission the expanded spent nuclear fuel storage 
facility.
It was also noted that TVO has utilised the ex­
periences gained during the readiness and com­
missioning inspections of the concrete structures 
manufactured during the Olkiluoto 3 project. 
Feedback issued by the steering group and com­
missioning team, as well as information obtained 
from non­conformance reports, have also been uti­
lised.  Utilisation of the experiences obtained from 
another plant unit was deemed a good practice.
The inspection scope also included quality as­
surance of the welding of pool lining plates, which 
was implemented in compliance with TVO’s pro­
cedures. The quality assurance procedures were 
apparently insufficient, however, because STUK 
observed non­conformances in the welding qual­
ity in its own inspections. STUK required that 
TVO submit to STUK for information a report on 
the reasons why the non­conformances were not 
detected in TVO’s own inspections prior to the com­
missioning inspection of the pool lining.
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Table 1. Inspections within construction inspection program in 2013.
Subject of inspection Inspection date
Main functions
Quality management – general procedures 26–27 March 2013
Project management and management of safety 22–23 May 2013
Quality management – quality management during commissioning and  
management of final documentation
20–21 November 2013
Work processes
Procedures during commissioning inspections of mechanical equipment 30–31 January 2013
Chemistry – flushing and preservation of turbine island systems 19–20 February 2013
Commissioning – TVO’s process for overseeing commissioning activities and 
for approval of test results
15–16 May 2013
I&C 17 September 2013
Electrical engineering 19–20 September 2013
Utilisation of PRA 27 November 2013
APPENDIX 6 Construction inspection 
programme of Olkiluoto 3 in 2013
The objective of the Olkiluoto 3 construction in­
spection programme is to verify that the operations 
required by the construction of the unit ensure a 
high quality implementation according to the ap­
proved plans and in compliance with official regu­
lations, without compromising the operating units 
within the site. The inspection programme assess­
es and oversees the licensee’s operations in con­
structing the unit, implementation of procedures in 
various technical areas, the licensee’s competence 
and use of expertise, the processing of safety is­
sues and the quality management and control. The 
inspection programme of Olkiluoto 3 was launched 
in 2005 when construction of the unit started. The 
number of annual inspections has varied between 
nine and fifteen.
In 2013, nine inspections included in the con­
struction inspection programme were carried out, 
four of which focused on  the main operations of 
the Olkiluoto 3 project, and ten on work processes 
(Table 1). Special focus areas of the inspections 
included quality management, I&C and electri­
cal engineering, commissioning procedures, TVO’s 
commissioning inspection procedures and prepara­
tion of TVO’s operating organisation for the future 
operation of the unit. Below is a brief description of 
the inspection findings for which STUK required 
improvements from TVO. On the whole, the inspec­
tions have led to the conclusion that the procedures 
and resources of TVO’s organisation are adequate.
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The quality management inspection included 
the status of requirements from previous quality 
management inspections and TVO’s procedures 
in assessing, approving and supervising suppliers. 
STUK stated in its 2012 inspection that TVO had 
developed the procedures based on an investiga­
tion of the procurement of emergency diesel gener­
ators and their auxiliary systems in 2011, but the 
results of the investigation had not been effectively 
utilised in developing the procedures and methods. 
STUK required a new assessment on the issue 
from TVO. During the inspection, TVO presented 
its systematic process of reviewing the investiga­
tion results to develop its operations. TVO’s new 
assessment on the measures taken based on the 
investigation results will be soon completed. STUK 
has required in its previous inspections that TVO 
revise its document management process so that 
no unfinished issues will be submitted to STUK 
for review, and the assessment on compliance 
with safety requirements made in connection with 
TVO’s own review will be clearly traceable. Since 
TVO had not revised its procedures, STUK re­
quired a written description of development meas­
ures. A new issue dealt within the inspection was 
TVO’s procedures when assessing, approving and 
supervising suppliers. The inspection results show 
that TVO has not specified detailed competence 
requirements for people assessing the acceptabil­
ity of subcontractors. Furthermore, TVO’s internal 
procedures do not include any principles based on 
the safety classification of the object to be used 
when making decisions on assessments. TVO must 
specify these parts of its procedures. Furthermore, 
in the assessment reports the assessment object 
and its scope must be determined in a more de­
tailed manner as required in TVO’s internal pro­
cedures.
The inspection on the management of the 
Olkiluoto 3 project and the management of safety 
focused on TVO’s project management’s actions 
related to the utilisation of experience from the 
construction, the identification and processing of 
safety issues, risk management, indicators and as­
sessing the functionality of safety culture reviews. 
In terms of the utilisation of experience from the 
construction, STUK required that TVO review the 
root causes of non­conformances in its annual anal­
ysis of non­conformances. The management of TVO 
must determine goals for the analysis and utilisa­
tion of construction experience, so that the lessons 
learned will be available not only to the Olkiluoto 3 
project but also to TVO’s other projects.
In the inspection on quality management dur­
ing commissioning and management of final docu­
mentation, STUK required that TVO specify how 
the graded approach will be applied to targeting 
supervision during commissioning. Furthermore, 
TVO must specify its plans on how the procedures 
for the Olkiluoto 3 project (TVO’s own procedures 
and the plant supplier’s procedures), as well as the 
procedures for TVO’s operating plant units, will be 
applied to Olkiluoto 3 after the loading of fuel.
In the inspection on procedures of commission­
ing inspections of mechanical equipment, TVO’s 
actions, supervision and control were assessed by 
interviewing people in charge of commissioning 
inspections and people who have participated in 
commissioning inspections, as well as by reviewing 
examples of completed commissioning inspections. 
In the inspection it was found that commissioning 
inspections in the turbine island prior to the start 
of the actual commissioning period are well under 
way, but schedules for the reactor island have not 
been specified yet because of the delayed construc­
tion schedules. No requirements were issued dur­
ing the inspection, and STUK noted that TVO is, as 
a general rule, well prepared for the commission­
ing inspections.
In the turbine island, STUK inspected chemical 
cleaning and preservation methods and procedures 
for process systems as well as documentation on 
completed actions. The inspection results show 
that TVO is not sufficiently familiar with the plant 
supplier’s flushing, cleaning and preservation pro­
cedures, and there was some discrepancy between 
the procedures. Based on the example studied it 
seemed that TVO had not participated in the deci­
sion­making process under exceptional situations 
where the procedures had to be interpreted. STUK 
required that TVO review said procedures with 
the people monitoring and controlling the flushing, 
cleaning and preservation, and that TVO correct 
the discrepancies in the procedures. Furthermore, 
TVO must participate in the decision­making in 
any exceptional situations pertaining to flushing, 
cleaning and preservation.
The inspection on commissioning focused on 
assessing the procedures related to performing the 
commissioning tests, as well as on the review and 
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approval of test results. Examples from already 
completed and currently ongoing test runs were 
used in the inspection. STUK did not find any 
faults with TVO’s procedures during the inspec­
tion. STUK requested that TVO submit to STUK 
for information a procedure on the handling of 
modifications onsite that was presented during the 
inspection.
The I&C inspection focused on supervision 
plans and procedures of the I&C unit of TVO’s 
Olkiluoto 3 project and how TVO is preparing for 
the I&C installation and commissioning stages. 
The general impression of TVO’s preparations was 
good and STUK did not impose any requirements 
during this inspection.
In the electrical engineering inspection, STUK 
assessed TVO’s non­conformance management pro­
cedures in the installation of electricity systems 
and equipment, the personnel resources available 
to TVO during the commissioning of electricity sys­
tems, and the management of the revisions of pro­
cedures and tests during the commissioning stage. 
During this inspection, TVO presented the current 
status of electrical cabling onsite. In connection 
with this inspection, STUK requested from TVO a 
report on how compliance with the requirements 
of the electric shielding and power distribution of 
‘parallel cabling’ can be proven. The term ‘parallel 
cabling’ refers to power being supplied to one elec­
tric consumer with more than one cable.
In the inspection on the utilisation of the proba­
bilistic risk analysis (PRA), TVO’s procedures in 
reviewing and utilising the PRA and monitoring 
work on the PRA during plant design, construction 
and commissioning were evaluated. During this 
inspection, TVO presented the current status of 
the PRA models and their delivery schedule, the 
available resources and the actions TVO has taken 
to verify correctness of the PRA. The inspection 
team studied the interface between the PRA and 
configuration/change	management.	STUK	did	not	
pose any requirements in this inspection.
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APPENDIX 6 Periodic insPection Programme during construction of olkiluoto 3 in 2012
Subject of inspection Time of inspection
Management system
ONP-A1 Management system –
Planning and management
ONP-B1 Project management and control –
ONP-B2 Safety management –
ONP-B3 Project quality management –
ONP-B4 Planning and management of the research and monitoring 
programme
–
ONP-B5 Design of Onkalo –
Implementation
ONP-C1 Site inspection and monitoring procedures 5-6 June 2013
ONP-C2 Drilling and modelling –*
ONP-C3 Foreign substances 4-5 December 2013
ONP-C4 Excavation and EDZ –
ONP-C5 Onkalo in-flows 6 -7 November 2013
ONP-C6 Monitoring and research methods –
”–”  denotes that the inpection being not carried out in 2013, as planned in ONP programme
”–*”  denotes the inspection being not carried out in 2013, but postponed to the inspection programme for  
 Posiva's construction licence application period in 2014.
APPENDIX 7 Inspection programme during 
the construction phase of Onkalo in 2013
The objective of the construction­time inspection 
programme is to verify that high­quality imple­
mentation of approved plans is ensured in the con­
struction of the underground research facility, with 
compliance with official regulations and without 
jeopardizing safe final disposal. The inspection pro­
gramme includes assessment and monitoring of 
Posiva’s operations in building Onkalo, the pro­
cedures applied to various parts of the construc­
tion work, the management of Onkalo research 
and monitoring, the management of safety and the 
quality assurance of the implementation. STUK 
prepares annual plans for Onkalo inspections.
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APPENDIX 8 Inspection programme for Posiva’s 
construction licence application period
In early 2013, STUK launched an inspection pro­
gramme for Posiva’s construction licence applica­
tion period. The goal of the programme is to assess 
Posiva’s procedures to ensure the construction of 
a safe encapsulation facility and a repository that 
is of a high quality. Some of the reviews and in­
spections included in the programme also involve 
Posiva’s suppliers whose actions are significant in 
terms of nuclear safety and radiation safety. The 
goal with these reviews and inspections is to as­
sess the supervision and control measures Posiva 
uses for its suppliers and the functionality and ef­
fectiveness of related procedures. STUK submitted 
the requirements on supplier reviews to Posiva, 
and Posiva is obligated to complete the corrective 
measures required. STUK  drafted and submited 
to Posiva a bi­annual inspection plan.
In 2013, the inspection plan consisted of eight 
inspections and reviews, of which six involved the 
Posiva organisation and two involved Posiva’s sup­
pliers. Below are brief descriptions of the inspec­
tions and reviews, as well as the key observations 
made based on which STUK had required improve­
ments from Posiva. STUK stated in its summary 
of the results that Posiva must further develop 
its activities and processes on implementing the 
construction project. The management system and 
the functions described do not yet fully comply 
with STUK’s requirements. STUK will complete 
a comprehensive assessment of the current status 
in 2014 when processing the construction licence 
application.
Inspection programme for Posiva's construction licence application period in 2013.
Subject of inspection Time of inspection
Quality assurance 26-27 February 2013
Inspections of Posiva's suppliers (Rock engineering design organization ) 14 March 2013
Inspections of Posiva's suppliers (Rock engineering design organization) 25 March 2013
Management of requirements 11-12 June 2013
Research activities 11 September 2013
Preparation for construction stage 3-4 October 2013
Selecting and supervising suppliers 17-18 September 2013
Management of research and development (R&D) plans 11-12 November 2013
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Quality assurance
In this inspection, STUK assessed the quality 
assurance of Posiva’s nuclear waste facility con­
struction project. The assessment covered quality 
assurance during the preparation stage and the 
planning of quality assurance during construction. 
After theinspection, STUK required that Posiva 
specify and document the procedures it will use 
to verify that all issues important to nuclear and 
radiation safety will be processed at the predeter­
mined organisational levels and, if the safety sig­
nificance warrants it, also by the management of 
the licensee’s project organisation. The inspection 
also covered the activities of Posiva’s safety team. 
The team controls and supervises the company’s 
activities pertaining to the quality targets and is­
sues statements on these issues to the company. 
STUK required that Posiva ensure that the role of 
the quality target controller and supervisor issued 
to the safety team will be realised during the con­
struction project and the construction project prep­
aration stage. Furthermore, STUK required that 
Posiva implement a systematic communications 
method for important management system modi­
fications, as well as their implementation among 
its own personnel and, to the extent necessary, also 
among Posiva’s suppliers working at the plant site.
Inspections of Posiva’s suppliers
STUK focused on two suppliers who provide Posiva 
with research activities. The goal with these in­
sepctions was to assess the suppliers’ operations in 
general and verify their performance with the help 
of already completed studies ordered by Posiva. 
The inspection also focused on verifying Posiva’s 
supplier control and supervision procedures. After 
theinspection, STUK required that Posiva arrange 
safety culture training also for its key suppliers, 
who are important to long­term safety of the nu­
clear fuel repository. Furthermore, STUK required 
that Posiva verify that these suppliers in particu­
lar are familiar with the requirements of STUK’s 
YVL	Guides	to	the	extent	they	are	related	to	their	
assignments. In terms of the implementation of re­
search activities, STUK required that Posiva par­
ticipate in all reviews important to safety.
Management of requirements
In Posiva’s requirement managementinspection, 
STUK focused on the current status of Posiva’s 
requirement management procedures to be used 
in the construction project in particular. The as­
sessment focused on compliance with the require­
ments	of	STUK’s	YVL	Guides	 in	the	requirement	
management procedures and realisation of re­
quirement management in project management 
and the organisation. After this inspection, STUK 
required that Posiva ensure, when developing the 
requirement specifications, that the management 
procedures will ensure traceability and consistency 
of the requirements posed. Furthermore, STUK 
required that Posiva ensure that the requirements 
for specifying and managing requirements laid 
down	in	STUK’s	YVL	Guides	will	be	met	with	the	
requirement management procedures Posiva plans 
to use.
Research activities
The quality assurance inspection on research ac­
tivities covered Posiva’s internal and external re­
search activities. The inspection assessed several 
issues linked to research activities: the Posiva 
organisation in charge of research activities, as 
well as updated management system procedures 
pertaining to research activities. Reviewed issues 
included Posiva’s procedures used when super­
vising the suppliers from whom it orders stud­
ies and Posiva’s research supervision development 
projects. One of the key issues in this inspection 
was quality assurance for research reports. After 
theinspection, STUK issued several observations 
that Posiva can use as an aid when developing its 
operations. Issues that require special attention 
include the roles of supporting teams working at 
the R&D unit (their roles should be specified in 
the management system manual) and the need to 
make the management process of the R&D unit’s 
personnel resources more systematic. Based on ob­
servation about Posiva’s auditing activities, STUK 
recommended that Posiva standardise its criteria 
for development proposals on internal audits.
Preparation for construction stage
In 2013, Posiva continued its preparations for the 
construction stage of the project. STUK’s inspec­
tion focused on Posiva’s processes, procedures and 
methods pertaining to the construction of the en­
capsulation facility and repository. The inspection 
assessed the construction project as a whole and 
the subprojects for construction of the encapsula­
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tion facility and repository.
After theinspection, STUK required that Posiva 
pay attention to standardising and reconciling the 
planning of subprojects in so far as the subprojects 
could influence the management of safety and 
quality. Furthermore, STUK required that Posiva 
verify that the implementation process for the en­
capsulation facility and repository will have access 
to a detailed action plan and schedule drafted by 
the solution management process of the encapsu­
lation facility and repository. After the inspection, 
STUK required that Posiva prepare a task­specific 
training plan, including all the people who will be 
involved in duties important to safety during the 
project,	 in	 compliance	 with	 STUK’s	 YVL	 Guide	
requirements.
As a conclusion of theinspection, STUK stated 
that it was unable to verify whether Posiva’s pro­
ject planning and management is at a stage where 
it is ready to start construction of the encapsula­
tion facility and repository. STUK will assess the 
construction readiness in a further inspection on 
the preparation for construction by 30 June 2014.
Selecting and supervising suppliers
In	 2012,	 Posiva	 noted	 in	 a	 comparison	 of	 YVL	
Guides in connection with its construction licence 
application that Posiva’s procedures for selecting 
and supervising suppliers need to be developed 
so	 that	 they	will	 comply	with	 STUK’s	 draft	YVL	
Guides	YVL	A.3	 and	YVL	A.5.	The	 status	 of	 this	
development work was assessed in a inspection of 
supplier selection and supervision. The key obser­
vation made was that Posiva’s development work 
is still unfinished. During theinspection, Posiva 
stated that it will continue the development of its 
procedures and assess the progress of the develop­
ment work by comparing it with the requirements 
of	the	new	YVL	Guides	to	be	published	at	the	end	
of the year. STUK will review Posiva’s procedures 
and their compliance with the requirements again 
in early 2014. STUK also reminded Posiva of an 
issue that requires specific attention regarding the 
approval of suppliers. In Posiva’s procedure, the 
approval of suppliers is processed by means of both 
auditing reports and supplier assessment reports. 
STUK is of the opinion that the procedure should 
be clarified by clearly specifying a process stage at 
which an approval will be reached.
Management of research and 
development (R&D) plans
In the inspection of the management of R&D plans, 
STUK focused on assessing Posiva’s procedures in 
the management of R&D. The inspection focused 
on	 compliance	 with	 STUK’s	 YVL	 Guides	 in	 the	
management of R&D at the organisational level 
and at the project level. Furthermore, procedures 
used by Posiva when creating R&D programmes 
and plans as well as procedures used by Posiva to 
monitor their progress were reviewed. The inspec­
tion studied R&D based on the needs of the con­
struction project and the licensing process. After 
theinspection, STUK required that Posiva develop 
procedures that will ensure that Posiva submits 
regular reports to STUK on any changes in con­
struction and R&D to make sure that STUK will 
be able to comment any changes made in the plans 
and their safety significance in due time. Posiva 
is also required to verify competence of people in 
duties important to safety in its own organisation. 
After the review, STUK issued several observa­
tions that Posiva can use as an aid when develop­
ing its operations. These included development of 
the R&D risk management process to cover the 
impact of the realisation of risks in a single project 
on the implementation and schedules of other pro­
jects. Posiva should also assess the need to develop 
the version management of plans,  particularly in 
the case of long and complex projects.
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APPENDIX 9 Nuclear materials in 
Finland on December 31.12.2013
Location
Natural uranium 
kg
Enriched uranium 
kg
Depleted 
uranium kg
Plutonium 
kg
Torium 
kg
Loviisa plant – 635 920 – 5 752 –
Olkiluoto plant – 1 563 865 – 11 313 –
VTT / FiR 1  
research reactor
1 511 60 ~0 ~0 ~0
Other facililties 5 384 < 1 1 568 ~0 ~3,5
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APPENDIX 10 Assignments funded by STUK in 2013
Safety of nuclear power plants
Most of the assignments in the 2013 plan for tech­
nical support assignments were inspection and as­
sessment tasks regarding the regulatory oversight 
of Olkiluoto 3 as part of STUK’s decision­making. 
Due to the delays in the Olkiluoto 3 construction 
project, some of the assignments proposed for 2013 
were postponed until 2014.
Of the assignment proposals for 2013, 27 were 
related to the regulatory oversight of the con­
struction of Olkiluoto 3, eleven to the operating 
Olkiluoto plant units and two to new nuclear 
power plant projects.
In 2013, the total costs of the technical support 
assignments amounted to around EUR 885,000. 
The most important assignments pertaining to the 
construction of Olkiluoto 3 that were completed 
during the year were:
•	 Analyses	for	verifying	emergency	operating	pro­
cedures
•	 Comparison	 analyses	 using	 the	 model	 TRAB-
3D/SMABRE	for	EPR	plants
•	 Comparison	calculations	on	the	population	ra­
diation doses given in the final safety analysis 
report
•	 Safety	culture	follow-up	study.
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Safety of the final disposal of nuclear waste
Regulatory oversight of nuclear fuel by the 
Radiation and Nuclear Safety Authority involves 
the research, development and design of the pro­
ject on a repository for spent nuclear fuel, con­
struction of waste facilities and waste manage­
ment at the nuclear power plants. As an aid for its 
decision­making and regulatory oversight, STUK 
uses external experts and projects on special is­
sues. In 2013, the technical support programme 
for the oversight of nuclear waste management 
(VATU2013) included assignments to oversee the 
construction of the underground research facility 
(Onkalo) as well as assignments related to the 
preliminary review of the construction license for 
the repository built by Posiva. Separate framework 
agreements were signed by several external ex­
perts (13 agreements in total). In 2013, the total 
costs of the technical support assignments amount­
ed to around EUR 600,000. The assignments and 
framework agreements involved the following sub­
jects linked to the regulatory oversight of nuclear 
waste management:
•	 A	 consultant	 on	 rock	 construction	 to	 support	
the regulatory oversight of the construction of 
Posiva’s underground research facility and re­
pository
•	 A	safety	case
•	 Long-term	safety	analyses
•	 Technical	release	barriers
•	 Chemical	and	biological	properties	of	buffer	and	
backfilling materials
•	 Physical	 and	 mechanical	 properties	 of	 buffer	
and backfilling materials
•	 Design	and	mechanical	strength	of	shield	canis­
ters
•	 Properties	of	spent	nuclear	fuel
•	 THMC	 modelling	 for	 the	 buffer	 material	 and	
evolution in the adjacent area
•	 Repository,	natural	release	barriers
•	 Hydrogeology
•	 Hydrogeochemistry,	 geochemistry,	 paleohydro­
geochemistry
•	 Rock	mechanics
•	 Biosphere
•	 Structural	geology
•	 Seismology
•	 Glacial	earthquakes
•	 Quality	management
•	 Assessment	of	Posiva’s	scenario	process
•	 Assessment	of	Posiva’s	expert elicitation process
•	 Assessment	 of	 interaction	 between	 water	 and	
rock material, as well as drift properties of the 
bedrock
•	 Further	development	of	impact	matrix	analysis	
tool
•	 State-of-the-art	assessment	on	corroding	of	cop­
per in clean, oxygen­free water
•	 Characterisation	of	the	buffer	and	tunnel	filling	
materials
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ITDB
Illicit Trafficking Data Base, an IAEA database 
to which member states deliver data on de­
viations observed as regards nuclear substances 
and radiation sources.
KYT
Finnish nuclear waste management research 
programme
LARA
I&C renewal project at the Loviisa power plant
MDEP, Multinational Design Evaluation 
Programme
A multinational cooperation programme evalu­
ating the practices and requirements of au­
thorities related to the licensing of new nuclear 
power plants
NKS (Nordisk kärnsäkerhetsforskning)
Nordic safety research programme
OECD/NEA
Nuclear Energy Agency of the Organisation for 
Economic Co­operation and Development
OLC
Operational Limits and Conditions (previously 
Technical Specifications)
Onkalo
underground research facility for the final dis­
posal of spent nuclear fue
PRA, Probabilistic Risk Analysis 
APPENDIX 11 Glossary and abbreviations
ALARA (as low as reasonably achievable)
radiation protection optimisation principle, ac­
cording to which exposure must be limited to 
being as low as reasonably achievable
BWR
boiling water reactor
CBRN (chemical, biological, radiological and 
nuclear)
chemical, biological, radioactive and nuclear 
weapons or hazards, for example: ”protective 
measures taken against CBRN weapons or 
hazards”
Euratom
for nuclear material safeguards, Euratom refers 
to the European Commission units responsible 
for nuclear material safeguards: Directorate 
General for Energy and Transport, Directorates 
H and I
FSAR
Final Safety Analysis Report
IAEA
International Atomic Energy Agency
INSAG
International Nuclear Safety Group; organisa­
tion called by the Director General of IAEA
IRS
International Reporting System for Operating 
Experience operated jointly by the IAEA and 
OECD/NEA
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PWR, pressurised water reactor
SAFIR, Safety of nuclear power plants
Finnish publicly funded national nuclear power 
plant research programme
SAGSI, Standing Advisory Group on 
Safeguards Implementation; 
an international team of nuclear material safe­
guard experts called by the Director General of 
the IAEA
WANO, World Association of Nuclear 
Operators
WENRA, Western European Nuclear 
Regulators’ Association
VVER (Vodo-Vodyanoi Energetichesky 
Reactor)
Russian pressurised water reactor; Loviisa 1 
and Loviisa 2 are VVER­440 reactors
nuclear material 
special fissionable material suitable for the 
creation of nuclear energy, such as uranium, 
thorium or plutonium
nuclear commodity (or: nuclear material)
nuclear material referred to above or another 
material referred to in Section 2, Paragraphs 4 
and 5 of the Finnish Nuclear Energy Act (deu­
terium or graphite), device, system and infor­
mation (Section 1, paragraph 8 of the Nuclear 
Energy Decree). 
nuclear material accounting and control 
manual
manual to be used by an organisation in pos­
session of nuclear commodities, describing the 
nuclear commodity safeguards and accounting 
system
nuclear non-proliferation manual
manual to be used by a future possessor of nu­
clear commodities, describing the measures to 
secure the requirements of nuclear safeguards
regulatory control of nuclear non-
proliferation
monitoring operations to prevent the prolifera­
tion of nuclear weapons; operations consist of 
nuclear safeguards and the monitoring of the 
nuclear test ban
EIA procedure
Enviromental Safety Assessment
YVL Guides
STUK guides containing detailed requirements 
set for the safety of nuclear power plants. A 
comprehensive	 reform	 of	 the	YVL	 guides	 was	
practically completed at the end of 2013 when 
40 guides came into force on 1.12.2013 and will 
be applied as such to  new nuclear facilities.
172
STUK-B 176
